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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual,
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah
corporation, and PHILLIPS
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., a
Utah corporation,
Case No. 20060856-SC
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
\7C

Vo.

B. BRETT BEZZANT, an individual,
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation,
Defendants/Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
JURISDICTION
Appellants, WILLIAM T. JACOB, COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., and
PHILLIPS MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., appeal from the district court's
grant of the Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Summary
Judgment, motions for attorney fees and related motion to strike portions of affidavits;
and from the denial of Plaintiffs' motion to reconsider. This Court has appellate
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION
ISSUE 1: Did the district court err in concluding that Defendants' internet
posting, mailing and hand-delivering an "Urgent Election Notice" to the homes of
American Fork City citizens, for the purpose of preserving a business relationship and

friendship, occurred in the "process of government" as defined by Utah Code Ann. §7858-101, etseq ("the Act" or "the anti-SLAPP1 Act")?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This is a question of statutory interpretation that is
reviewed for correctness, "granting no deference to the district court's decision." Carter
v. Univ. of Utah Med. Or., 2006 UT 78, «(j8.
PRESERVATION: This issue was preserved in Plaintiffs' MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS BRETT BEZZANT AND NEWTAH, INC.'S MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND/OR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ("JP

Oppos.") (R1648) and Plaintiffs' MOTION TO RECONSIDER COURT'S RULINGS ON
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND/OR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIM MOTION TO RECONSIDER ("Motion to

Reconsider") R2603.
ISSUE 2: Did the district court err in awarding Defendants' their attorneys fees
under the Act and under 42 U.S.C. §1983, concluding that the action "was commenced or
continued without a substantial basis in fact and law and could not be supported by a
substantial argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law"; and
were Plaintiffs denied due process of law when the district court concluded affidavits
submitted on this issue were inadmissible, and thereby refused to allow Plaintiffs to
present evidence of a substantial basis in fact and law and their good faith in filing the
lawsuit?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue involves questions of law and questions
1

SLAPP is an acronym for "Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation."
2

of fact. Questions of law and statutory interpretation are reviewed for correctness,
"granting no deference to the district court's decision." Carter v. Univ. of Utah Med.
Ctr., 2006 UT 78, ^[8. Because the factual determinations were made pursuant to a
judgment on the pleadings, this Court must accept Plaintiffs' factual allegations and all
reasonable inferences therefrom as true and in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs. In re
Estate of West, 948 P.2d 351, 353 (Utah 1997). Whether evidence is admissible is a
question of law that can be reviewed for abuse of discretion or for correctness,
"incorporating a clearly erroneous standard of review for subsidiary factual
determinations." D.A. v. State (In the Interest ofW.A.), 63 P.3d 607, 611 (Utah 2002)
(citations and quotations omitted).
PRESERVATION: The issue of attorney fees was heavily litigated and thus
preserved in several of the pleadings below. See, e.g., R2161, 2167, 2463.
ISSUE 3: Did the district court err in granting Defendants' motion for judgment
on the pleadings and/or summary judgment, and thereby concluding that the statements at
issue are not defamatory per se and that Plaintiffs' claims for defamation and false light
lack merit?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "[F]or purposes of appellate review, the standard for
reviewing a summary judgment or a judgment on the pleadings is the same, since
motions for either kind of judgment can be granted only as a matter of law. ... [A] court
must accept the material allegations of the [nonmoving party's pleadings] as true, ... and
the trial court's ruling should be affirmed only if it clearly appears that [the nonmoving
party] can prove no set of facts in support of his claim. Similarly, reviewing a grant of

3

summary judgment under rule 56, an appellate court may reverse the trial court only if
'there is no genuine issue of material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.' Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)." In re Estate of West, 948 P.2d 351,
353 (Utah 1997). "[W]hen an appellate court reviews a district court's grant of summary
judgment, the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are viewed in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, while the district court's legal conclusions and
ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment are reviewed for correctness." Massey v.
Griffiths, 2007 UT 10, ^8 (some citations and quotations omitted). Whether a statement
is defamatory is a question of law that is also reviewed for correctness. West v. Thomson
Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1008 (Utah 1994).
PRESERVATION: This issue was preserved in Plaintiffs' JP Oppos. R1648.
ISSUE 4: Is the anti-SLAPP Act unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this
case under the Open Courts provision of the Utah Constitution?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Whether a statute is constitutional as applied to the
facts of a specific case is a question of law. Grand County v. Emery County, 52 P.3d
1148, 1151 (Utah 2002). A statute is presumed constitutional such that any reasonable
doubts are resolved in favor of its constitutionality. Id.
PRESERVATION: Plaintiffs raise this state constitutional law claim for the first
time on appeal under the interests of justice and the exceptional circumstances doctrine.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

4

Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on October 26, 2000. R6. The parties stipulated to
Plaintiffs filing an Amended Complaint (R280) on June 10, 2002. R293. The Amended
Complaint named current Defendants as well as American Fork City and various
individuals who were mostly public officials in that municipality. R280. Plaintiffs'
claims included several violations of 42 U.S.C. §1983, defamation, and false light. Id.
In Defendants' Answer and Counterclaim (R385) filed July 18, 2002, they raised
their claims and defenses under Utah Code Ann. §78-58-101, etseq. (2001), also known
as the Citizen Participation in Government Act or anti-SLAPP Act (Addendum A),
which was enacted in April 2001, six months after the action was commenced.
Defendants then filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Summary Judgment
on July 31, 2002, arguing that Plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed under the antiSLAPP Act and generally that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for defamation or false
light. R426. Under the provisions of the anti-SLAPP Act, Defendants' Motion was
treated as one for judgment on the pleadings and resulted in a mandatory stay on
discovery. Utah Code Ann. § 78-58-104.
In the meantime, the matter was removed to federal court on August 19, 2002,
then returned to the state district court in or about August 2003. R523, 531, 996.
Notwithstanding the federal court's refusal to award Defendants attorney fees based on
its finding that Plaintiffs' acted in good faith (R1086), Defendants relitigated the issue in
the district court and won. R1903.
On April 2, 2004, the district court issued its Ruling on Defendants' Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Motion for Summary Judgment (R1825, 1855;

5

Addendum B), wherein it concluded that Plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed under
the anti-SLAPP Act, After the matter was heavily litigated over a period of several
months, the court concluded that Plaintiffs' claims lacked any merit and awarded
Defendants attorney fees and costs under the statute, which fees exceeded $200,000.
R1897, 1900, 1903, 2637, 2833, 2987, 2992, 3000, 3038, 3045; Addendum C.
On October 7, 2005, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Reconsider Court's Rulings on
Summary Judgment and/or Judgment on the Pleadings, wherein Plaintiffs pointed out that
Defendants' defamatory statements did not occur "in the process of government" as
defined by the Act. R2603, 2630. The district court denied this motion on January 12,
2006. R2828. Via stipulation, all orders and judgments were adjudged final under Rule
54(b) on August 23, 2006 (R3058) and Plaintiffs timely filed a Notice of Appeal on
September 13, 2006. R3068.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Introduction
This case is about a private citizen, William T. (Bill) Jacob, who was publicly
ridiculed and falsely accused of lying and negative campaigning. When Jacob sought
redress of his grievances in good faith, he was not only denied access to the courts, but he
was severely sanctioned just for seeking a judicial remedy that has existed at common
law even prior to statehood.
To summarize the material facts that are provided in greater detail below, in the
context of a pending municipal election, an American Fork City newspaper published a
flyer containing false statements about Jacob, a private individual. Jacob sued for
6

defamation and the newspaper counterclaimed under the recently enacted anti-SLAPP
Act, claiming that the purpose of the lawsuit was to punish the newspaper for exercising
its First Amendment rights. After substantial analysis of conflicting legal authority, the
district court dismissed Jacob's claims and ordered him to pay over $200,000 in attorney
fees and costs. The district court never found that Jacob's claims were frivolous. Rather,
it concluded that the statements in the newspaper flyer were not defamatory.
While the facts in this case are construed in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs
{see, Issues and Standards of Review, supra), the issues involve primarily questions of
law. Because Plaintiffs' claims were dismissed under the recently enacted anti-SLAPP
Act, some are also important questions of statutory interpretation and thus questions of
first impression.
Relevant Facts
Plaintiff, William T. (Bill) Jacob ("Jacob") is a private person and business owner
in American Fork City ("AFC"), Utah, whose reputation for integrity, honesty, and sound
judgment is essential to the success of his business. R280:5. Jacob is a shareholder and
Chief Operating Officer of Plaintiffs Commercial Properties, Inc. ("CPI") and Phillips
Manufacturing Company, Inc. ("PMC"). Id. (Plaintiffs will be collectively referred to
herein either as "Plaintiffs" or "Jacob").
In 1993, Jacob established a confidential relationship with Newtah, the owner of
the American Fork newspaper, Citizen New Utah, and Brett Bezzant, Newtah's publisher,
whereby Jacob agreed to provide information about current events of interest to AFC
citizens in exchange for Defendants protecting Jacob's anonymity. Id. at 11; R1528
7

(Defendants who are parties to this appeal will be collectively referred to herein either as
"Defendants" or "Bezzant"). This agreement was reaffirmed in 1997 when Bezzant
agreed not to reveal Jacob as the source of such information. Id. at 12.
In 1997, Jacob learned that AFC public officials were conducting closed meetings
in violation of the Open Meetings Law, during which they covertly planned the purchase
and development of land contrary to an already existing Strategic Plan that had been
publicly discussed and adopted five years prior in 1992. R280:12-13, 20. When Jacob
attempted to express his concerns as a private citizen about the closed meetings during a
1997 city council meeting, a city employee told him to "shut up, sit down, and quit
talking." Id. at 19. Subsequently during a press conference held in July 1997, an AFC
public official falsely accused Jacob of "grilling" AFC council members without factual
basis. Id. at 21-2. Through a series of subsequent events involving threats, intimidation,
and confrontation perpetrated by AFC public officials, hostility toward and retaliation
against Jacob and other private citizens who questioned the propriety of public officials'
activities continued to escalate. Id. 19-25.
Because of increasing threats, intimidation, and the unlawful use of police force,
by the fall of 1997 Jacob and his wife feared for their safety such that, among other
things, they avoided traveling alone at night. R280:26-7; see also, R280:20-9. When
Jacob's wife expressed these fears during an October 1997 city council meeting, other
private citizens in attendance responded with an enthusiastic round of applause,
indicating that Jacob and his wife were not the only citizens who felt intimidated and
threatened. Id. at 28.
8

Notwithstanding these fears, Jacob continued his efforts to keep AFC citizens
informed. Id. at 28, 30-1, 33-7. In retaliation, in January 1998 the mayor of AFC
threatened Jacob that his or his daughter's home might be burglarized and a subsequent
police investigation might reveal something that Jacob wanted to "keep quiet,"
suggesting that illegal drugs, pornography, or other contraband would be planted. Id. at
30-1. In November 2000 and consistent with the constant harassment, Jacob received a
document via mail entitled, "Certificate of Upgrade to Complete Asshole" that was
signed by "Citizens Who Know." Id. at 35.
In 1992, AFC adopted Ordinance Nos. 92-05-20 and 92-05-21, which define
"exempt" AFC employees as all elected officials, all appointed officials, the City
Administrator, the Chief of Police, attorneys serving as legal counsel, consultants
rendering professional services, part-time employees working thirty hours per week or
less, and all volunteer personnel serving with or without pay. R280:10. Ordinance No.
92-05-21 prohibits any such exempt employee from seeking or holding public office in
AFC. M a t 11.
In 1999, Ricky Storrs and Tom Hunter announced their intent to seek public office
in AFC. R280:36. Jacob contends that both were exempt employees under the foregoing
city ordinances. Storrs worked part-time for AFC as an EMT, while Hunter was
employed as AFC's Employee Benefit Consultant. Id. Jacob was not the only concerned
private citizen. Hunter's and Storrs' apparent conflicts of interest were the topic of
articles published by The Deseret News and the Provo Daily Herald. Id. AFC citizens
also questioned Hunter directly about his conflict during a "Meet the Candidate Night" in
9

September 1999. Id. at 38.
To better inform the public about this issue and pursuant to the existing
confidentiality agreement between Bezzant and Jacob, on October 27, 1999, Bezzant
distributed an anonymous "Nonpartisan Citizens Group Information Bulletin" ("NPCG
Bulletin") (Addendum D; R2740) that questioned the propriety of Hunters' and Storrs'
seeking and holding public office in violation of AFC ordinances. R280:38-9. Bezzant
saw the NPCG Bulletin and knew of its content before it was distributed. R1528.
Bezzant also admits that he could have refused to distribute the NPCG Bulletin. R1527.
Immediately upon distribution of the NPCG Bulletin, Hunter contacted Bezzant
and threatened to sue him and Newtah, and to discontinue advertising in the Citizen
unless Bezzant published a retraction prepared by Hunter. Id. at 39-40. Contrary to their
existing confidentiality agreement, Bezzant disclosed Jacob's name to Hunter as the
person who paid for the distribution of the NPCG Bulletin. Id. Hunter then contacted
Jacob and threatened to sue him for defamation if he did not have Bezzant publish the
prepared retraction. Id. R1457 (December 9, 1999 Letter from Brett Bezzant to William
T. Jacob, Addendum G). Hunter's attorney reiterated these threats in a letter sent to
Jacob during this same time period. Id. at 40. Jacob ignored Hunter's threats because he
believed AFC citizens should be informed about the candidates and their conflicts of
interest.
However, Bezzant immediately published an "Urgent Election Notice" and
"Apology" ("Notice") (Addendum E; R2609-10) that disclosed Jacob's name ("William
T. (Bill) Jacob") and referred to the NPCG Bulletin as "Mr. Jacob's flyer," falsely
10

identified him as the author of the NPCG Bulletin, falsely accused him of feeding the
public false and misleading information, and described the Bulletin attributed to him as a
"classic" example of "negative campaigning intended to hurt one candidate in order to
favor another." Id. The Notice was published with the express approval of candidates
Hunter and Storrs. R1529-30 (Response to Requests for Admission Nos. 6, 7, 12, 13).
The Notice was mailed and hand delivered to the residents of American Fork, and
published on the Citizen World Wide website. Addendum B at 9. The content of the
Notice is as follows:
New Utah! Offers apology to Tom Hunter, Rick Storrs for campaign flyer

Urgent Election Notice
To: All American Fork Residents
From: Publisher Brett Bezzant, American Fork Citizen New Utah!
Correction and Apology to American Fork City Council Candidate Tom
Hunter
The Oct. 27 issue of the American Fork Citizen New Utah! and New Utah!
Shopper carried a political advertisement that ran as a preprinted flyer, paid and
produced by William T. (Bill) Jacob and others involved in a "Nonpartisan
Citizens Group."
In fairness to Mr. Hunter and his candidacy, New Utah! apologizes for distributing
this flyer without giving Mr. Hunter the opportunity to respond to what we believe
is false and misleading information regarding his service to American Fork City.
Mr. Hunter is not and never has been employed by American Fork City. Neither
has he received any employee compensation nor any other employee benefit from
American Fork City. However, Mr. Hunter does own Hunter & Associates
Insurance and his firm was selected in 1997 to act as an independent insurance
broker on the employee benefits package for American Fork City. His firm
provides this same kind of service for many other employers.

11

Since this client/agent relationship with American Fork City is a potential conflict
of interest, Mr. Hunter intends, if elected, to file a letter with the Mayor clearly
identifying the potential conflict and stating that he will abstain from voting on
any issue that involves his pre-existing interest in the employee benefits package.
Contrary to what Mr. Jacob's flyer implied, Mr. Hunter is, to the best of our
knowledge, a qualified and eligible city council candidate and his candidacy has
not, in any way, violated the policies or procedures of American Fork City.
We also apologize to City Councilman Rick Storrs
The same flyer also questioned the candidacy of Rick Storrs, citing a city
personnel ordinance that does not even apply to Mr. Storr's part-time volunteer
employment as a city EMT. The precedent for his eligibility as a city councilman
and as an incumbent candidate have been well established in at least two other
elections. We apologize to Mr. Storrs for distributing misleading information that
would bring his candidacy into question.
Comments on the flyer
Mr. Jacob's flyer is falsely labeled as a "nonpartisan" group. Since American
Fork no longer has political parties, there is no such thing as a "nonpartisan"
group. Unfortunately, this flyer is a classic example of negative campaigning
intended to hurt one candidate in order to favor another. We believe it hurts the
entire process. Again, we apologize to Candidates Hunter and Storrs for
distributing this misinformation.
After publication of the foregoing, AFC Mayor Ted Barratt publicly denounced
the authors of the NPCG Bulletin attributed to Jacob as "scum-feeders" and
"bottomfeeders." R280:40. Jacob commenced this lawsuit, the procedural history of
which is outlined in the Statement of the Case, supra.
Additional material facts will be cited herein as warranted.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to these facts. Bezzant's conduct did not
occur in the "process of government." Bezzant admits he published the Notice to
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preserve his friendship and business relationships with Hunter and Storrs and that he did
not intend to influence the decisions of the legislative and executive branches of
government, as required by the Act's plain language.
There is also no evidence, clear and convincing or otherwise, that Jacob's purpose
in filing the lawsuit in this case was motivated by bad faith or by a desire to chill
Bezzant's right to participate in the process of government.
The district court erred in awarding Bezzant attorney's fees based on its
conclusions that Jacob's claims lack legal and factual merit. The district court engaged in
a detailed legal analysis of seemingly conflicting authority when it evaluated Jacob's
claims, which fact standing alone demonstrates their merit. The district court also failed
to construe the facts in a light most favorable to Jacob and denied him due process of law
when it refused to permit Jacob to produce evidence of his good faith in bringing suit,
particularly when the basis for Bezzant's claim for attorney's fees was Jacob's purported
bad faith.
Bezzant is equitably estopped from seeking attorney fees because he was unable to
provide any response to Jacob's specific request for information relative to Bezzant's
defense that Jacob's claims were filed in bad faith. Moreover, because a federal court has
already denied Bezzant's request for attorney's fees based on a finding of good faith, the
law of the case doctrine precludes the district court's subsequent inconsistent order.
The district court erred in concluding that the statements at issue are not
defamatory and did not cast Jacob in a false light. Not only did Jacob establish a prima
facie case for defamation and false light, the court failed to construe the facts in a light
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most favorable to Jacob. Also, because the statements accused Jacob of deliberately
misleading the public in an effort to promote negative campaigning and identified him
contrary to his wishes while holding him out as an object of public contempt and ridicule,
the statements are defamatory per se.
Finally, application of the anti-SLAPP Act to these facts violates the Open Courts
provision of the Utah Constitution.
ARGUMENT
I. THE ANTI-SLAPP ACT DOES NOT APPLY TO THESE FACTS.
The district court found that Jacob's claims were filed "for the purpose of chilling
Bezzant's political speech and thereby preventing or interfering with Bezzant's proper
participation in the process of government. ... Jacob intended to use this litigation as a
means of punishing Bezzant for Bezzant's publication of the political speech contained in
the election notice." Addendum B at 14. These findings and conclusions are incorrect
for three reasons. First, Bezzant's publication was not a "proper participation in the
process of government" as defined by the Act. Second, there is no evidence that Jacob
filed his claims to chill Bezzant's "proper participating in the process of government."
Finally, the district court failed to construe the evidence in a light most favorable to
Jacob. Accordingly, the Act does not apply to these facts.2

2

Although the district court denied Jacob's Motion to Reconsider on the ground that the
motion was procedurally improper, the court still addressed the question of whether
Defendants' publication occurred in the process of government and found that it did.
R2828 (Addendum I). The district court's analysis is flawed. A motion to reconsider
should be considered and construed according to its substance. Bonneville Billing &
Collection v. Torres, 15 P.3d 112, 113 (Utah App. 2000). A court should carefully
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A. Defendants Were Not Participating in the Process of Government When
They Published the Notice.
The anti-SLAPP Act only applies to an action if its "primary purpose ... is to
prevent, interfere with, or chill the moving party's proper participation in the process of
government." Utah Code Ann. §78-58-104(2). Section 78-58-102(5) defines "process of
government" as "the means and mechanisms by which the legislative and executive
branches of government make decisions, and the activities leading up to the decisions,
including the exercise by a citizen of the right to influence those decisions under the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution." See Addendum A. Even if Defendants'
statements are "political speech" as the district court concluded they were (Addendum B
at 14), political speech has no nexus to the decision-making mechanisms of the legislative
and executive branches of government.
When construing statutes, this Court "assumes that each term included in the
[statute] was used advisedly." Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 104 P.3d 1208 (Utah 2004).
A court must look to a statute's plain language to determine the intent and purpose of the
legislature, and must not go beyond that plain language unless it is ambiguous. State v.
McKinnon, 2002 UT App 214, f6, 51 P.3d 729. This Court has already concluded that
there is no ambiguity in the limiting provisions of the anti-SLAPP Act. Anderson v.
Tobias, 116 P.3d 323, 336 (Utah 2005). The legislature's advised use of the plain

of such a motion and correct any errors raised therein. Gillmore v. Cummings, 806 P.2d
1205, 1208 (Utah App. 1991). The substance of Jacob's motion in this case raised errors
of law based on the court's incorrect application of the controlling statute. Therefore, the
district court erred in denying Jacob's motion to reconsider because it raised legal errors
of statutory interpretation that the district court should have corrected.
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language limiting the Act's application to the decision making mechanisms of the
legislative and executive branches of government was intended to limit the Act's scope
accordingly.
Thus the Act does not apply when, as here, a newspaper, in admitted response to
threats of a lawsuit and lost advertising, posts on its website and hand-delivers to citizens
an "Urgent Election Notice" and "apology." These facts evidence no intent to influence
the decisions of the legislative and executive branches of government. Notably, nor have
the Defendants so claimed.
Under the plain language of the Act, Bezzant's conduct is not protected.
B. The "Urgent Election Notice" Was Hand Delivered to and Intended for
the Citizens of American Fork and had No Nexus to the Decision
Making Mechanisms of Government.
Even the district court initially concluded that Bezzant's conduct did not qualify
for the Act's protection, if inadvertently. In its first ruling before the statutory definition
of "process of government" was raised, the district court found, "Bezzant's publication of
the election notice was primarily directed to the citizens of American Fork who had a
direct interest in the upcoming election." Addendum B at 16-17. There was no finding
that the Notice was intended to influence decisions of the legislative and executive
branches of government and there was not one iota of evidence to suggest otherwise.
Later when Jacob pointed out that such conduct was not directed to the decision
making mechanisms of any branch of government and thus the Act did not apply, the
district court created its own facts and found that Bezzant's Notice was directed "to those
in the city's executive and legislative positions who had the power to disqualify the
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candidates." R2545 at 5; Addendum F. There is no factual support for this
subsequently crafted finding. Moreover, the district court's inconsistent and creative
findings evidence its failure, indeed its refusal, to construe the facts in a light most
favorable to Jacob.
When evaluating Bezzant's true intent, nothing is as persuasive as his own
admissions. Defendants' Answer and Counterclaim admits the following:
Plaintiffs' lawsuit is without merit and is not brought or asserted in good faith, but
instead is a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) filed to chill
and discourage Defendants' publication of information and commentary on issues
of public interest relating to the American Fork City Council election, and in
particular, to punish Defendants for publishing information and commentary
critical of the Bulletin prepared by plaintiff. (Thirty-Second Defense).
16. The Editorial is personally addressed from Bezzant to "All American Fork
Residents.
17. The Editorial disputes the allegations contained in Jacob's Bulletin
concerning the eligibility of Hunter and Storrs to run for the American Fork
City Council and apologizes to readers for distributing the Bulletin without
giving the candidates an opportunity to respond before the election.
20. In distributing the Editorial at his own expense, it was Bezzant's intent to
publicly communicate the information he received from Hunter and Storrs
disputing the allegations made about them in the Bulletin; to disseminate such
information prior to the municipal election so that the residents of American
Fork City could be more fully informed on the matter before they cast their
votes; to comment upon the Bulletin and its effect on the political process; to
apologize for distributing the Bulletin without giving Hunter and Storrs an
opportunity to respond prior to the election; to participate in the process of
American fork City government by communicating to voters information and
commentary relevant to the municipal election; and to engage in activity that is
at the core of the First Amendment - political speech and commentary.
R385 (emphasis added).
A letter Bezzant wrote to Plaintiff Jacob is even more helpful:
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... in fairness to the two candidates mentioned in your advertisement, I corrected
what was lacking in your preprinted flyer ... I discussed with ... our managing
editor, the possibility of publishing some disclaimer in the newspaper. ...
Wednesday morning [October 27, 1999] I received an angry message from Tom
Hunter. He wanted to know who paid for the flyer and threatened to sue
whomever thait was as well as the newspaper. He also threatened to cancel his
business advertising with the newspaper. He was, understandably, upset...
In my conversation with Tom Hunter ... I ... offered to deliver my own response
prior to the election. I asked him to write down what he would like me to publish

In retrospect, my response was partly an emotional one. I was, in effect,
defending a friend whose character had been maligned. Tom Hunter is not only a
valued business client of the newspaper, he is also my insurance agent and friend.
R1457 (Addendum G).
The Notice was widely published via mailing, door-to-door delivery, and on a web
site that is accessible from anywhere in the world. No statements contained therein were
personally or generally directed to members of the executive or legislative branches of
government and, according to Bezzant's own admissions, the publications were not
intended to influence the decisions of those branches but were in defense of a friend. The
Notice was published to the citizens of AFC. Addendum E. Its title unambiguously and
publicly communicates an "apology" to Hunter and Storrs for the previous NPCG
Bulletin. Id. Bezzant's publications were designed to sooth the ruffled feathers of two
candidates who were in reality not qualified to run for public office and who wrote it or
approved of it prior to distribution. Rl 529-30.
Construing the facts in a light most favorable to Jacob, Bezzant was not
participating in the process of government when he publicly accused Jacob of distributing
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false and misleading information and of negative campaigning. Moreover, there is no
fact in this case to suggest that Bezzant's publications were intended to petition or to
otherwise influence the decisions of the executive or legislative branches. The district
court's conclusion that the anti-SLAPP Act applied to these facts is incorrect as a matter
of law.
C. Anti-SLAPP Statutes Are Wisely Limited to Protecting Citizens' Rights
to Petition Government.
While the foregoing demonstrates that Bezzant's Notice does not qualify for the
anti-SLAPP statute's protection, a comparison to similar legislation in other states sheds
additional light on the Act's purpose and legislative intent.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court preemptively recognized the problem with
overreaching and unconstitutional application of proposed anti-SLAPP legislation.
Accordingly, the court advised the New Hampshire legislature that such proposed
legislation would violate the state constitution. Opinion of the Justices, 138 N.H. 445,
641 A.2d 1012, 1994 N.H. LEXIS 50 (declining to address the constitutionality of the
proposed legislation under the federal constitution because the fact that the proposed bill
would deprive litigants of their state constitutional right to a jury trial in civil cases was
dispositive). See also, Avis v. Board of Review, 837 P.2d 584, 586 (Utah App. 1992)
("Utah's open courts provision guarantees a person access to the courts 'for an injury
done to him in his person, property or reputation.' Utah Const. Art. I, §11.")- With these
same concerns in mind, other states that have enacted anti-SLAPP legislation have been
careful to limit its application.
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In New York for example, anti-SLAPP legislation is limited to actions "brought
by a public applicant or permittee [or a developer], and is materially related to any efforts
of the defendant to report on, comment on, rule on, challenge or oppose such application
or permission." NY CLS Civ. R. §76-a (2005). See also, Long Island Ass 'n for Aids
Care v. Greene, 269 AD2d 430, 702 NYS2d 914 (2000) (holding anti-SLAPP did not
apply because claims asserted against defendant were not materially related to any efforts
by her to report on, comment on, challenge, or oppose application by plaintiff for permit,
license, or other authorization from public body); Guerrero v. Carva, 779 NYS2d 12
(App Div, 1st Dept, 2004) (explaining that anti-SLAPP did not apply where defamatory
flyer distributed by tenants regarding a landlord and developer did not relate to any
petition or other permit-related proceeding).
Strategic lawsuits against public participation, or SLAPPS, "are typically filed by
real estate developers against citizens' groups or individuals who have voiced their
opposition to a planned development." Scanlon v. McHugh, 4 Mass. L. Rep. 334, 1995
Mass. Super. LEXIS 228, n. 6 (noting that "right to petition" is defined by the Mass. Act
as "any written or oral statement made before or submitted to a legislative, executive, or
judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding; any written or oral statement made
in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or
judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding; any statement reasonably likely to
encourage consideration or review of an issue by a legislative, executive, or judicial body
or any other governmental proceeding; any statement reasonably likely to enlist public
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participation in an effort to effect such consideration; or any other statement falling
within constitutional protection of the right to petition government").
Because it includes rights to petition the judiciary, the Massachusetts act applies
more broadly than the Utah language limiting the "process of government" only to the
executive and legislative branches of government. A moving party in Massachusetts
must also establish that claims against him are based upon the exercise of his right to
petition "under the constitution of the United States or of the Commonwealth [of
Massachusetts]." Id. (holding that although the defendant's defamatory statements
constituted conduct under the anti-SLAPP statute because it did involve the right to
petition regarding a proposed real estate development, the plaintiff had made the requisite
showing that the statements were false and that he had suffered actual injury in the form
of mental suffering); See also, Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, 116 P.3d 323
(involving a developer suing private citizens for their opposition to development).
The language in Georgia's anti-SLAPP legislation is similarly restrictive. The
Georgia act applies only to "any written or oral statement, writing, or petition made
before or to a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official
proceeding authorized by law, or any written or oral statements, writing, or petition made
in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or
judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law." See, Georgia
Community Support & Solutions, Inc. v. Berryhill, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 840, n. 3 ("The
anti-SLAPP statute does not encompass all statements that touch upon matters of public
concern").
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Similar to the anti-SLAPP acts in New York, Massachusetts, and Georgia,3 the
Utah statute was crafted to apply to a narrow range of conduct: that occurring in the
process of government as defined by the Act. This limitation on the type of conduct
subject to an anti-SLAPP claim is well reasoned and specifically designed to create
statutory protection for private citizens against abusive lawsuits filed by large private
interests. See, Salvo v. Ottoway Newspapers, Inc., 1998 Mass. Super. LEXIS 724
(explaining that SLAPP suits are "generally meritless suits brought by large private

3

In contrast to New York, Georgia, Massachusetts, and Utah, California's antiSLAPP act is both drafted and construed more broadly to encompass matters of "public
interest," which accounts for the substantial volume of litigation and widely divergent
rulings that have been generated since its enactment in the early 1990fs. See e.g., Du
Charme v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 110 Cal. App. 4th 107, 1 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 501, 2003 Cal. App. LEXIS 1002. However, even in California, courts have
narrowly construed what constitutes a matter of "public interest," concluding that
defamatory statements directed at an individual, even in the context of a public issue, are
not necessarily issues of public interest. Id. at 117 (explaining that "a union's allegedly
defamatory statements were not made in connection with a public issue or an issue of
public interest because they concerned the supervision of a staff of eight by an individual
who had previously received no attention or media coverage, and the only people directly
involved in and affected by the situation were the supervisor and his eight supervisees. . .
. [T]he mere publication (in a newsletter, for example, or on a Web site) should not turn
otherwise private information (e.g., job termination) into a matter of public interest"); see
also, O'Meara v. Palomar-Pomerado Health System, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 406 (Cal. App.
2005) (holding that anti-SLAPP did not apply to doctor's action against defendant
because, among other reasons, defendant's conduct of defaming the doctor in a peer
review hearing "did not involve an exercise of their free speech or petition rights").
Further, even in California a prima facie showing of defamation defeats a SLAPP
counterclaim. Lafayette, Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d
46 (App. 1 Dist. 1995) 37 Cal. App. 4th 855, rehearing denied, review denied, cert,
denied, 519 U.S. 809; see also, e.g., Fleishman v. Superior Court, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 383
(App. 2 Dist. 2002) 102 Cal. App. 4th 350 (motion to strike under anti-SLAPP must be
denied if plaintiff alleges prima facie case which, if believed by trier of fact, will result in
judgment for the plaintiff); Wang v. Hartunian, 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 909, (App. 2 Dist. 2003)
111 Cal. App. 4th 744 (same).

22

interests to deter common citizens from exercising their political or legal rights or to
punish them for doing so") (citation omitted). Anti-SLAPPs were never intended to
banish private citizens from the courts and punish them for seeking a judicial remedy for
very public wrongs, such as occurred here.
Further, the misuse of anti-SLAPP legislation against private citizens, as in this
case, has been strongly criticized in a federal forum as "standing] the purpose of the
legislation on its head." Yeshiva Chofetz Chaim Radin, Inc. v. The Village of New
Hempstead, 98 F. Supp. 2d 347, 360 (US So. Dist. NY 2000) ("The new anti-SLAPP law
creates a new right of action for victims of SLAPP suits. It places new restrictions on the
ability of public applicants to seek redress from courts.... As such, the new anti-SLAPP
law is in derogation of the common law. It is well established that statutes in derogation
of the common law are to be construed narrowly") (citations omitted).
As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, while recognizing the potential for
abuse and unconstitutional application if anti-SLAPP legislation is not narrowly confined
to infringements upon the right to petition government, other states have either
preemptively discouraged the legislation or have restricted its application to its narrow
purpose: precluding large private interest plaintiffs from bringing meritless lawsuits to
harass and intimidate private citizens. It was never intended to enable a large private
interest to publish defamatory statements about a private citizen, then to punish that
citizen for seeking a remedy from the court as has occurred in the present case.
D. There is No Evidence, Clear and Convincing or Otherwise, that Jacob's
Purpose in Bringing Suit was to Chill Bezzanf s Participation in the
Process of Government.
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For the district court to conclude that Jacob's Complaint was a SLAPP action, it
had to find, while construing all of the facts and reasonable inferences in a light most
favorable to Jacob, there was still clear and convincing evidence that Jacob filed suit to
interfere with or chill Bezzant's proper participation in the process of government. Utah
Code Ann. §78-58-104(2); Anderson v. Tobias, 116 P.3d 323 (Utah 2005).
The district court was unable to point to any fact suggesting Jacob's purpose in
filing suit was improper. Rather, the court concluded, "The lengthy procedural history ...
supports the proposition that Jacob intended to use this litigation as a means of punishing
Bezzant for Bezzanf s publication of the political speech contained in the election
notice." Addendum B at 14. However, a "proposition" based on a vaguely referenced
procedural history is not clear and convincing evidence of an improper purpose.
Moreover, the district court's language again demonstrates a failure to construe the facts
in Jacob's favor, which is required on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
SLAPP suits are fundamentally aimed at harming the First Amendment right of
citizens to petition government. Therefore, the hallmark of a SLAPP suit is one that
lacks any merit and is brought for the sole purpose of obtaining an economic advantage
over a citizen party by increasing his litigation costs to the extent that his case becomes
weakened or abandoned. eCash Technologies\ Inc. v. Guagliardo, 210 F. Supp. 2d 1138
(CD. Cal. 2001); Wilcox v. Superior Court (App. 2 Dist. 1994) 27 Cal. App. 4th 809)
(explaining that SLAPP suits are brought by large private interests to deter citizens from
exercising their First Amendment rights, or to punish them for doing so). A SLAPP suit
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is not a legitimate dispute of facts and law like this case is, the outcome of which is
contingent upon judicial interpretation of conflicting authority.
Thus anti-SLAPP statutes only apply when the actual objective of the suit is to
interfere with the defendant's First Amendment rights, primarily the right to petition
government. Foothills Townhome Assn. v. Christiansen, 65 Cal. App. 4 688 (App. 4
Dist. 1998), rehearing denied, review denied, cert, denied, 525 U.S. 1106; see also,
Dixon v. Superior Court (App. 4 Dist. 1994) 30 Cal. App. 4th 733 (explaining that
plaintiffs who bring SLAPP suits do not intend to win, but do so to cause delay and
distraction, and to punish citizen activists by causing them to incur litigation costs for
exercising their right to speak and petition government for redress of grievances).
Indeed, the purpose of anti-SLAPP legislation is to encourage private citizens to
participate in government and to prevent the chilling of such participation through the
abuse of judicial process. People ex re. 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Building Permit
Consultants, Inc., App. 2 Dist. 2000) 86 Cal. App. 4th 280; see also, Dixon v. Superior
Court (App. 4 Dist. 1994) 30 Cal. App. 4th 733 (explaining that plaintiffs who bring
SLAPP suits do not intend to win, but rather intend to delay and create a distraction, and
to punish activists for exercising their right to petition government by causing them to
incur litigation costs).
Notwithstanding the fact that Bezzant's conduct cannot be construed as "proper
participation in the process of government," there are no facts to support an inference that
Jacob's primary motivation in bringing suit was to interfere with or chill any of Bezzant's
rights. The facts compel the opposite conclusion. The most obvious such fact is that the
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Complaint was filed a year after the election of Bezzant's friend and business associate to
the AFC City Council.
The anti-SLAPP required the district court to find Jacob never believed his claims
had any merit prior to concluding the Act applied. There are no facts to suggest that
Jacob lacked an honest belief that his claims were meritorious, even if not construed in a
light most favorable to Jacob. There is no dispute that Bezzant published the Notices in
this case. There is no dispute that the Notices named Jacob contrary to his express
wishes. There is no dispute that the Notices accused Jacob of intentionally publishing
false information and of "classic" negative campaigning, and thereby held him out as an
object of public ridicule, contempt and hatred. Bezzant's pleadings are devoid of any fact
suggesting Jacob filed his claims in bad faith or that he lacked a reasonable belief in their
merits. The district court made no finding that Jacob believed his claims lacked merit.
Further, Jacob's prior attorney, Brent Stephens, submitted specific requests for
discovery giving Bezzant an opportunity to support his bare allegation in his first Answer
that Jacob's claims were brought in bad faith and were frivolous. R1544. In response,
Bezzant stated only a general belief but was unable to cite any facts suggesting bad faith,
and could only reserve the right to supplement his response as additional facts were
obtained in discovery. R1540. No supplementation ever occurred. Bezzant's inability to
cite a single fact evidencing Jacob's alleged bad faith hardly supports a finding that
Jacob's claims were brought primarily to interfere with or chill Bezzant's rights.
Based on the foregoing facts and law, the district court's conclusion that the
anti-SLAPP Act applies in this case is incorrect.
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SANCTIONING PLAINTIFFS' GOOD FAITH
EFFORTS TO OBTAIN A JUDICIAL REMEDY BY AWARDING
DEFENDANTS ATTORNEYS FEES.
The district court awarded Bezzant his attorney fees on two separate occasions.
First, Bezzant was awarded fees for litigating Jacob's claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983.
Addendum B at 23. Later, Bezzant was awarded fees and costs under Utah Code Ann.
§78-58-105. Both provisions require a showing of bad faith before imposition of the
attorney fees sanction can be justified.
A. The District Court Erred in Awarding Fees Under the anti-SLAPP Act Because
Jacob's Claims Have Both Legal and Factual Merit.
Failing to construe the facts in a light most favorable to Jacob and only after much
briefing and analysis, the district court concluded that Jacob's claims lacked factual and
legal merit because (1) Bezzant's Notice did not convey a defamatory meaning as a
matter of law; (2) the Notice was protected by Utah's public interest privilege;4 (3) the
statements in the Notice were opinion and not verifiable statements of fact; (4) the
statements were not defamatory per se and Jacob failed to plead special damages; (5)
Jacob's claims "were so deficient that they did not even pass the 'relatively low'
threshold for surviving a motion for summary judgment." Addendum F at 10. The
court also concluded that Jacob's claims were "not supported by a substantial argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." Id.

4

Notably, in concluding that the statements were privileged, the district court cited
Seegmiller, infra, which it previously determined this Court had implicitly overruled.
Addendum B at 16.
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To justify an award of attorney fees, Utah Code Ann. §78-58-105 requires a
showing "that the action involving public participation in the process of government was
commenced or continued without a substantial basis in fact and law and could not be
supported by a substantial argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law." This language is almost identical to that provided in Rule 11 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for similarly harsh sanctions only when "the
claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are [not] warranted by existing law
or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law
or the establishment of new law." However, while Rule 11 imposes an equitable notice
requirement and sanctions counsel, the attorney fees provision in the anti-SLAPP Act
provides no notice requirement and sanctions the party.
An award of attorney's fees is generally recognized as a harsh and punitive
sanction for demonstrable bad faith. See Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56. This Court
recently instructed, "We remind trial courts that the reason for awarding attorney fees
based on bad faith is to punish the wrongdoer, and not compensate the victim, and that
fees should therefore be awarded only upon specific evidence of bad faith." Still
Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen, 122 P.3d 556, 560-61 (Utah 2005) (holding that "lack of
legal merit is insufficient for an attorney fee award under [§78-27-56]") (citations,
quotations, and brackets omitted).
A finding of bad faith is required under the anti-SLAPP Act. The statute was
expressly created to punish parties for knowingly abusing the judicial process by bringing
a meritless action for the purpose of interfering with and chilling a person's right to
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petition government. Such abuse of the judicial process embodies the essence of bad
faith. In contrast, the Act was not intended to punish unsuspecting plaintiffs who
honestly seek a judicial remedy for genuinely disputed harms based on genuinely
disputed conflicting authority, such as occurred here.
As already noted, any evidence of bad faith is absent from the record in this case.
Jacob also argued that Defendants' anti-SLAPP counterclaim resulted in an
unconstitutional application of the Act, thereby arguing in good faith for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law. R1005, 1648, 1779. Indeed, after oral
argument on March 16, 2004 on Bezzant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, Judge
Lynn W. Davis commended, "Well argued and well briefed ... I think it's nicely done on
behalf of both of your clients.... I'll take the matter under advisement. There are
technical issues here. If I spoke from the bench and made a ruling right now I might
overlook evidence, et cetera." R3069:93.
The district court then concluded that Jacob's claims lacked merit only after
analysis of conflicting authority on point. Specifically, the court concluded that this
Court implicitly overturned its holding in Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc.5 with its subsequent
decision in Larson v. Sysco Corporation6 such that a written statement constitutes libel
per se only if it alleges criminal conduct, a loathsome disease, unchaste behavior, or
operation of an unlawful business. Addendum B at 15.
5

626 P.2d 968, 977 n. 7 (Utah 1981) (defining libel per se as "defamatory words
specifically directed at the person claiming injury, which words must, on their face, and
without the aid of intrinsic proof, be unmistakably recognized as injurious").
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The district court engaged in similar analysis of additional pertinent authority. Id.
Thus, the district court based its conclusions that a sanction of attorney fees was
warranted not on a finding that Jacob's claims were frivolous or for any act of bad faith,
but based on its legal conclusion that this Court implicitly overturned Seegmiller with its
subsequent decision in Larson.
Accordingly, the district court made no finding of bad faith based on any "factual
determination of [Plaintiffs'] subjective intent." Still Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen, 122
P.3d 556, 559 (Utah 2005). Rather, the court equated "without merit" with "bad faith,"
apparently and erroneously "believing that an absence of legal merit meant that bad faith
could be presumed." Id.
The trial court's analysis evidences the legal merit of Plaintiffs' claims under
Seegmiller and other pertinent authority, thereby defeating the court's finding that
Jacob's claims were so lacking in merit that Bezzant was entitled to attorney's fees and
costs. It also defeats its conclusion that this was a SLAPP action, which by definition is
completely lacking in merit. See, supra. Thus, Jacob was severely punished not for bad
faith, but because he and his competent legal counsel did not accurately predict the trial
court's unpredictable conclusion that this Court implicitly overruled Seegmiller, which
case is still good law.
Jacob's claims have a substantial basis in fact and law and were filed in good faith.
The detail and significant analysis of the district court's ruling alone demonstrates the

6

767 P.2d 557 (Utah 1989).
30

substantial merit of Jacob's claims. Thus, the district court's conclusions are incorrect
and the award of attorney fees is improper.
B. Jacob Was Denied Due Process of Law When the District Court Refused to
Permit Evidence of Good Faith.
When Bezzant moved for attorney fees under the Act, he argued that Jacob's
claims lacked a substantial basis in fact and law accused Jacob of being motivated solely
by a desire to punish Bezzant for exercising his First Amendment rights. R1952; R1969.
In response to Bezzant's allegations, Jacob submitted affidavits from himself and both
current and previous counsel explaining Jacob's and his counsel's intent. R2\6l,et

seq.

(Addendum H). Attorneys David Aagard and Brent Stephens both submitted affidavits
explaining how they independently conducted an exhaustive evaluation of the merits of
Jacob's claims prior to filing suit. R2161. David Aagard in particular analyzed the
merits of this case in light of Mast v. Overson, 971 P.2d 928 (Utah App. 1998), and
determined that that the facts in Mast were distinguishable from this case. Jacob's
current counsel also addressed the distinguishing factors of Mast in Jacob's memorandum
in opposition to the Bezzant's motion for judgment on the pleadings and during oral
argument on March 16, 2004. Id.
Bezzant moved to strike this evidence on the ground that those portions of the
affidavits rebutting Bezzant's claims of bad faith were inadmissible. R2167; R2218.
Without offering any analysis of its own, the district court expressly adopted Bezzant's
arguments, concluding that the affidavits "consist of argument, opinions, and
inadmissible legal conclusions"; accordingly, all of the evidence rebutting Bezzant's
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claims and demonstrating Jacob's good faith was stricken. Addendum F at 3. The
district court failed to recognized that the only way Jacob could rebut Bezzant's
allegations of bad faith was through testimony explaining his intent and his attorneys'
review of the merits of the case prior to filing.
Moreover, the district court granted Bezzant's motion to strike Jacob's evidence in
the same ruling wherein it granted Bezzant's motion for attorney fees. Addendum F. In
other words, Jacob was not allowed to present, and the district court refused to consider,
any evidence demonstrating his good faith, while Bezzant was permitted to make
unsupported allegations of bad faith. This refusal resulted in Jacob being ordered to pay
Bezzant over $200,000 simply for legitimately seeking a judicial remedy. Not only did
the district court err in concluding that this evidence was inadmissible, but by excluding
it the court denied Jacob of his right to due process of law.
A person may not be deprived of property without due process of law. Utah
Const, art. I, § 7; U.S. Const. Fifth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment. The right to
present evidence in one's behalf is an essential element of due process that is recognized
as necessary to preserve fundamental fairness. See, Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320,
1322 (Utah 1982) (right to present evidence is a "minimal procedural protection" in
judicial proceedings); In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 650 (Utah 1988)
(same); Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1170 (Utah 1988) (in a prosecution for
contempt, federal due process requires that the accused have the right to offer evidence in
the form of testimony or affidavits).
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Judicial standards are established upon due process principles of fundamental
fairness and require the minimal right to meet an opposing party's claims by presenting
evidence. McGrew v. Industrial Comm yn, 85 P.2d 608, 624 (Utah 1938). See also, Ut.
R. Civ. P. 43 (mandating that all admissible evidence shall be admitted); Utah Code Ann.
§78-32-3 (providing the right to present evidence by testimony or affidavit in a contempt
proceeding).
Jacob has a property interest in the $200,000 sanction imposed by the district
court. But the court unfairly stopped Jacob from presenting any relevant evidence to
rebut Bezzant's unsupported assertions of bad faith. The court merely adopted
Defendants' position that "the assertions made in the affidavits consist of argument,
opinions, and inadmissible legal conclusions." Addendum F. The district court also
refused to address Jacob's contention not only that Bezzant opened the door when he
made Jacob's intent an issue, but the evidence was not offered as argument, legal
conclusions, or opinion. Rather, it was offered as evidence of Jacob's intent in filing the
lawsuit, which intent Bezzant made the central issue of his motion for attorney fees.
Based on the foregoing facts and law, the district court erred in concluding that the
affidavits were inadmissible and in striking them. Moreover, by doing so the district
court prohibited Jacob from presenting any evidence in his defense and thereby violated
his right to due process of law.

C. Bezzant is Equitably Estopped From Seeking Attorney Fees.
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As noted above, when Jacob requested information to support Bezzant's general
Rule 11 defense (which is virtually identical to the sanction provision of the Act) that
Jacob's claims lacked merit and were filed in bad faith, Bezzant was unable to provide
any response other than to reserve the right to supplement as facts became known through
discovery. R1540. No supplementation ever occurred. Bezzant is still unable to cite a
fact to support his claim that Jacob filed this action in bad faith. Bezzant's admissions
equitably estop him from now taking a contrary position.
A party is equitably estopped from taking a certain position during litigation when
the following three conditions are met: (1) the first party's prior admissions or failure to
act is inconsistent with a later asserted claim; (2) there is reasonable action or inaction on
the part of the second party based on the first party's admission or failure to act; and (3)
allowing the first party to contradict its prior admission or failure to act will cause injury
to the second party. Youngbloodv. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2007 UT 28? Tfl4.
All of these conditions are met on these facts. Bezzant admitted he could provide
no facts supporting his defense that Jacob's claims were brought in bad faith and he
failed to supplement that response. R1540. Jacob, knowing that his Complaint was filed
in good faith, reasonably relied on Bezzant's admission and subsequent failure to act and
thus continued to pursue his claims on their merits. Further, Bezzant's failure to respond
to the discovery requests and thereby give Jacob notice of the specific facts supporting
Bezzant's claim of bad faith is analogous to the invited error doctrine where a party is
estopped from claiming error when it allowed the error to occur. See, Chang v. Soldier
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Summitt Development, 82 P.3d 203 (Utah App. 2003); State v. Chaney, 989 P.2d 1091
(UtahApp. 1999).
When the district court allowed Bezzant to contradict his prior admission and
failure to act, Jacob was injured in an amount exceeding $200,000. Accordingly, the
doctrine of equitable estoppel bars Bezzant's claim for attorney fees under the antiSLAPP Act.
D. The District Court Erred When it Awarded Bezzant Attorney's Fees Incurred
for Litigating Jacob's §1983 Claims.
Similar to the attorney fees provisions under the anti-SLAPP Act and Rule 11, a
party is entitled to an award of attorney's fees related to claims brought under 42 U.S.C.
§1983 only upon a showing of bad faith. See, Houston v. Norton, et at, 2158 F.3d 1172,
1174 (10th Cir. 2000) (explaining that for an award of attorneys fees to be justified under
42 U.S.C. §1988, "the plaintiffs action must be meritless in the sense that it is groundless
or without foundation. The fact that a plaintiff may ultimately lose his case is not in itself
a sufficient justification for the assessment of fees. ... [A] plaintiff should not be assessed
his opponent's attorney's fees unless a court finds that his claim was frivolous,
unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly
became so").
As applied to the facts in this case, Jacob has pled facts sufficient to establish a
prima facie claim of civil rights violations under §1983. Jacob's Amended Complaint
alleges widespread abuses, including threats, intimidation, and retaliation by AFC public
officials. R280:19-28, 30-31, 33-37. Jacob has also alleged that Tom Hunter and Ricky
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Storrs were "exempt" AFC employees. R280:38-39. Further, there is no dispute that
Hunter and Storrs insisted that the defamatory Notice be published or that they even
wrote and/or approved of its content prior to distribution. Rl 529-30. Even the AFC
mayor expressed strong and defamatory sentiments about Jacob relative to the
controversy surrounding Hunter's and Storrs' exempt employee status. R280:40.
Furthermore, in the Amended Complaint Jacob alleged that Bezzant was complicit with
AFC public officials and employees and, therefore, was subject to suit pursuant to a
§1983 claim. R280:40. Accordingly, when the facts and all reasonable inferences
therefrom are interpreted in a light most favorable to Jacob, a prima facie claim was pled
and might have been proved had the district court allowed discovery to continue.
Based on the foregoing facts and law, Jacob's civil rights claims under §1983 had
both legal and factual merit, and the district court improperly awarded Bezzant his
attorney's fees incurred for litigating those claims.
E. The Law of the Case Doctrine Precludes an Award for Attorneys' Fees and
Costs Prior to January 2003.
When this matter was removed to the federal court on Jacob's §1983 claims,
Bezzant's request for attorneys fees and costs was denied based on the federal court's
January 15, 2003, finding after review of the merits of Jacob's claims that Jacob acted in
good faith as to the removal. R1086. This finding is the law of this case.
The law of the case doctrine "was developed to promote the obedience of
inferior courts as well as 'to avoid the delays and difficulties involved in repetitious
contentions and reconsideration of rulings on matters previously decided in the same
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case.'" Gildea v. Guardian Title Company of Utah, 31 P.3d 543, 546 (Utah 2001)
(quoting Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Utah 1995). The law of
the case will be enforced unless "exceptional circumstances" exist: "(1) when there has
been an intervening change of controlling authority; (2) when new evidence has become
available; or (3) when the court is convinced that its prior decision was clearly erroneous
and would work a manifest injustice." Gildea at 546.
While the federal court denied Bezzant's request for attorney's fees based on
Jacob's good faith related to the removal (R1086), it is noteworthy that the court's
finding could only be made after it had reviewed the merits of Jacob's claims. Had the
federal court concluded that Jacob's claims lacked merit and were filed in bad faith, it is
unlikely that the court could have found that Jacob's removal of the case to the federal
court was in good faith.
Since the federal court's ruling denying Bezzant's request for attorney fees, there
has been no intervening change of controlling authority, no new evidence has become
available, and the federal court's ruling is not clearly erroneous or manifestly unjust.
Accordingly, the district court erred in awarding Bezzant attorney's fees subsequent the
federal court's ruling.
III. THE DISTRICT COURT APPLIED AN INCORRECT STANDARD AND THUS
ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE STATEMENTS WERE NOT
DEFAMATORY.
The trial court concluded that Bezzant's statements did not constitute defamation
per se and that Jacob had failed to plead special damages. Addendum B at 14-15. The
trial court further concluded that the Notice was protected by Utah's public interest
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privilege7 and that the statements did not convey a defamatory meaning. Addendum B
at 16-17. While failing to construe the facts and all reasonable inferences in a light most
favorable to Jacob and failing to construe his allegations as true, the district court made
fact-dependent findings that the statements were published amidst a heated political
debate of which there was public awareness, there was no evidence of malice, publication
was not excessive, and there was no evidence that Bezzant knew the statements were
false. Id.
Of course, these findings were made after discovery was stayed. The court also
made these findings despite the facts showing that Bezzant published the Notice and
revealed Jacob's name knowing the statements were false and also knowing that Jacob
wished to remain anonymous. See, e.g., Rl604-06.
The district court applied the wrong standard. To survive a motion for a judgment
on the pleadings filed, a plaintiff need only establish a prima facie case, because all of the
facts must be construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Fleishman v.
Superior Court, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 383 (App. 2 Dist. 2002) 102 Cal. App. 4th 350 (a
motion to strike under California's anti-SLAPP statute must be denied if the plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case, which if believed by the trier of fact, will result in
judgment for the plaintiff). Further, because the context of the analysis is a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, the district court was required to construe all facts and

7

Notably, in concluding that the statements were privileged, the district court cited
Seegmiller, supra, which it previously determined this Court had implicitly overruled.
Addendum B at 16.
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reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to Jacob and to accept Jacob's allegations
as true. Here, Jacob established a prima facie case of both defamation and false light.
A prima facie case for defamation includes, (1) the defendant published statements
about the plaintiff; (2) that were false; (3) not subject to privilege; (4) with the requisite
degree of fault; and (5) the statements resulted in damages. Debry v. Godbe, 872 P.2d
999 (Utah 1994). A prima facie case for false light includes, (1) the defendant gave
publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the public in a false
light; (2) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person; and (3) the defendant had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard
as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other was placed.
Stein v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc., 944 P.2d 374, 380 (Utah App. 1997). A false
light claim is "closely allied" with a claim for defamation and "the same considerations
apply to each." Id.
There is no dispute that Bezzant published the Notice. Jacob has also
affirmatively alleged that the statements in the Notice are false, not subject to any
privilege8, and they placed Jacob in a false light and were published with at least
negligence and a reckless disregard for the truth (see, e.g., R1643 (Jacob's JP Oppos.;
Rl631-39). These allegations are fact-dependent and thus must be accepted as true and

The district court erred as a matter of law in concluding the statements were privileged.
Defamatory publications relating even to matters of public interest that are directed at
private individuals are not privileged if the defendant was negligent in printing the
defamatory material. Cox v. Hatch, 763 P.2d 556 (Utah 1988).
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all reasonable inferences construed in a light most favorable to Jacob. However, the
district court failed to apply this standard.
Further, the Bezzant's Notice was defamatory per se. A publication such as the
Notice at issue here is libel. "[L]ibel is classified as per se if it contains defamatory
words specifically directed at the person claiming injury, which words must, on their
face, and without the aid of intrinsic proof, be unmistakably recognized as injurious."
Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968, 977, fn. 7 (Utah 1981) (citation and quotations
omitted). Libel is per se and actionable if it includes words "which impute to a person
the commission of a crime, or degradation of character, or which have a tendency to
injuriously affect him in his office of trust, profession, trade, calling, or business, or
which tend to degrade him in society, or expose him to public hatred, contempt, or
ridicule ..." Nichols v. Daily Reporter Co., 83 P. 573, 547 (Utah 1905); accord, Prince v.
Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325, 1328 (Utah 1975). A libelous accusation of dishonesty and
"negative campaigning," such as occurred in this case, has a tendency to degrade the
subject in society and expose him to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule. As such, it is
defamatory per se and thus requires no pleading of special damages. Baum v. Gillman,
667 P.2d 41, 43 (Utah 1983) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Prince v. Peterson, supra; Combes
v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 228 P.2d 272 (Utah 1951).
The district court rejected this Court's holding in Seegmiller, concluding without
any supporting legal authority that this Court intended to implicitly overrule its own
holding with its subsequent decision in Larson v. Sysco Court, 767 P.2d 557 (Utah 1989).
The district court's conclusion is wrong. There is nothing in Larson to indicate that this
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Court intended to overrule Seegmiller, which is still good law. Holding that a private
person, such as Jacob, need only prove that media published defamatory statements
negligently rather than with malice, this Court expressed particular concern that
Seegmiller
.. .was plucked by the defendant from the anonymity of private life and thrust
against his will into the limelight. ... [W]e recognize that the integrity of an
individual's reputation is essential to his standing in society, in his vocation, and
even in his family. It may indeed be indispensable to one's sense of self-worth.
The dignity of virtually every human being depends in part upon his right to be
known as the person he truly is. ... [I]t has been recognized that an assault upon a
person's character may be far more damaging and long-lasting than an assault
upon his person. Indeed, freedom from false attacks on one's personality may be
viewed as at least as essential to ordered liberty as freedom from physical abuse.
Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d at 972-73.
However, citing Mast v. Overson, 971 P.2d 928 (Utah App. 1998), the district
court rejected Jacob's contention that he is not a public figure. Addendum B at 19.
While the court's conclusion was incorrect, "the public/private figure distinction should
not be a consideration that significantly affects a court's determination as to whether
allegedly defamatory language actually conveys defamatory meaning as a matter of law."
Mast v. Overson, 971 P.2d 928. The district court concluded that Bezzant's statements
were "less caustic" than the statements in Mast and did not convey a defamatory meaning
as a matter of law. Id. Finally, the district court concluded that Jacob's claims for false
light and defamation are defective because Bezzant's statements are "non-actionable"
editorial opinion rather than statements of fact, notwithstanding the fact that the
statements were not published in an editorial. Id. at 20.
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The district court's analysis and conclusions are incorrect. Mast involved a public
debate surrounding the construction of a golf course that the Citizen Taxpayers of Utah
("CTU") opposed. As CTU president, David Mast was willingly quoted in several
newspaper articles and publicly interviewed regarding CTlTs position. During a
subsequent press conference, Salt Lake County Commissioner, Brent Overson, accused
Mast as falsely representing himself as a "concerned taxpayer" because Mast had a
prospective financial interest in the property as a developer. Overson further stated that a
CTU advertisement regarding the debate was "rife with misstatements and barefaced
lies."
Mast did not argue that Overson accused him of dishonesty. Rather, Mast argued
that Overson's statements alleged criminal conduct and were defamatory per se. Finding
that Mast was a public figure and had deliberately placed himself in the limelight, the
appellate court concluded that the statements at issue did not allege criminal conduct and
were not defamatory per se. Mast v. Overson, 971 P.2d 928 (Utah App. 1998). These
facts are inapposite to this case. Jacob has never "relinquished [any] part of his interest
in the protection of his own good name, and consequently he has a more compelling call
on the courts for redress of injury inflicted by defamatory falsehood." Id. (citing Gertz v.
Robert Welch Inc., An U.S. 323, 345 (1974)).
Bezzant's Notice was an extraordinary strategic public relations campaign crafted
to preserve friendships and business relationships. It was entitled "apology" and
addressed to AFC citizens. Bezzant deliberately plucked "William T. (Bill) Jacob" from
anonymity and falsely accused him of dishonesty, misleading the public, publishing false
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information, and of negative campaigning to help one candidate by hurting another,
thereby impugning his reputation for honesty and exposing him to public hatred,
contempt and ridicule. This attack on Jacob's character was deliberate, methodical, and
hand-delivered to the homes of AFC citizens. It was strategically designed to hold Jacob
out as an object of public ridicule and contempt and received Hunter's and Storrs'
express approval. The purpose was to distract voters from Hunter's and Storrs' conflicts
of interest by holding a private person out as a target for public contempt.
Accordingly, Bezzant's Notice constitutes defamation per se and Jacob's damages
are presumed.
IV. AS APPLIED TO THE FACTS HERE, THE ANTI-SLAPP ACT VIOLATES THE
CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE THAT COURTS SHALL BE OPEN FOR
REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES.
Article I, §11, of the Utah Constitution, also known as the Open Courts provision,
guarantees access to the courts and prevents arbitrary deprivation of remedies. That
provision specifically protects a person's right to seek a remedy for injury done to his
reputation and "limits the legislature's ability to substantially modify or abrogate
remedies to ... reputation." Ross v. Schackel, 920 P.2d 1159, 1162 (Utah 1996). It
specifically provides:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred
from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or
counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
Article I of the Utah Constitution, also know as the Declaration of Rights, includes
what are considered those important rights that are guaranteed to all citizens in our
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society. The Utah Constitution was drafted amidst a long and oftentimes hostile power
struggle between the federal government and the "Mormon" people of Utah who sought
statehood as a way to "escape domination by the federal government." Charter for
Statehood: The Story of Utah's State Constitution at 38-8, Jean Bickmore White (Univ.
of Utah Press 1996). When the final and ultimately accepted draft of the Utah
Constitution was debated in 1895, the public sentiment expressed was t h a t " . . . the
people want, and they have the right to demand, not a code of all the laws we have ever
had or ever expect to have, but a plain, square, honest definition of rights and powers, and
a broad basis for future legislation." Editorial, Deseret Evening News, March 27, 1895.
Article I, §11, which has not been altered since 1895, has been recognized by this
Court as a substantive provision guaranteeing access to the courts based on fairness and
also providing remedies to persons who have been injured in their person, property, or
reputation. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., Ill P.2d 670 (Utah 1985). It is intended to
prevent the legislature from closing the courts' doors against any person who has a legal
right associated with a recognized remedy. Brown v. Wightman, 47 Utah 31, 34, 151 P.
366, 366-67 (Utah 1915). This Court further explained:
[T]he plain meaning of the guarantee imposes some substantive limitation on the
legislature to abolish judicial remedies in a capricious fashion. In general, open
courts provisions in Utah and other states have served two principal purposes:
First, they were intended to help establish an independent foundation for the
judiciary as an institution. See Jonathan M. Hoffman, By the Course of the Law:
The Origins of the Open Courts Clause of State Constitutions, 74 Or. L. Rev. 1279
(1995); Industrial Comm'n v. Evans, 52 Utah 394, 174 P. 825, 831 (1918) ("The
question of ultimate legal liability cannot be withdrawn from the courts."). Second,
open courts or remedies clauses were intended to grant individuals rights to a
judicial remedy for the protection of their person, property, or reputation from
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abrogation and unreasonable limitation by economic interests that could control
state legislatures. See Schuman, 65 Temp. L. Rev. at 1208; Berry, 717 P.2d at 675.
Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, ^30-31 (some citations omitted) (explaining the
history of state open courts provisions created in response to political abuses that caused
distrust of the legislature; also citing other Utah constitutional provisions specifically
designed to limit legislative power).
Article I § 11 expressly recognizes the right of access to the courts. "The clear
language [of this provision] guarantees access to the courts and a judicial procedure that
is based on fairness and equality." Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., Ill P.2d 670, 675
(Utah 1985). Under this provision, Courts are to "resolve doubts in favor of permitting
parties to have their day in court on the merits of a controversy." Carman v. Slovens, 546
P.2d 601, 603 (Utah 1976). "At a minimum, a day in court means each party shall be
afforded the opportunity to present claims and defenses, and have them adjudicated on
the merits according to the facts and the law." Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 44 P.3d 663,
674-75 (Utah 2002).
The seminal case analyzing the question of whether a statute violates the Open
Courts provision is Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., Ill P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), in which
this Court established a two-part test. First, section 11 is violated by a statute abrogating
a right protected by it if the law fails to provide "an effective and reasonable alternative
remedy by due course of law for vindication of his constitutional interest... [which
alternative remedy] must be substantially equal in value or other benefit to the remedy
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abrogated in providing essentially comparable substantive protection to one's ...
reputation..." Burgandy v. State, 983 P.2d 586, 588 (Utah App. 1999).
Second, if no such alternative remedy is provided, "abrogation of the remedy or
cause of action may be justified only if there is a clear social or economic evil to be
eliminated and the elimination of an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or
unreasonable means for achieving the objective." Id.
Jacob has a constitutional right to seek a remedy for damages to his reputation.
That right existed prior to Utah's statehood and is expressly protected in Utah's
Declaration of Righls. However, application of the anti-SLAPP Act to this case has
completely abrogated Jacob's constitutionally protected right. Not only has Jacob been
left with no remedy, he has been severely penalized just for seeking one in the first place.
Further, the social or economic evil purported to be eliminated by the Act, the
abuse of judicial process by large private interests to punish private citizens for
participating in the process of government, does not apply in this case. Jacob is not a
large private interest; he is a private citizen. Jacob did not file suit to chill anyone's First
Amendment rights. Jacob filed suit because he was seeking a judicial remedy for a
specific harm with a known remedy that has existed in this state since prior to statehood.
The Defendants are not private citizens; they are large private interests owned by Pulitzer
Newspaper Group at the time of the events giving rise to the claims in this case. R2161
{see advertisement attached as Exhibit A to that pleading). When they published the
Notice, Defendants were not participating in the process of government. They were
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concededly seeking to preserve friendships and business relationships, and to hold Jacob
out for public hatred, contempt, and ridicule.
Because the Act completely abrogates Jacob's remedy for harm to his reputation,
and because the societal or economic evil the Act was intended to eliminate does not
exist in this case, its application to these facts is a violation of Jacob's constitutional
rights under article I, §11, of the Utah Constitution.
A.

This Court Should Consider Jacob's State Law Claim Under the
Exceptional Circumstances Doctrine.

The exceptional or extraordinary circumstances doctrine allows review of issues
that have not been raised below. See, State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 10 (Utah App. 1996);
State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, ^[23, 93 P.3d 186. It applies to "rare procedural
anomalies" and is used sparingly "where [an appellate court's] failure to consider an
issue that was not properly preserved for appeal would have resulted in manifest
injustice." Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, ^23. While the exceptional circumstances
doctrine has not been precisely defined, it is considered a "safety device" to insure
fairness and protect against manifest injustice. Id. (quoting Irwin, 924 P.2d at 8) (citation
omitted).
Although Jacob's open courts argument was not raised in the district court, the
exceptional circumstances doctrine allows this Court to review the issue. Exceptional
circumstances justifying review in this case include the fact that it involves important
constitutional issues of first impression on how the anti-SLAPP Act is supposed to be
applied, the case has not yet gone to trial so the issue has not been waived and it could be
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raised on remand, and the issue involves questions of law that can easily be reviewed for
the first time on appeal. Not reviewing Jacob's claim will also result in a manifest
injustice because of the fundamental nature of the constitutional interests involved.
A review of the important statutory interpretation questions of first impression in
this case will not be complete without considering the state constitutional claim.
Manifest injustice will be prevented by considering the state constitutional issue at this
juncture. Moreover, judicial efficiency will be furthered and justice served by reviewing
the issue. Therefore, the constitutional issue should be reviewed now.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs respectfully request this Court to find that the anti-SLAPP Act does not
apply in this case and is unconstitutional as applied to these facts, and thereby reverse the
district court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims as well as the court's grant of Defendants'
motions for attorney's fees, and remand this matter back to the district court for the
completion of discovery and trial.

Respectfully submitted this

day of April,

2007.
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC

Jenrjifer K/uowans
Attorneys for Appellant
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ADDENDA

Tab A

§ 78-58-101. Title This chapter is known as the "Citizen Participation in Government Act."
HISTORY: C. 1953, 78-58-101, enacted by L. 2001, ch. 163, §§ 1. NOTES: EFFECTIVE
DATES. -Laws 2001, ch. 163 became effective on April 30, 2001, pursuant to Utah Const., Art.
VI, Sec. 25.
§ 78-58-102. Definitions As used in this chapter: (1) "Action involving public participation in
the process of government" means any lawsuit, cause of action, claim, cross-claim, counterclaim,
or other judicial pleading or filing requesting relief to which this act applies. (2) "Government"
includes a branch, department, agency, instrumentality, official, employee, agent, or other person
acting under color of law of the United States, a state, or subdivision of a state or other public
authority. (3) "Moving party" means any person on whose behalf the motion is filed. (4)
"Person" means the same as defined in Section 68-3-12. (5) "Process of government" means the
mechanisms and procedures by which the legislative and executive branches of government
make decisions, and the activities leading up to the decisions, including the exercise by a citizen
of the right to influence those decisions under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. (6)
"Responding party" means any person against whom the motion described in Section 78-58-103
is filed. (7) "State" means the same as defined in Section 68-3-12.
§ 78-58-103. Applicability (1) A defendant in an action who believes that the action is
primarily based on, relates to, or is in response to an act of the defendant while participating in
the process of government and is done primarily to harass the defendant, may file: (a) an answer
supported by an affidavit of the defendant detailing his belief that the action is designed to
prevent, interfere with, or chill public participation in the process of government, and specifying
in detail the conduct asserted to be the participation in the process of government believed to
give rise to the complaint; and (b) a motion for judgment on the pleadings in accordance with
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(c). (2) Affidavits detailing activity not adequately
detailed in the answer may be filed with the motion.
§ 78-58-104. Procedures (1) On the filing of a motion for judgment on the pleadings: (a) all
discovery shall be stayed pending resolution of the motion unless the court orders otherwise; (b)
the trial court shall hear and determine the motion as expeditiously as possible with the moving
party providing by clear and convincing evidence that the primary reason for the filing of the
complaint was to interfere with the first amendment right of the defendant; and (c) the moving
party shall have a right to seek interlocutory appeal from a trial court order denying the motion
or from a trial court failure to rule on the motion in expedited fashion. (2) The court shall grant
the motion and dismiss the action upon a finding that the primary purpose of the action is to
prevent, interfere with, or chill the moving party's proper participation in the process of
government. (3) Any government body to which the moving party's acts were directed or the
attorney general may intervene to defend or otherwise support the moving party.
§ 78-58-105. Counter actions — Attorney^ fees — Damages (1) A defendant in an action
involving public participation in the process of government may maintain an action, claim, crossclaim, or counterclaim to recover: (a) costs and reasonable attorney's fees, upon a demonstration
that the action involving public participation in the process of government was commenced or
continued without a substantial basis in fact and law and could not be supported by a substantial
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; and (b) other
compensatory damages upon an additional demonstration that the action involving public
participation in the process of government was commenced or continued for the purpose of
harassing, intimidating, punishing, or otherwise maliciously inhibiting the free exercise of rights
granted under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. (2) Nothing in this section shall
affect or preclude the right of any party to any recovery otherwise authorized by law.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual; COMMERCIAL
PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah Corporation; and
PHILLIPS MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., a

Utah Corporation,

RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
AND/OR MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 000403530

BRETT BEZZANT, an individual; NEWTAH, INC.,
dba AMERICAN FORK CITY, a Utah corporation;
AMERICAN FORK CITY, a Utah municipal

Judge Lynn W. Davis

corporation;

TED BARRATT, an individual;
TERRY FOX, an individual; DON HAMPTON,

an
individual; TOM HUNTER, an individual; RlCKY
STORRS, an individual; CARL WANLASS, an
individual; and DOES I through X,
Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court on defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
and/or Motion for Summary Judgment. Oral arguments were held on March 16, 2004. Randall K.
Spencer appeared on behalf of William T. Jacob ("Jacob") and Jeffrey J. Hunt appeared on behalf
of Brett Bezzant ("Bezzant"). The Court having heard oral arguments and carefully considered the
Motions and Memoranda of the Parties now makes the following ruling.
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I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
(As Stipulated by the Parties)
1.

On or about October 26, 2000, William T. Jacob filed this lawsuit against Brett Bezzant, an
individual; and Newtah, Inc., dba The American Fork Citizen New Utahl, a Utah
corporation, in the Fourth Judicial District Court for Utah County, State of Utah. Jacob's
Complaint alleged a claim for defamation against the Citizen and Bezzant.

2.

The Citizen and Bezzant were served with a Summons and a copy of the Complaint on or
about February 13, 2001. The Citizen and Bezzant filed an Answer to the Complaint on
March 2, 2001.

3.

An Attorneys Planning Meeting was held on March 22, 2001 between counsel for the
Citizen and Bezzant and then-counsel for Jacob, David Aagard. At the conclusion of that
meeting, the Citizen and Bezzant served their First Set of Discovery Requests on Jacob.

4.

On June 14, 2001, Mr. Aagard withdrew as counsel for Jacob due to health-related
problems. The Citizen and Bezzant thereafter filed a Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel
requesting that Jacob obtain substitute counsel.

5.

On or about June 18, 2001, The Citizen and Bezzant submitted Defendants' Rule 26(a)(1)
Initial Disclosures designating in part Tom Hunter, Ricky Storrs and Kevin Bennett as
potential trial witnesses.

6.

On July 9, 2001, the law firm of Snow Christensen & Martineau ("Snow Christensen")
entered its appearance on behalf of Jacob. R. Brent Stephens, a partner at Snow
Christensen, specifically appeared on Jacob's behalf.

7.

On July 25, 2001, through Mr. Stephens, Jacob served his First Set of Interrogatories,
Requests for Admissions, and Requests for Production of Documents on the Citizen and
Bezzant.

8.

The Citizen and Bezzant agreed to grant Jacob's new counsel an extension in responding to
its pending discovery requests. On October 24, 2001, Jacob served his Responses to those
requests.

9.

On or about October 25, 2001, Jacob submitted Plaintiffs Rule 26(a)(1) Initial
Disclosures, designating in part claims of specific damages.

10.

On November 9, 2001, Jacob filed Notices for five depositions he planned to take in this
case: Ted Barratt (the Mayor of American Fork City); Tom Hunter (an American Fork City
Councilman); Ricky Storrs (an American Fork City Councilman); Pamela Hunsaker (the
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American Fork City Treasurer); and Kevin Bennett (the American Fork City Attorney).
Those five depositions were taken by Jacob between December 2001 and February 2002.
11.

Jacob agreed to grant the Citizen and Bezzant an extension to respond to his discovery
requests. On December 10, 2001, the Citizen and Bezzant served their Responses to
Jacob's pending discovery requests.

12.

On February 26, 2002, the Citizen and Bezzant filed a Motion to Compel based on Jacob's
alleged refusal to, inter alia, disclose the identity of the members of the Nonpartisan
Citizens Group and to provide documents concerning Jacob's financial condition. That
Motion was fully briefed by the parties, and the Citizen and Bezzant filed a Notice to
Submit the Motion for Decision on April 18, 2002. Because of subsequent events, detailed
below, the Motion to Compel has not yet been heard by the Court.

13.

On May 3, 2002, Jacob moved the Court for leave to file an Amended Complaint. The
Amended Complaint added two new plaintiffs - CPI and Phillips - and eight new
defendants - American Fork City, Mayor Ted Barratt, Tom Hunter, Ricky Storrs, Kevin
Bennett, Terry Fox, Don Hampton, and Carl Wanlass (collectively, the "City Defendants").
The new City Defendants were all various public officials of American Fork City.

14.

In addition to the defamation claim in the original Complaint, the proposed Amended
Complaint added new claims against the Citizen and Bezzant for "false light" and for
violation of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Amended Complaint also
included various claims against the City Defendants, including procurement of defamation
alleging that certain city officials directed Bezzant, who allegedly acted as the City's
implicit agent, in publishing allegedly defamatory material.

15.

On or about June 6, 2002, Jacob filed a Stipulation and Motion for Leave to Amend
Complaint, signed by counsel for all parties, in the Fourth District Court.

16.

On June 12, 2002, the Court granted Jacob leave to file his Amended Complaint and
deemed the Amended Complaint filed as of that date.

17.

On or about July 11, 2002, the City Defendants filed an Answer and Jury Demand.

18.

On July 15, 2002, the Citizen and Bezzant filed an Answer and Counterclaim to the
Amended Complaint. The Citizen's and Bezzant's Counterclaim alleged three causes of
action: a claim under Utah's Citizen Participation in Government Act, Utah Code Ann. §
78-58-101, et seq. (the "Anti-SLAPP Statute"); Wrongful Civil Proceedings; and Bad Faith
Action under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.

19.

On July 31, 2002, and pursuant to the Anti-SLAPP Statute, the Citizen and Bezzant filed a
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Motion for Summary Judgment seeking
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dismissal of Jacob's and the other Plaintiffs' claims against the Citizen and Bezzant.
20.

Pursuant to the Anti-SLAPP Statute, all discovery in this case was automatically stayed
upon the filing of the Citizen }s and Bezzant's Motion as of July 31, 2002. See Utah Code
Ann. §78-58-104(l)(a).

21.

On August 19, 2002, Counterclaim Defendants, CPI and Phillips, filed a Notice of Removal
seeking to remove this case to the United States District Court for the District of Utah.
The case was initially assigned to Judge Dee V. Benson, but was later transferred to Judge
Ted Stewart.

22.

On August 26, 2002, Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss
Counterclaim seeking dismissal of the Citizen's and Bezzant's Counterclaim. Additionally,
Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants filed a Notification of Claim of Unconstitutionality in
the Federal Court.

23.

On September 5, 2002, the Citizen and Bezzant filed a Motion to Remand this case back to
the Fourth District Court.

24.

On September 19, 2002, the City Defendants filed a Motion to Disqualify Snow
Christensen as counsel for Plaintiffs based on alleged conflicts of interest. In particular, the
City Defendants alleged that Snow Christensen had previously represented some of the
City Defendants on matters that were substantially related to the instant case.

25.

On October 2, 2002, Jacob - along with five other named plaintiffs ~~fileda new lawsuit in
federal court, purporting to be a class action, entitled Crookston, et ah v. American Fork
City, et aL, Case No. 2:02-CV-1094 (the "Federal Lawsuit"). Mr. Stephens and Snow
Christensen appeared as Plaintiffs' counsel in the Federal Lawsuit. The defendants in the
Federal Lawsuit are the same City Defendants. The Citizen and Bezzant were not named
defendants in the Federal Lawsuit. The Federal Lawsuit was eventually assigned to Judge
Paul G. Cassell.

26.

On October 10, 2002, Jacob moved to consolidate this case with the Federal Lawsuit on
the grounds that many of the issues in the lawsuits were allegedly similar. On that same
date, Plaintiffs also opposed the Citizen's and Bezzant's Motion to Remand and requested
that the case remain in federal court.

27.

On October 17, 2002, Plaintiffs opposed the City Defendants' Motion to Disqualify Snow
Christensen as counsel for Plaintiffs.

28.

On November 7, 2002, David W. Slagle, chairman of the board of Snow Christensen, filed
a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Record for Plaintiffs. On the same day, Mr. Slagle,
on behalf of Snow Christensen, moved to withdraw its opposition to the Motion to
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Disqualify filed by the City Defendants.
29.

Snow Christensen simultaneously moved to withdraw as counsel for Plaintiffs in the
Federal Lawsuit based on the same conflicts of interest.

30.

Soon thereafter, Plaintiffs retained a different attorney to oppose Snow Christensen's
Motion to Withdraw. On November 18, 2002, James Lowrie and the law firm of Jones
Waldo Holbrook & McDonough entered their special appearance for this purpose.

31.

Also on November 18, 2002, R. Brent Stephens filed a "Notice of Recertification of
Memorandum and Affidavit Pursuant to Rule 11" in which Mr. Stephens argued that there
was no basis for his own firm's withdrawal as counsel for Plaintiffs.

32.

On November 25, 2002, Plaintiffs filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Snow
Christensen's Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, and a Memorandum in Opposition to Snow
Christensen's Motion to Withdraw their opposition to the Motion to Disqualify. These
briefs were signed by Mr. Lowrie on Plaintiffs' behalf.

33.

On December 4, 2002, the Citizen and Bezzant filed a Waiver of Oral Argument on their
Motion to Remand and Request for Decision on the Briefs.

34.

On December 31, 2002, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Take Deposition of Don Hampton
Pursuant to Rule 30(2)(c) and requested an expedited hearing on this Motion. Plaintiffs
noticed Mr. Hampton's deposition for January 29-31, 2003. The deposition was requested
pursuant to three pending cases: the present case, the Federal Lawsuit, and a separate case
pending in the Fourth District Court before Judge Stott, Case No. 990402547, in which
CPI was the plaintiff.

35.

On January 9, 2003, the Citizen and Bezzant filed a Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiffs' Motion to Take Deposition of Don Hampton on the grounds that, inter alia, all
discovery in this case had been stayed under the Anti-SLAPP Statute.

36.

Plaintiffs also sought to depose Mr. Hampton in the Federal Lawsuit. On January 10,
2003, Plaintiffs filed a Stipulation and Motion in the Federal Lawsuit, signed by counsel for
the City Defendants, which stipulated and agreed to take the concurrent deposition of Don
Hampton on January 29, 2003.

37.

On January 15, 2003, Judge Cassell held a hearing in the Federal Lawsuit on Snow
Christensen's Motion to Withdraw as Jacob's counsel. Judge Cassell granted the Motion
to Withdraw based on Snow Christensen's admitted conflict of interest, but permitted R.
Brent Stephens to take the deposition of Don Hampton in the Federal Lawsuit as agreed
upon by Plaintiffs and the City Defendants on January 29, 2003.
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38.

On January 16, 2003, Judge Ted Stewart granted the Citizen \s and Bezzant's Motion to
Remand without oral argument, finding that the case had been improperly removed by
Plaintiffs and remanding this case back to the Fourth District Court. Judge Stewart denied
the Citizen \s and Bezzant's request for attorneys' fees.

39.

On January 29 and 30, 2003, Mr. Hampton's deposition was taken by Plaintiffs.

40.

On January 31, 2003, based on Judge Cassell's ruling in the Federal Lawsuit, the Citizen
and Bezzant filed a Second Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel requesting that Jacob
obtain new counsel in this case. On February 24, 2003, Plaintiffs filed an Objection to this
Notice (through Mr. Stephens) on the basis that this Court had not yet granted the Motion
to Withdraw in this case, and that Judge Cassell's ruling in the Federal Lawsuit was not
binding.

41.

On April 8, 2003, the Citizen and Bezzant filed Notices to Submit for Decision requesting
a ruling on Snow Christensen's Motion to Withdraw as Counsel and on the City
Defendants' Motion to Disqualify, both of which had been fully briefed.

42.

On July 1, 2003, the Citizen and Bezzant filed a Third Notice to Appear or Appoint
Counsel requesting that Jacob obtain new counsel in this case so that the pending motions
could be heard. On July 25, 2003, Plaintiffs again objected to this Notice, arguing that the
Motion to Withdraw had not yet been granted.

43.

On August 13, 2003, following a telephone conference with the parties, this Court issued a
Minute Entry clarifying that it had not yet received any portion of the file compiled by the
federal court after this case was removed by Plaintiffs, which prevented consideration of
some of the pending motions. The Citizen and Bezzant therefore undertook to obtain the
record compiled while this case was pending in federal court and submitted a full copy of
this record to the Court on August 15, 2003.

44.

This Court then scheduled oral arguments for November 6, 2003 on Snow Christensen's
Motion to Withdraw as Counsel and the City Defendants'1 Motion to Disqualify.

45.

On October 24, 2003, Plaintiffs (still acting through Mr. Stephens) filed a Motion to Stay
or, in the Alternative, to Dismiss this Action Without Prejudice. This Motion sought to
stay this case until the Federal Lawsuit was resolved, and further requested that the Motion
be considered prior to the Court's consideration of the Motion to Withdraw and the
Motion to Disqualify.

46.

On November 4, 2003, the Citizen and Bezzant filed a Memorandum opposing Plaintiffs'
latest Motion on the grounds that Mr. Stephens' continued participation in the case was
improper given the pending conflicts issues, and because the Citizen and Bezzant were not
parties to the Federal Lawsuit.
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47.

On November 6, 2003, the Court heard oral argument on Snow Christensen's Motion to
Withdraw as Counsel and the City Defendants' Motion to Disqualify. By bench ruling on
that date, the Court granted Snow Christensen's Motion to Withdraw, effective
immediately, and instructed counsel for the Citizen and Bezzant to prepare and serve a
Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel on Plaintiffs. The Court deferred consideration of
the Motion to Stay until Plaintiffs had obtained new counsel.

48.

On November 6, 2003, the Citizen and Bezzant filed and served a Fourth Notice to Appear
or Appoint Counsel pursuant to the Court's order.

49.

On December 10, 2003, Mr. Randall K. Spencer entered his appearance as counsel of
record for Plaintiffs in this case.

50.

On January 6, 2004, Plaintiffs moved the Court to dismiss without prejudice all claims
asserted by Plaintiffs against the City Defendants, to which the City Defendants stipulated.
The Court subsequently granted this Motion.

51.

On February 2, 2004, Plaintiffs filed their Memorandum in Opposition to the Citizen \s and
Bezzant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Motion for Summary Judgment.
On that same date, the Citizen and Bezzant filed a Memorandum opposing Plaintiffs'
Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim.

52.

Both the Citizen's and Bezzant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Motion for
Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim were subsequently
fully briefed and submitted to the Court for decision. The Court heard oral argument on
these Motions on March 16, 2004.
IT.
FACTUAL SUMMARY

1.

Newtah is a Utah corporation that, during the relevant time frame, owned and operated the
print newspaper American Fork Citizen New Utah and the online version New Utah. Brett
Bezzant was, during the relevant time frame, the publisher of the American Fork Citizen
New Utah.

2.

The Citizen newspaper is published on a weekly basis and contains news coverage of local
events as well as editorials on politics, current events, and other issues. The Citizen has
approximately 3,000 subscribers.

3.

In October 1999 Jacob asked the Citizen to publish a political advertisement. Jacob then
produced and paid for a political bulletin/advertisement claiming that Rick Storrs and Tom
Hunter were legally prohibited from holding seats of the American Fork City Council
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because both individuals were already connected to the City through ties that would create
a conflict of interest. The Citizen published Jacob's advertisement on October 27, 1999,
the final issue of the citizen published prior to the election.
4.

The content of Jacob's political advertisement is set forth below:
NONPARTISAN CITIZENS GROUP INFORMATION BULLETIN
A 1999 ELECTION QUESTION: CAN TWO CITY EMPLOYEES SEEK POLITICAL
OFFICE? FACTS LISTED BELOW....
"••CANDIDATE RICKY STORRS**
STORRS FACT #1: Candidate Storrs is a City employee
functioning under the "Exempt Personnel Policies and
Procedures" of the City. (See City Ordinance No. 92-0520)
STORRS FACT #2:

As a City EMT Ambulance Employee,
Candidate Storrs, by City Personnel Policy, is prohibited
from holding political office while employed by the City.
(See City ordinance #95-05-21).
Candidate Storrs has been
employed by the City for several years. The public record
indicates that Candidate Storrs failed to go on leave without
pay from his City employment, while seeking election to
political office. (See City ordinance #92-05-21)
STORRS FINDINGS OF FACT:

A VOTER'S QUESTION: Will the failure of Candidate Storrs
to go on leave without pay from his City employment create
a special privilege for himself while he is seeking election to
political office, and if elected, will he give up his
employment with the City during the term of his political
office?
••CANDIDATE TOM HUNTER**

#1: Candidate Hunter is employed by the City
as a health insurance consultant functioning under the
"Exempt personnel policies and Procedures" of the City.
(See City Ordinance #92-05-20)

HUNTER FACT
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#2: As a health insurance consultant,
Candidate Hunter, by City Personnel Policy, is prohibited
from holding political office while employed by the City.
(See City Ordinance #92-05-21)
HUNTER FACT

Candidate Hunter has been
employed by the City since 1997. The public record
indicates that Candidate hunter failed to go on leave without
pay from his City employment, while seeking election to
political office. (See City Ordinance #92-05-21)
HUNTER FINDINGS OF FACT:

A VOTER'S QUESTION: Will the failure of Candidate Hunter
to go on leave without pay from his City employment create
a special privilege for himself while he is seeking election to
political office, and if elected, will he give up his
employment with the City during the term of his political
office?
5.

Storrs and Hunter contacted the Citizen and complained about the political advertisement.
Specifically, Hunter and Storrs questioned the veracity of the political advertisement and
objected to the fact that they would not have a chance to rebut such allegations before the
election.

6.

Based on information received from Hunter and Storrs, the Citizen published a political
editorial, or election notice, on the New Utah web site and hand-distributed the election
notice to American Fork Residents on October 30, 1999. (Jacob has characterized the
allegedly defamatory material as an "election notice" whereas Bezzant refers to the
allegedly defamatory material as a "political editorial." This Court will hereinafter refer to
the allegedly defamatory material as an "election notice" to avoid confusion, but the Court
will not attach any weight to such a label.) Bezzant paid the entire cost of printing and
distributing the election notice.

7.

The full content of the Bezzant's election notice is set forth below:
New Utah! Offers apology to Tom Hunter, Rick Storrs for
campaign flyer

Urgent Election Notice!
To: All American Fork Residents
From: Publisher Brett Bezzant, American Fork Citizen New
Utah!
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Correction and Apology to American Fork City Council Candidate
Tom Hunter
The Oct. 27th issue of the American Fork Citizen New Utah!
And New Utah! Shopper carried a political advertisement
that ran as a preprinted flyer, paid and produced by William
T. (Bill) Jacob and others involved in a "Nonpartisan
Citizens Group."
In fairness to Mr. Hunter and his candidacy, New Utah!
apologizes for distributing this flyer without giving Mr.
Hunter the opportunity to respond to what we believe is
false and misleading information regarding his service to
American Fork City.
Mr. Hunter is not and never has been employed by
American Fork City. Neither has he received any employee
compensation nor any other employee benefit from
American Fork City. However, Mr. Hunter does own
Hunter & Associates Insurance and his firm was selected in
1997 to act as an independent insurance broker on the
employee benefits package for American Fork City. His
firm provides this same kind of service for many other
employers.
Since this client/agent relationship with American Fork City
is a potential conflict of interest, Mr. Hunter intends, if
elected, to file a letter with the Mayor clearly identifying the
potential conflict and stating that he will abstain from voting
on any issue that involves his pre-existing interest in the
employee benefits package.
Contrary to what Mr. Jacob's flyer implied, Mr. Hunter is,
to the best of our knowledge, a qualified and eligible city
council candidate and his candidacy has not, in any way,
violated the policies of procedures of American Fork City.
We also apologize to City Councilman Rick Storrs
The same flyer also questioned the candidacy of Rick
Storrs, citing a city personnel ordinance that does not even
apply to Mr. Storr's part-time volunteer employment as a
city EMT. The precedent for his eligibility as a city
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councilman and as an incumbent candidate have been well
established in at least two other elections. We apologize to
Mr. Storrs for distributing misleading information that
would bring his candidacy in question.
Comments on the flyer
Mr. Jacob's flyer is falsely labeled as a "nonpartisan" group.
Since American Fork no longer has political parties, there is
no such thing as a "nonpartisan" group. Unfortunately, this
flyer is a classic example of negative campaigning intended
to hurt one candidate in order to favor another. We believe
it hurts the entire process. Again, we apologize to
Candidates Hunter and Storrs for distributing this
misinformation.
8.

Hunter and Storrs were subsequently elected to the American Fork City Council and
continue to serve as Council members.

9.

On October 26, 200 Jacob filed a Complaint in the instant action against the Citizen.
Jacob's complaint alleged that the Citizen's publication of the editorial defamed Jacobs.

10.

The Citizen filed an Answer to Jacob's Complaint on March 2, 2001. In the Answer, the
Citizen alleged that Jacob's Complaint was a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public
Participation ("SLAPP") designed to discourage the Citizen's commentary on issues of
public interest.

11.

On May 3, 2002, after engaging in a contentious round of discovery, Jacob filed an
Amended Complaint that included American Fork City and various city officials as
defendants. The Complaint alleges a conspiracy between the Citizen and American Fork
officials to deprive Jacob of constitutionally protected rights.

12.

The Citizen filed a Counterclaim against Jacob and two other plaintiffs identified as CPI
and PMC soon after Jacob filed his Amended Complaint. The Counterclaim alleges that
Jacob's actions in this case violated Utah's Anti-SLAPP statute.
III.
ANALYSIS

Defendants Brett Bezzant and Newtah (collectively referred to as "Bezzant") ask this
Court for a judgment on the pleadings, or in the alternative for a summary judgment ruling,
dismissing defendants from Plaintiff William Jacob's lawsuit. Bezzant contends Jacob's claims
should be dismissed for three independent reasons: (1) Jacob's lawsuit is subject to dismissal
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under Utah's Anti-SLAPP statute because its primary purpose is to prevent or chill Bezzant's
proper participation in the process of government, (2) Jacob's claims for defamation and false
light are defective, and (3) Jacob's assertion that Bezzant violated Jacob's constitutional rights
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not fulfill the elements set forth in the statute.
A.

JACOB'S CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED UNDER UTAH'S A N T I - S L A P P STATUTE

Bezzant argues that this lawsuit should be dismissed because Jacob's claims run afoul of
Utah's Anti-SLAPP statute. Specifically, Bezzant contends that Jacob initiated this lawsuit as a
retributive action designed to punish Bezzant's use of political speech and his legitimate
participation in the political process. Conversely, Jacob argues this case does not contain any
indicia of a SLAPP lawsuit because he has pursued this litigation in a good faith effort to prevail
on the merits. Jacob also contends that the Utah Anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to the case
at bar because the legislature passed the statute after Jacob filed his original Complaint.
1.

The Anti-SLAPP statute is applicable in the case at bar.

This Court finds that the Anti-SLAPP statute does apply to the case at bar because the
express language of Utah's Anti-SLAPP statute demonstrates that the statute applies to pleadings
other than the original Complaint. The language found in § 78-58-102(1) of the Utah Code
indicates that the provisions of the Anti-SLAPP statute apply to "any lawsuit, cause of action,
claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or other judicial pleading or filing requesting relief." Utah Code
Ann. § 78-58-102(1) Similarly, § 78-58-105(1) of the Utah Code provides a remedy "upon a
demonstration that the action involving public participation in the process of government was
commenced or continued without a substantial basis in fact and law." Utah Code Ann. § 78-58105(l)(emphasis added). These statutory provisions of the Utah Code clearly indicate that the
Utah Legislature created the Anti-SLAPP statute with the intention that it apply to various
instruments and stages of the litigation proceedings.
Jacob did file his three page original Complaint before the Anti-SLAPP statute became
effective. However, Jacob's filing of an Amended Complaint, consisting of 274 paragraphs and
sixty-three pages of lext, subsequent to the date the statute was implemented brings this litigation
under the purview of the Anti-SLAPP statute. Indeed, under § 78-58-102(1), any judicial
pleading Jacob filed after the Anti-SLAPP statute took effect could conceivably subject Jacob to
the provisions of the Utah Anti-SLAPP statute.
Additionally, the Utah Anti-SLAPP statute is also applicable to the case at bar because it is a
remedial statute. In a 1983 decision, the Utah Supreme Court noted that "remedial and
procedural amendments apply to accrued, pending, and future actions." Stale v. Norton, 675 P.2d
577, 585 (Utah 1983). In an earlier decision, the Court provided guidance as to what constitutes
a remedial statute when it stated that "[sjtatutes enacted to promote and facilitate the
administration of justice are prominent in the category of remedial statutes." State v. Higgs, 656
P.2d998, 1002 (Utah 1982).
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The language of the Anti-SLAPP statute supports an inference that the statute applies to a
variety of pleadings and is a remedial statute intended to further the administration of justice.
Indeed, the statute appears to be a prototypical remedial statute in that it is designed to further the
administration of justice by reducing abusive litigation and providing a remedy to plaintiffs
subjected to harassing lawsuits. As a remedial statute, the Anti-SLAPP statute encompasses
"accrued, pending, and future actions" and can be applied to the case at bar.
2.

Jacob's actions in this litigation arc prohibited by Utah's Anti-SLAPP statute.

When Utah enacted its Anti-SLAPP statute, § 78-58-101 et seq. of the Utah Code, it
joined the growing number of states that have recognized the potential for strategic abuse of the
legal system by individuals and entities attempting to interfere with a party's right to political
commentary and participation. In response to a growing number of "Strategic Lawsuits Against
Public Participation," or "SLAPP" suits, such states have enacted statutes similar to Utah's in an
attempt to deter parties from filing frivolous lawsuits in retaliation for unfavorable political
speech. In Beilenson v. Superior Court of Ventura County, the California Court of Appeals
articulately set forth the policy concerns engendered by SLAPP lawsuits:
SLAPP lawsuits stifle free speech. They undermine the open expression of ideas,
opinions and the disclosure of information. The marketplace of ideas, not the tort
system is the means by which our society evaluates and validates those opinion.
The threat of a SLAPP action brings a disquieting stillness to the sound and fury of
legitimate political debate. The SLAPP action . . . has no place in our courts.
Beilenson v. Superior Court of Ventura County, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 357, 365 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1996).
Utah's Anti-SLAPP statute provides that "a defendant in an action who believes that the
action is primarily based on, relates to, or is in response to an act of the defendant while
participating in the process of government and is done primarily to harass the defendant, may file .
. . a motion for judgment on the pleadings in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 12(c)." Utah Code Ann. § 78-58-103(1). Defendant Brett Bezzant has filed such a motion
in the case at bar. In order to prevail on his Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Bezzant must
demonstrate that the primary purpose of Jacob's lawsuit is "to prevent, interfere with, or chill
[Bezzant's] proper participation in the process of government." Utah Code Ann. § 78-58-104(2).
First, this Court finds that Bezzant's publication of the election notice at issue constitutes
political speech and is afforded significant protection under the First Amendment. In 1976, the
United States Supreme Court identified discussion of political candidate's qualifications for office
as an area of political speech meriting First Amendment protection:
Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are
integral to the operation of the system of government established by our
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Constitution. The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such
expression in order "to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes desired by the people." . . . In a republic
where the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed
choices among candidates for office is essential, for the identities of those who are
elected will inevitably shape the course that we follow as a nation. . . . [I]t can
hardly be doubted that the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most urgent
application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office. Buckley v.
Ka/eo, 424 U.S. 1,14-15(1976).
Bezzant's election notice should be considered protected political speech because the
content of the election notice addresses whether Tom Hunter and Rick Storrs should be eligible to
hold positions on the American Fork City Council. Furthermore, the context surrounding the
publication of the election notice, Bezzant's publication of the election notice in the midst of a
heated political debate in the days leading up to an election, also supports the proposition that the
election notice is prolected political speech. In accordance with the aforementioned case law, this
Court finds that Bezzant's election notice is political speech entitled to broad protection under the
First Amendment.
Second, the evidence presented to this Court intimates that Jacob filed the litigation at
issue for the purpose of chilling Bezzant's political speech and thereby preventing or interfering
with Bezzant's proper participation in the process of government. The lengthy procedural history
set forth in Section I of this opinion supports the proposition that Jacob intended to use this
litigation as a means of punishing Bezzant for Bezzant's publication of the political speech
contained in the election notice.
B.

JACOB'S CLAIMS FOR DEFAMATION AND FALSE LIGHT LACK LEGAL MERIT

Bezzant argues that Jacob's claims for defamation and false light are legally defective
because (1) Jacob did not plead special damages, (2) the allegedly defamatory language is
protected by Utah's "public interest" privilege and Jacob has not demonstrated that Bezzant acted
with malice, (3) the allegedly defamatory language does not convey defamatory meaning, (4) the
allegedly defamatory language is a non-actionable expression of editorial opinion, and (5) any
statements of fact contained in the allegedly defamatory language are truthful and not defamatory.
Conversely, Jacob contends that his claims for defamation and false light should not be dismissed
because the allegedly defamatory language at issue is not protected speech and Jacob has
established a prima facie case for defamation. This Court finds that Jacob's claims for defamation
and false light are defective for the reasons discussed below.
1.

Jacob failed to adequately plead special damages

Under Utah law, defamation can be either per se, in which case damage is implied, or per
quod, in which case the plaintiff must specifically plead "special damages," / e. specific,
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measurable out-of-pocket losses. If a complaint does not allege special damages, then the
allegedly defamatory statements must constitute defamation per se in order for damages to be
recoverable. Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, No. 1:95CV0094K, 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 22143
(D.Utah 1999).
The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that slander per se only exists under the following
circumstances:
In order to constitute slanderer se, without a showing of special harm, it is
necessary that the defamatory words fall into one of four categories: (1) charge of
criminal conduct, (2) charge of a loathsome disease, (3) charge of conduct that is
incompatible with the exercise of a lawful business, trade, profession, or office; and
(4) charge of the unchastity of a woman. If the words spoken do not apply to one
of the foregoing classifications, special harm must be alleged. Alfred v. Cook, 590
P.2d 318, 320 (Utah 1979).
Whether the words of the election notice fall into one of the categories set forth in Alfred is a
question of law for the court. Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Haugen,^o. 1:95CV0094K, 1999 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 22143 (D. Utah 1999).
Jacob contends that the allegedly defamatory language at issue constitutes libel per se,
rather than slander, because the language was disseminated in writing. Therefore, Jacob argues
that a libel per se standard should be used in the case at bar. In 1981, the Utah Supreme Court
indicated that libel is classified as per se if it contains "defamatory words specifically directed at
the person claiming injury, which words must, on their face, and without the aid of intrinsic proof,
be unmistakably recognized as injurious." Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968, 977 n. 7 (Utah
1981). However, nearly ten years after Seegmiller was decided, the Utah Supreme Court
revisited the issue of defamation per se in Larson v. Sysco Court and employed the Alfred fourcategory test, despite the fact that the allegedly defamatory language in Larson involved a written
termination report. Larson v. Sysco Court, 767 P.2d 557 (Utah 1989). Specifically, the Larson
Court dismissed Larson's libel claim because the claim did not allege criminal conduct, a
loathsome disease, unchaste behavior, or operation of an unlawful business. Id. at 560. Through
its ruling, the Larson Court implicitly rejected the use of disparate standards for libel per se and
slander per se and adopted Alfred's four-category test as applicable to both forms of defamation.
This Court finds that Bezzant's election notice does not constitute defamation per se. Even Jacob
acknowledges that the election notice alleges, at most, that Jacob acted dishonestly by
disseminating misinformation to the public. Such claims do not constitute allegations of criminal
conduct, a loathsome disease, unchaste behavior, or operation of an unlawful business. Since
Jacob's allegations do not fit any of the categories outlined in Alfred, the election notice at issue is
not defamatory per se. Because the election notice does not constitute defamation per se, Jacob's
failure to plead special damages with specificity is fatal to his defamation claim.
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2. The allegedly defamatory statements are protected by Utah's "public interest
privilege11
Utah recognizes a qualified privilege for publications regarding a matter of public interest.
Utah Code Ann. § 45-2-3(5). The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that the privilege certainly
applies "when there is a legitimate issue with respect to the functioning of governmental bodies,
officials, or public institutions, or with respect to matters involving the expenditure of public
funds." Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc, 626 P.2d 968, 978 (Utah 1981). In order to overcome the
privilege the plaintiff must demonstrate that the publication was made with common law malice,
was excessively published, or that the defendant had no reasonable belief in the truth of the
statements made. Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 904-05 (Utah 1992).
This Court finds that the content of the election notice at issue is protected by Utah's
"public interest privilege" because the election notice addressed the qualifications of candidates
for public office and was published in the midst of a heated political debate surrounding those
candidates. Indeed, the evidence presented before this Court indicates that there was substantial
public awareness and concern regarding the candidacies and qualifications of Tom Hunter and
Rick Storrs.
Furthermore, Jacob's allegations and the facts of the case at hand demonstrate that Jacob
has not overcome the public interest privilege. In order to defeat this privilege, Jacob must prove
that Bezzant's statements in the election notice "were made with ill will, were excessively
published, or [Bezzant] did not reasonably believe his or her statements were true." Russell v
Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 904-05 (Utah 1992). None of the evidence presented
before this Court satisfies Jacob's burden of proof in this instance.
Jacob has nol shown that Bezzant's publication was motivated by ill will. In fact, the
allegations set forth in Jacob's Amended Complaint indicate that Bezzant was not motivated by
personal animus. Instead Jacob alleges that he and Bezzant enjoyed a six-year working
relationship prior to Bezzant's publication of the election notice and that Bezzant published the
allegedly defamatory language under the coercive influence of Hunter and Storrs.
Nor has Jacob adequately demonstrated that Bezzant's election notice was excessively
published. Utah law indicates that excessive publication can only occur where "publication of the
defamatory material extended beyond those who had a legally justified reason for receiving it."
DeBry v. Godbe, 992 P.2d 979 (Utah 1999). Jacob's Amended Complaint states that the editorial
was only published twice: once in a preprinted article and once on the Newtah Internet website.
Furthermore, the circumstances surrounding the publication at issue indicate that the election
notice was published in an attempt to respond to an earlier political advertisement that Jacob
published in Bezzant's newspaper. While it is true that the election notice was delivered door-todoor in American Fork and perhaps had somewhat broader exposure than the newspaper's
circulation of 3,000 households, the publication of the material did not extend beyond those who
had a legally justified reason for receiving it. Bezzant's publication of the election notice was
primarily directed to citizens of American Fork who had a direct interest in the upcoming election.
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Under such circumstances, the context and scope of Bezzant's publication of the election notice
indicate that Bezzant did not excessively publish the notice.
Finally, Jacob has not shown that Bezzant knew the content of his election notice was
false. Indeed, the evidence and facts presented to this Court support the proposition that the
election notice's interpretation of certain City ordinances was the official legal interpretation of
such ordinances as set forth by American Fork's political officials and legal counsel. Additionally,
Jacob has presented no evidence that demonstrates Bezzant had reason to doubt the veracity of
the information included in his election notice. Therefore, Jacob has failed to meet the requisite
level of proof required to overcome the "public interest privilege" associated with Bezzant's
publication of the election notice.
3. The allegedly defamatory statements do not convey defamatory meaning as a matter of
law
Perhaps the principle defect in Jacob's defamation and false light claims is the fact that the
allegedly defamatory statements at issue do not carry defamatory meaning as a matter of law.
"Whether a statement is capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning is a question of law [.]" West
v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1008 (Utah 1994). The Utah Supreme Court has
provided guidance for courts attempting to determine whether a statement conveys defamatory
meaning. Specifically, the Utah Supreme Court has indicated that "a publication is not
defamatory simply because it is nettlesome or embarrassing to a plaintiff, or even because it makes
a false statement about the plaintiff." Cox v. Hatch, 16\ P.2d 556, 561 (Utah 1988). Rather, a
court should look to whether reasonable people could reasonably infer defamatory meaning from
the statement at issue. Id. Furthermore, in determining whether a particular statement conveys
defamatory meaning, a court "must carefully examine the context in which the statement was
made, giving the words their most common and accepted meaning." West v. Thomson
Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1009 (Utah 1994).
The facts of the case at bar are quite similar to those found in Mast v. Overson, 971 P.2d
928 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); and therefore, an analysis of Mast provides valuable guidance as to
whether the statements in the case at bar convey defamatory meaning.
In Mast, David Mast, a private citizen, opposed the development of a local golf course.
Mast published an anonymous advertisement arguing against the golf course in the local Salt Lake
City newspapers. In this advertisement, signed by "The Citizen Taxpayers of Utah," Mast alleged
that Salt Lake County Commissioner Brent Overson "misleads the public and continues to violate
state law" by holding secret meetings and failing to disclose government records. Mast v.
Overson, 971 P.2d 928, 929-30 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)
Overson subsequently held a press conference for the purpose of responding to Mast's
allegations. At the press conference Overson identified Mast as the individual who placed and
paid for the newspaper ad in question. Overson also stated that the ad was "politically motivated,
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mean spirited, and a sham. Finally, Overson asserted that Mast had engaged in "character
assassination" with an ad that was "rife with misstatements and bare-faced lies." Mast v Overson,
971 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Mast sued Overson for defamation resulting from the
statements Overson made during the press conference.
The Utah Court of Appeals held that Overson's statements were not defamatory. Within
its ruling, the Court set forth some of the policy considerations undergirding its ruling: "Overson's
statements were not defamatory as a matter of law. The discourse between Mast and Overson is
commendable for demonstrating why 'debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open,' and statements made in the course of such debate do not become compensable
merely because they 'include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks.'"
Mast v. Overson, 971 P.2d 928, 934 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). One section of the Mast ruling is
particularly applicable to the case at bar. Commenting on Overson's statement that Mast's ad
was "rife with misstatements and bare-faced lies," the Appellate Court held that, "because these
statements were published in the context of a political debate on a public issue and the audience
was thus not apt to take them at face value, there was no likelihood of damage to Mast's
reputation and the statements, therefore, were not defamatory." Id. at 933.
As previously mentioned, the similarities between Mast and the case at bar arc striking.
First, just as the golf course controversy in Mast generated significant public controversy, Hunter
and Storrs candidacies for the American Fork City Counsel attracted a great deal of public
attention. Second, like Mast, Jacob placed an anonymous political ad in a local paper and used
that ad as a vehicle for attacking the controversial actions of specific public officials. Third, like
Overson, Bezzant publicly identified the individual who placed the political ad (Jacob) and
indicated that he believed the political ad contained "false and misleading information." Finally,
like Mast, Jacob sued Bezzant for defamation under the premise that Bezzant's imputation that
Jacob's article was misleading harmed Jacob's reputation.
Amidst all these similarities, two differences between Mast and the case at bar have
captured this Court's attention: (1) Mast's voluntary involvement in the golf course controversy
may have been greater than Jacob's involvement in the election controversy, and (2) the allegedly
defamatory language in Mast was significantly more vitriolic than the language at issue in the case
at bar.
First, Jacob contends that Mast is quite dissimilar from the case at bar because Mast
actively sought the public spotlight in connection with the golf course controversy while Jacob
attempted to remain anonymous in regard to the election controversy. Jacob points out that Mast
was quoted and identified as the President of Citizen Taxpayers of Utah in various newspaper
articles and was even publicly interviewed regarding the golf course controversy. Based on such
actions, Jacob argues that, Mast should be considered a public figure for defamation purposes.
Conversely, Jacob asserts that his own actions in the case at bar are consistent with those of a
private individual in that such actions demonstrate Jacob's desire to avoid the public spotlight.
Jacob asserts that this public/private figure distinction is a critical difference between Mast and the
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litigation presently before the Court.
This Court cannot agree with Jacob's characterization of his actions as being consistent
with those of a private citizen attempting to avoid the political spotlight. In the two year's leading
up to Bezzant's publication of the election notice, Jacob was featured or quoted in at least fifty
one different newspaper articles. Many of these articles focused on American Fork politics and
highlighted clashes between elected officials and certain members of the local citizenry. Indeed,
one article describes Jacob as having a "constant presence" in local politics and notes that Jacob is
present at most meetings of the City Council. (See WTJ0393 and 0408 in Exhibit "A" of
Defendant's Reply Memorandum). The evidence presented before this Court belies the
proposition that Jacob is a private individual and indicates that Jacob has repeatedly sought the
public spotlight when commenting on local political issues.
Furthermore, this Court rejects Jacob's argument that the public/private figure distinction
is a pivotal issue in the case at bar. Rather, the Court finds that it need not consider Jacob's status
as a public or private figure for purposes of determining whether Bezzant's election notice
conveyed defamatory meaning. Despite Jacob's attempt to portray the Mast decision as revolving
on the standard of fault issue, that issue never arose in Mast and does not appear in the Mast
court's opinion. A plaintiffs status as a public or private figure generally only comes into play
when determining what standard of fault should be applied to a defamation defendant.
Accordingly, the public/private figure distinction should not be a consideration that significantly
affects a court's determination as to whether allegedly defamatory language actually conveys
defamatory meaning as a matter of law.
Second, the allegedly defamatory language in Mast is much more caustic than the
language at issue in the current litigation. Whereas Bezzant indicated that he believed Jacob's
political advertisement to be "false" "misleading," and "misinformation"; Overson described
Mast's political advertisement in much more vitriolic terms. Specifically, Overson characterized
Mast's political advertisement as being "deceptive . . . mean spirited, . . . and rife with
misstatements and bare-faced lies." Mast v. Overson, 971 P.2d 928, 930 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
Despite Overson's scathing characterization of Mast's political advertisement, the Utah Court of
Appeals found that Overson had not defamed Mast because "these statements were published in
the context of a political debate on a public issue and the audience was thus not apt to take them
at face value." Id. at 933. The Court of Appeals further held that since "there was no likelihood
of damage to Mast's reputation . . . the statements . . . were not defamatory." Id. Since
Bezzant's statements regarding Jacob's political advertisement were considerably less caustic than
Overson's diatribe, and because Bezzant's statements were published in the context of a political
debate on a public issue, this Court follows the lead of the Utah Court of Appeals and holds that
Bezzant's characterization of Jacob's political advertisement does not convey defamatory
meaning as a matter of law.
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4.

The allegedly defamatory statements are non-actionable statements of editorial opinion

This Court also finds Jacob's defamation and false light claims are defective because the
allegedly defamatory statements contained in Bezzant's election notice are non-actionable
statements of editorial opinion rather than statements of fact. In order to state a claim for
defamation, a plaintiff must allege defamatory statements of fact that are "capable of being
objectively verified as true of false." West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1018 (Utah
1994). In West, a 1994 case in which a mayor sued a local newspaper for comments appearing in
the newspaper's editorial section, the Utah Supreme Court indicated that "the distinction
[between fact and opinion] can only be based on the totality of circumstances surrounding the
[allegedly defamatory] statement. Id. at 1018. The court then set forth four factors that are
useful in distinguishing fact from opinion: "(1) the common usage or meaning of the words used;
(2) whether the statement is capable of being objectively verified as true or false; (3) the full
context of the statement — for example, the entire article or column — in which the defamatory
statement is made; and (4) the broader setting in which the statement appears." Id.
Jacob's Amended Complaint only identifies four allegedly defamatory phrases in Bezzant's
election notice. These phrases are quoted, in context, below. The allegedly defamatory phrases
are in bold:
(1) In fairness to Mr. Hunter and his candidacy, New Utah! apologizes for
distributing this flyer without giving Mr. Hunter the opportunity to respond to
what we believe is false and misleading information regarding his service
American Fork City.
(2) Mr. Jacob's flyer is falsely labeled as a Nonpartisan group. Since
American Fork no longer has political parties, there is no such thing as a
"nonpartisan group."
(3) Unfortunately, this flyer is a classic example of negative campaigning
intend to hurt one candidate in order to favor another. We believe it hurts the
entire process.
(4) Again, we apologize to Candidates Hunter and Storrs for distributing this
misinformation.
These statements apparently constitute the entire basis for Jacob's defamation and false light
claims. It is the opinion of this Court that, under the factors set forth in West, the phrases at issue
should be considered statements of editorial opinion rather than statements of fact.
First, the common meaning of the allegedly defamatory words in the Editorial suggests
that the words are nothing more than political rhetoric common to public debates. Phrases such
as "negative campaigning," "nonpartisan, and "misinformation" are frequently used in connection
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with politics and political issues. Furthermore, Bezzant qualifies phrases like "false and
misleading information" by stating that "we believe" the information in Jacob's political
advertisement is false. Bezzant's repeatedly uses phrases like "we believe" and "to the best of our
knowledge" throughout the election notice and thereby intimates that the election notice contains
editorial opinions rather than statements of fact. Indeed, this Court finds that, according to their
"common meaning or usage," the phrases "we believe" and "to the best of our knowledge" carry a
connotation that the speaker/writer using such phrases is stating an opinion rather than a fact.
Second, none of the allegedly defamatory statements in the election notice can be
objectively verified as true or false. With regard to the first phrase, Bezzant's use of the words
"we believe" creates a statement of subjective intent immune to objective verification. The second
phrase merely expresses Bezzant's opinion that the designation "nonpartisan citizens group is
meaningless because American Fork City no longer has political parties. Similarly, in the third
phrase at issue, Bezzant merely expresses the opinion that Jacob's political advertisement is a
classic example of negative campaigning that "we believe . . . hurts the entire process." The final
phrase at issue, where Bezzant apologizes for publishing "misinformation," merely echoes the
qualified opinion Bezzant expressed at the beginning of the election notice and should not be
construed as a statement of fact.
Third, the overall tone of Bezzant's election notice, coupled with the fact that phrases like
"we believe" and "to the best of our knowledge" are liberally sprinkled throughout the text,
intimates that the content of the election notice should be construed as editorial opinion rather
than factual statements.
Fourth, the election notice regarding Hunter and Storrs candidacies was published during
the final days of a heated political debate leading up to the American Fork City elections. Utah
case law suggests that "courts are much more likely to construe statements as opinion when they
are made by participants in, and people who comment on, political campaigns." West v
Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1018 (Utah 1994).
Based on the foregoing analysis, this Court holds that the allegedly defamatory statements
contained in Bezzant's election notice should be considered expressions of editorial opinion rather
than statements of fact. Therefore, such statements cannot support Jacob's defamation and false
light claims.
C.

JACOB'S

42 U.S.C. § 1983 CLAIMS LACK LEGAL MERIT

1. Jacob's § 1983 claims fail because Bezzant did not publish the allegedly defamatory
language "under color of lawM
Bezzant contends, among other things, that Jacob's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should
be dismissed because Jacob cannot show that Bezzant published the allegedly defamatory
statements under "color of law." In contrast, Jacob argues his § 1983 claims are meritorious in
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that Bezzant acted under "color of law" by publishing the allegedly defamatory language at the
direction of American Fork City public officials. This Court finds that Jacob's §1983 claims are
not meritorious because Bezzant did not act "under color of law" when he published the allegedly
defamatory language at issue.
"To state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . the challenged conduct must
constitute state action." Scott v. Hern, 216 F. 3d 897, 906 (10th Cir. 2000). Furthermore,
"attempts to charge the media with state action have generally met with a cool reception in the
courts." Jones v. Taibbi, 508 F. Supp. 1069, 1073 n. 6 (D. Mass. 1981). In such cases "[e"|ven a
'considerable degree of cooperation' between a private party and the state does not, standing
alone, justify a finding that the challenged action . . . occurred under color of state law." Id at
1073 n. 7. Indeed, in situations similar to the case at bar, courts have held that journalists
involved in publishing newspaper articles have not engaged in the requisite state action to support
state action claims. Idema v. Wager 120 F. Supp. 2d 361, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
Under the case law previously cited, and in light of the undisputed fact that Bezzant is not
a government official, Jacob's claim that the Bezzant was acting under "color of law" can only be
sustained if Bezzant voluntarily published the statements at issue at the behest of a government
official acting in an official capacity. Jacob claims that Bezzant acted "under color of law" by
publishing the allegedly defamatory language at the behest of American Fork City Councilman
Rick Storrs. In effect, Jacob is asserting that his § 1983 claims derive from a conspiracy between
American Fork City and Brett Bezzant. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has indicated that, in
light of the potential for abusive lawsuits, courts impose a heightened pleading standard on § 1983
conspiracy claims: "When a plaintiff in a § 1983 action attempts to assert the necessary 'state
action' by implicating state officials . . . in a conspiracy with private defendants, mere conclusory
allegations with no supporting factual averments are insufficient; the pleadings must specifically
present facts tending to show agreement and concerted action." Scott v. Hern, 216 F.3d 897 (10th
Cir. 2000).
This Court holds that Jacob has not met the heightened pleadings standard applied to §
1983 conspiracy claims. Indeed, Jacob's § 1983 claims against Bezzant appear to be nothing
more than conclusory allegations that lack the requisite factual undergirding necessary to survive
summary judgment. Even Jacob's own allegations in prior pleadings indicate that Bezzant was
not acting under "color of law" when he published the allegedly defamatory statements.
Specifically, in his Amended Complaint Jacob alleges that Councilman Storrs was acting for his
own private pecuniary benefit when Store's convinced Bezzant to publish the alleged defamation.
Therefore, according to the arguments set forth in Jacob's Amended Complaint, Storrs was not
acting in his official capacity when he asked Bezzant to publish the statements at issue. Since
Storrs was not acting in his official capacity during the time in question, Bezzant's publication of
the allegedly defamatory language cannot have a sufficient nexus with state action to support
Jacob's § 1983 claim.
Furthermore, this Court finds that Bezzant cannot be implicated in the conspiracy Jacob
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has alleged if, as Jacob asserted in his Amended Complaint, American Fork government officials
used coercive threats to procure Bezzant's publication of the election notice at issue. Amended
Complaint Iff 172-74. Jacob's allegations that American Fork officials threatened Bezzant with
lawsuits and lost advertising opportunities prevents Jacob from now claiming that Bezzant should
be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for depriving Jacob of his civil rights.
2.

Bezzant is awarded attorney fees in connection with Jacob's § 1983 claims

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, "in any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section! J .
. . 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983 . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other
than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).
Under the facts of this case, and in light of the extensive procedural history associated with
Jacob's claims, this Court exercises its discretion and awards Bezzant attorney fees and costs
associated with litigating Jacob's § 1983 claims. Such fees and costs shall be submitted by
affidavit.
D.

BEZZANT'S COUNTERCLAIM IS NOT DISMISSED

The facts and legal arguments pertaining to Bezzant's Counterclaim arc inextricably
intertwined with the facts and arguments concerning Jacob's Complaint. Therefore, based on the
foregoing legal analysis and in reliance on the facts and arguments previously addressed in this
ruling, the Court finds Jacob has not met his burden of proof and declines to dismiss Bezzant's
Counterclaim against Jacob.
IV.
CONCLUSION

Pursuant to the discussion outlined above, this Court hereby grants Defendant's Motion
For Judgment On The Pleadings And/Or Motion For Summary Judgment and Denies Plaintiffs
Motion To Dismiss Counterclaim. Brett Bezzant's counsel is instructed to prepare an order
consistent with the findings contained herein.
DATED this / ^ d a y of April, 2004.

Fourth District Court Judge
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BRETT BEZZANT, an individual;
NEWT AH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation,
Counterclaimants,
vs.
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual;
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah
corporation; and PHILLIPS
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., a
Utah corporation,
Counterclaim Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by Defendants and Counterclaimants Brett Bezzant
("Bezzant") andNewtah, Inc. ("Newtah") d/b/a The American Fork Citizen New Utah! (collectively,
the "Citizen'), and on the Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim filed by Plaintiffs and Counterclaim
Defendants William T. Jacob ("Jacob"), Commercial Properties, Inc. ("CPI"), and Phillips
Manufacturing Company ("Phillips") (collectively, "Plaintiffs"). Oral arguments on these Motions
were held on March 16, 2004. Randall K. Spencer appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs, and Jeffrey J.
Hunt and David C. Reymann appeared on behalf of the Citizen.
The Court, having heard the arguments of counsel and carefully considered the motions,
memoranda, and other materials submitted by the parties, issued an extensive written Ruling on
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Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Motion for Summary Judgment, dated
April 2, 2004 (the "Ruling"). The Ruling is incorporated herein by this reference.
As set forth in and consistent with the Ruling, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows:
1.

The Citizen's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Motion for Summary

Judgment is hereby GRANTED. All of Plaintiffs' claims against the Citizen are hereby dismissed
with prejudice and on the merits.
2.

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the Court hereby enters judgment against Plaintiffs,

jointly and severally, for the amount of the attorney fees and costs incurred by the Citizen in
connection with litigating Plaintiffs' claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The amount of this
award shall be submitted by affidavit from the Citizen's counsel. Plaintiffs shall pay the amount of
this judgment to the Citizen no later than thirty (30) days from the date this Court confirms the
amount of the award and enters and order consistent therewith.
3.

Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim is hereby DENIED.

DATED

this iffi^day of April 2004.
BY THE COURT.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

6 day of April 2004, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing ORDER AND JUDGMENT GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND/OR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTERCLAIM was served, via
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on the following:
Randall K. Spencer
SPENCER, SMITH & CARD, LLC

39 West 300 North
Provo, Utah 84601
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

T. JACOB, an individual; COMMERCIAL
PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah Corporation; and
WILLIAM

PHILLIPS MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., a

RULING ON DEFENDANTS'
ATTORNEYS' FEES

Utah Corporation,
Civil No. 000403530

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Judge Lynn W. Davis

BRETT BEZZANT, an individual; NEWTAH, INC.,
dba AMERICAN FORK CITY, a Utah corporation;
AMERICAN FORK CITY, a Utah municipal
corporation; TED BARRATT, an individual;
TERRY FOX, an individual; DON HAMPTON, an
individual; TOM HUNTER, an individual; RICKY
STORRS, an individual; CARL WANLASS, an

individual; and DOES I through X,
Defendants.
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs' Objection to the Affidavit of Jeffery J.
Hunt Regarding Attorneys' Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and Objection to Memorandum of
Costs ("Objection"). These Parties stipulated to waive oral argument on the Objection and to
allow the Court to rule based upon the pleadings. Accordingly, the Court has focused exclusively
on the arguments contained within the memoranda and has not examined any of the other potential
legal theories or arguments. The Court having carefully considered the Memoranda of the Parties
now makes the following ruling.

1

I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1.

On or about October 26, 2000, William T. Jacob filed this lawsuit against Brett Bezzant, an
individual; and Newtah, Inc., dba The American Fork Citizen New Utahl, a Utah
corporation, in the Fourth Judicial District Court for Utah County, State of Utah. Jacob's
Complaint alleged a claim for defamation against the Citizen and Bezzant.

2.

Oral arguments were held on March 16, 2004. Randall K. Spencer appeared on behalf of
William T. Jacob et al., ("Jacob" or "Plaintiffs") and Jeffrey J. Hunt appeared on behalf of
Brett Bezzant et al., ("Bezzant" or "Defendants"). The only question still alive in this
proceeding is whether the attorneys' fees for the claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and costs
of the trial awarded by this court were justly calculated.

3.

This court resolved the underlying First Amendment/slander dispute in this case on April 2,
2004, dismissing Jacob's anti-SLAPP and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims and failing to dismiss
Bezzant's counterclaim. This Court also awarded attorneys' fees to Bezzant in connection
with Jacob's § 1983 claims.

4.

On or about April 6, 2004, Defendants submitted the Affidavit of Jeffery J. Hunt Regarding
Attorneys' Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 ("Affidavit of Fees") stating the fees and
costs incurred in connection with the § 1983 claims.

5.

On or about April 12, 2004, Defendants submitted Brett Bezzant and Newtah, Inc.'s
Memorandum of Costs and Necessary Disbursements ("Memo of Costs") detailing the
costs incurred in connection with this matter pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
54(d).

6.

On or about April 19, 2004, Plaintiffs submitted the Objection.

7.

On or about May 6, 2004, Defendants submitted Brett Bezzant and Newtah, Inc.'s
Response to the Objection ("Response").
II.
ANALYSIS

At the outset it is important to note that Plaintiffs' Objection does not claim that the court

2

acted outside its discretion in granting attorneys' fees pursuant to its 42 U.S.C. § 1988 authority.1
As Defendants' Response notes, "[t]he Court's decision under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 was fully
supported and justified by the record, and it need not be revisited here." [Response at p. 5].
Plaintiffs list three specific objections to the attorneys' fees and costs awarded to the
Defendants. Plaintiffs claim that: 1) Awarding fees and costs to Defendants violates the Law of
the Case doctrine because the federal court already denied attorneys' fees and costs for claim
brought in this matter on January 15, 2003 (therefore, at most the court could award fees for
actions taken after January 15, 2003); 2) the affidavit on fees was not sufficiently specific to show
that the attorneys were working on § 1983 claims; and the hourly rates they charged were
excessive; 3) the court order did not award costs for any part of the trial not related to § 1983
claim, so the cost claimed in Defendants' Memo of Costs should be denied.
A.

Law of the Case Doctrine

Plaintiffs claim that awarding attorneys' fees in this matter, at least before January 15,
2003, is contrary to the federal court's decision not to award fees and violates the law of the case
doctrine, which is designed to avoid "reconsideration of rulings on matters previously decided in
the same case." Gildea v. Guardian Title Company of Utah, 31 P.3d 543, 546 (Utah 2001).
Defendants counters that the federal court was not addressing the underlying merits of the
substantive claims when it refused to award fees and costs. The law of the case doctrine as
addressed in Gildea is not implicated since the substantive claims were not "previously decided" by

1

Plaintiffs maintain that their claims under § 1983 were brought in good faith, but they do not further object to the
Court's April 2, 2002 Ruling where the court exercised discretion pursuant to § 1988 granting reasonable
attorneys' fees for the § 1983 claim. Their objections relate primarily to the way the fees were calculated, not to
the Court's § 1988 authority.
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the federal court and cannot therefore be "reconsidered." Id.
The federal court found that the case had been improperly removed and remanded the
matter back to this Court. Notwithstanding its decision to remand, the federal court found no bad
faith in Plaintiffs' attempt to remove the case and therefore didn't award fees for the removal. The
Response cites the federal court's order finding that "the removal was an attempt to expand
removal law and was made in good faith. Accordingly the court will not award attorneys' fees."
[Response p. 4] However, when the federal court refused to award fees and costs it was
addressing the 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) removal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction claim. As a
result, the federal court's decision not to award fees in the removal matter has nothing to do with
this court's decision to grant the fees under § 1988 in the § 1983 substantive claim. Thus, this
Court's award in no way implicates the law of the case and is appropriate.
B.

Deficiencies in the Affidavit Regarding Fees and Costs
1.

Insufficient Specificity of Attorneys' Fees

Plaintiffs claim that the Affidavit of Fees fails to adequately separate costs and fees
associated with the § 1983 claims from other anti-SLAPP claims that were litigated jointly. In
such cases, attorney fees must be "allocated as to separate claims and/or parties." Valcarce v.
Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 318 (Utah 1998). Plaintiffs also cite Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co.,
56 P.3d 524 (Utah 2002), requiring that the claims for fees be separated into 1) successful claims
for which there may be entitlement to attorney's fees, 2) unsuccessful claims which would have
carried entitlement to attorney's fees, and 3) claims with no entitlement to attorney's fees, so that
fees may be awarded only on prevailing claims. In the case before this Court, the distinction
between successful and unsuccessful claims seems irrelevant since the Defendants prevailed on all
4

claims.
To separate the fees associated with the § 1983 claim, Mr. Hunt conservatively looks at
four isolated proceeding where the § 1983 claim was litigated and asks for fees for one-third of the
hours in each of these matters. He uses only one-third of the hours because there were two other
primary claims litigated along with the § 1983 claim. Plaintiffs' Objection offers no alternative for
calculating the fees, instead they merely state that the Affidavit of Fees has not sufficiently
separated the fees awarded by this Court from the fees spent on other claims jointly litigated.
In contrast, Defendants assert that the Affidavit of Fees completely complies with the rule
governing attorney's fees affidavits, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 73. Upon careful review, this
Court agrees that the Affidavit of Fees provides the amount claimed and explains how this amount
was calculated. Rule 73(b)(2) requires a "reasonably detailed description of the time spent and
work performed." Mr. Hunt identified specific events related to the claim, identified the attorneys
who did the work and gave their billing rates, and reasonably discounted the hours by two-thirds to
account for the unrelated claims that were argued jointly with the § 1983 claim. Rule 73(b)(2)
requires the affidavit to provide "factors showing the reasonableness of the fees." In addition to
the factors above, the Affidavit of Fees states that although this litigation has stretched over four
years with a total bill well over $115,000, the amount claimed is only a small fraction of this total.
Furthermore, the claims in this litigation were always prepared and argued jointly. Consequently,
it would be unreasonable to separate the exact hours and days spent on the § 1983 claim from the
other claims litigated. Mr. Hunt offers his professional judgment that at least one third of this time
was spent on the § 1983 claim. In sum, the Affidavit of Fees meets the standard of reasonableness
required by Rule 73, as well as satisfying the Valcarce requirement of allocating costs to separate

5

claims. 961 P.2dat318.
2.

Excessive Rates

Plaintiffs also argue that the rates charged by attorneys at Parr Waddoups Brown Gee &
Loveless were excessive. However, this claim of excessiveness does not appear to be accurate.
Mr. Hunt testified to the reasonableness of the rate for his experience and expertise in the Salt
Lake City market. Moreover, although the Plaintiffs are currently represented by a less expensive
lawyer from Utah County, during much of this litigation they were represented by the Salt Lake
City office of Snow, Christensen & Martineau.
C.

Award of Costs Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)

Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants' Memo of Costs improperly included the total costs
incurred in this litigation. Plaintiffs claim that because this Court has not expressly awarded these
costs, the Defendant can only collect costs associated with the § 1983 claim.
Defendants rebut this proposition by citing Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1): "[An award of all
costs] shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs." The
court order did not explicitly direct that these costs not be awarded, and this Court's order
allowing fees and costs related to Defendants in the matter of the § 1983 claim should not be
interpreted to preclude Defendants from receiving the other costs associated with the litigation
pursuant to Rule 54. Further, Defendants subtracted the costs included in the § 1988 award of
costs and fees from the total costs claimed in the Memo of Costs to avoid double counting.
Hence, the Memo of Costs conforms to Rule 54 and the costs claimed appear reasonable.
Therefore, this court should grant Defendants' costs of $6,386.f22 for the entire proceeding be paid
by Defendants.
6

III.
CONCLUSION

Accordingly, this Court hereby denies Plaintiffs' Objection to Affidavit of Jeffery J. Hunt
Regarding Attorneys' Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and Objection to Memorandum of
Costs. Consistent with the findings contained herein, the Court will now execute the previously
submitted "Order and Judgment Regarding Award of Attorney Fees and Costs Under 42 U.S.C. §
1988" and the "Order and Judgment Regarding Award of Costs and Necessary Disbursements."
Counsel for Defendants, Mr. Hunt, is hereby instructed to prepare an Order consistent with this
Ruling.

DATED this / ^ ^ a y of August, 2004.
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following people for case 000403530 by the method and on the date
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METHOD
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Mail

Dated this
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Jeffrey J. Hunt, Esq. (5855)
David C. Reymann, Esq. (8495)
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS

185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7840
Facsimile: (801) 532-7750
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaimants
Brett Bezzant and Newtah, Inc. d/b/a American
Fork Citizen New Utah!

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual;
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah
corporation; and PHILLIPS
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., a
Utah corporation,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT
REGARDING AWARD OF COSTS
AND NECESSARY
DISBURSEMENTS

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 000403530

BRETT BEZZANT, an individual;
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation;
AMERICAN FORK CITY, a Utah municipal
corporation; TED BARRATT, an individual;
KEVIN BENNETT, an individual; TERRY
FOX, an individual; DON HAMPTON, an
individual; TOM HUNTER, an individual;
RICKY STORRS, an individual; CARL
WANLASS, an individual; and DOES I
through X,

Judge Lynn W. Davis

Defendants.

BRETT BEZZANT, an individual;
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation,
Counterclaimants,
vs.
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual;
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah
corporation; and PHILLIPS
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., a
Utah corporation,
Counterclaim Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on the Memorandum of Costs and Necessary
Disbursements of Defendants and Counterclaimants Brett Bezzant ("Bezzant") and Newtah, Inc.
("Newtah") d/b/a The American Fork Citizen New Utah! (collectively, the "Citizen ").
The Court having considered the Citizen's Memorandum of Costs and Necessary
Disbursements and the other pertinent materials submitted by the parties, and pursuant to Utah R.
Civ. P. 54(d) and the Court's previously-entered Order and Judgment Granting Defendants' Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs'
Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim, hereby ORDERS as follows:
1.

The Citizen is hereby awarded costs and necessary disbursements in the amount of

$6.386.22.
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2.

Plaintiffs shall pay this judgment to the Citizen within thirty (30) days of the date of

this Order and Judgment.
DATED

this / ? ^ a y of ^/&i<f//J^2004

/
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iton^Lynn W. Davis
Fourth District Court Judge
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185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7840
Facsimile: (801) 532-7750
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaimants
Brett Bezzant and Newtah, Inc. d/b/a American
Fork Citizen New Utah!

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual;
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah
corporation; and PHILLIPS
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., a
Utah corporation,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT
REGARDING AWARD OF
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
UNDER 42 U.S.C. §1988

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 000403530

BRETT BEZZANT, an individual;
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation;
AMERICAN FORK CITY, a Utah municipal
corporation; TED BARRATT, an individual;
KEVIN BENNETT, an individual; TERRY
FOX, an individual; DON HAMPTON, an
individual; TOM HUNTER, an individual;
RICKY STORRS, an individual; CARL
WANLASS, an individual; and DOES I
through X,

Judge Lynn W. Davis

Defendants.

BRETT BEZZANT, an individual;
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation,
Counterclaimants,
vs.
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual;
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah
corporation; and PHILLIPS
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., a
Utah corporation,
Counterclaim Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on the Affidavit of Jeffrey J. Hunt Regarding Attorneys'
Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which was submitted in connection with this Court's written
Ruling on Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Motion for Summary
Judgment, dated April 2,2004. In that Ruling, the Court awarded Defendants and Counterclaimants
Brett Bezzant ("Bezzant") and Newtah, Inc. ("Newtah") d/b/a The American Fork Citizen New Utah!
(collectively, the "Citizen") the amount of the attorney fees and costs incurred by the Citizen in
litigating claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Plaintiffs and Counterclaim Defendants William
T. Jacob ("Jacob"), Commercial Properties, Inc. ("CPI"), and Phillips Manufacturing Company
("Phillips") (collectively, "Plaintiffs").
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The Court having considered the Affidavit of Mr. Hunt and the other pertinent materials
submitted by the parties, hereby ORDERS as follows:
1.

The amount of the award and judgment entered against Plaintiffs, jointly and

severally, and in favor of the Citizen, is determined to be $13,693.94.
2.

Plaintiffs shall pay this judgment to the Citizen within thirty (30) days of the date of

this Order and Judgment.
DATED

this

day of
BY THE COURT:

lon.'i^ynn W. Davis
Fourth District Court Judge
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Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

Jeffrey! Hunt, Esq. (5855)
David C. Reymann, Esq. (8495)
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS

185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7840
Facsimile: (801) 532-7750
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaimants
Brett Bezzant and Newtah, Inc. d/b/a American
Fork Citizen New Utah!

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual;
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah
corporation; and PHILLIPS
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., a
Utah corporation,

ORDER GRANTING
COUNTERCLAIMANTS'
MOTION TO STRIKE AND
MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Civil No. 000403530
BRETT BEZZANT, an individual;
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation;
AMERICAN FORK CITY, a Utah municipal
corporation; TED BARRATT, an individual;
KEVIN BENNETT, an individual; TERRY
FOX, an individual; DON HAMPTON, an
individual; TOM HUNTER, an individual;
RICKY STORRS, an individual; CARL
WANLASS, an individual; and DOES I
through X,
Defendants.

Judge Fred D. Howard
Division 5

BRETT BEZZANT, an individual;
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation,
Counterclaimants,
vs.
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual;
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah
corporation; and PHILLIPS
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., a
Utah corporation,
Counterclaim Defendants.

These matters came before the Court on two motions filed by Defendants and
Counterclaimants Brett Bezzant ("Bezzant") and Newtah, Inc. d/b/a American Fork Citizen New
Utah! ("Newtah") (collectively, the "Citizen"): (1) The Citizen's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, filed October 19, 2004; and (2) The Citizen's Motion to Strike Inadmissible Portions of
Affidavits of David Aagard, R. Brent Stephens, Randall K. Spencer, and William T. Jacob ("Motion
to Strike"), filed March 18, 2005. A hearing was held on both motions at 1:30 p.m. on September
13, 2005, Randall K. Spencer representing Plaintiffs and Counterclaim Defendants, and Jeffrey J.
Hunt and David C. Reymann representing the Citizen. The Court, having considered the pertinent
materials submitted by the parties and having heard the arguments of counsel, issued a written
Ruling Re: Counterclaimants' Motion to Strike Inadmissible Portions of Affidavits of David Aagard,
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R. Brent Stephens, Randall K. Spencer, and William T. Jacob and Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, dated September 16,2005 (the "Ruling"), which is incorporated herein by this reference.
For the reasons set forth in the Ruling and for good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS
the Citizen 9s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike in full and as prayed for.
The Citizen is hereby awarded all costs and reasonable attorneys fees it has incurred in this action
from April 30, 2001 through the date of entry of this Order, less the amount of attorneys fees and
costs already awarded to the Citizen by this Court. The amount of this award shall be established
by affidavit submitted by counsel for the Citizen, subject to Court approval.
DATED

this/p

day of ^/^l^fy^fJ

2005.
BY THE COURT:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 26th day of September 2005, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER GRANTING COUNTERCLAIMANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE AND
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT was served, via facsimile and U.S. Mail,
postage prepaid, on the following:
Randall K. Spencer
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC

3301 North University Ave.
Provo, Utah 84604

\7JWDavid C. Reymann
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Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah
ifiz/oC
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Deputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual;
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah
corporation; and PHILLIPS
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., a
Utah corporation,

RULING RE: PROPOSED ORDER
AND JUDGMENT REGARDING
AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES
AND COSTS UNDER UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-58-105(l)(a)

Plaintiffs,
Case # 000403530
vs.

Judge Fred D. Howard

B. BRETT BEZZANT, an individual,
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation,
and DOES I THROUGH X,

Division 5

Defendants.
BRETT BEZZANT, an individual; NEWTAH,
INC., dba AMERICAN FORK CITIZEN
NEW UTAH, a Utah Corporation,
Counterciaimants,
vs.
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual;
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah
Corporation; and PHILLIPS
MANUFACTURING CO.,
Counterclaim Defendants.
This matter comes before the Court on Counterciaimants' submission of^Proposed Order
and Judgment Regarding Award of Attorneys Fees and Costs Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-58-

105(1) (a). The Court, having reviewed the file and being fully advised in the premises, hereby issues
the following ruling.
RULING
The Court notes that Defendants and Counterclaimants Brett Bezzant and Newtah, Inc.
d/b/a The American Fork Citizen New Utah! (collectively, the "Citizen") submitted a Proposed Order
and Judgment Regarding Award of Attorneys Fees and Costs with an accompanying Affidavit of
Jeffrey J. Hunt on October 21, 2005. On October 27, 2005, Plaintiffs filed an Objection to the
Proposed Order. Defendants filed a Response to Plaintiffs' Objection and a Request to Submit for
Decision on November 14, 2005.
Defendants assert that the basis for the Court's award of costs and reasonable attorney's
fees arises under Section 105(l)(a) of Utah's Citizen Participation in Government Act, Utah Code
Ann. § 78-58-105(l)(a). In his affidavit, counsel for Defendants Jeffrey Hunt attests that he has
reviewed his firm's billing records and his files to confirm the reasonableness and accuracy of the
figures he has claimed. Mr. Hunt has provided the Court with a spreadsheet prepared by his film's
accounting department showing the hours spent and fees and costs incurred by the Citizen on a
monthly basis by each attorney that has worked on the case. Mr. Hunt has also included a printout
of the state court docket in the case and a printout of the docket in the case during the time it was
removed to federal court.
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Plaintiffs object to the proposed order, arguing that they are entitled to conduct discovery
relative to Defendants' counterclaim and that it is inappropriate to award attorneys' fees and costs
on the representations of counsel's affidavit alone. Defendants respond that Plaintiffs have not filed
any objection to Mr. Hunt's affidavit or challenged in any way the reasonableness or accuracy of the
costs and attorneys' fees set forth by Mr. Hunt. Defendants argue that Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure specifies the substantive requirements for affidavits regarding attorneys' fees and
that Mr. Hunt has met the specified requirements. In addition, Defendants respond that the request
for additional discovery is outrageous in the context of this case because it is an attempt to further
prolong litigation that has been pending for more than five years.
The Court notes Plaintiffs' objection to the proposed order and argument regarding
discovery. The Utah Supreme Court has clarified that "[calculation of reasonable attorney fees is
in the sound discretion of the trial court" but "must be supported by evidence in the record." Dixie
State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985,988 (Utah 1988). The Utah Supreme Court has identified four
questions that must be addressed by the trial court before attorneys' fees may be assessed:
1.

What legal work was actually performed?

2.

How much of the work performed was reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute the
matter?

3.

Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with the rates customarily charged in the locality
for similar services?

4.

Are there circumstances which require consideration of additional factors, including those
listed in the Code of Professional Responsibility?
Page 3 of
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Id at 990.
This Court notes that in order to perform a proper analysis of the reasonableness of
Defendants' attorneys' fees and costs, this Court will require more specific information than a
general accounting summary statement and a copy of court dockets. The Court has reviewed Exhibit
"C" of Mr. Hunt's affidavit and requests that Mr. Hunt supplement his affidavit to more fully
delineate the work performed during the months in question and the hours billed to each task. If
such an accounting can no longer be accessed through the law firm's record keeping systems, copies
of the monthly invoices summarized in Exhibit "C" may be an appropriate submission for the
Court's review, or counsel should assess their file and records and prepare a summary of work
performed with attendant hours and billings.
The Court hereby respectfully denies Plaintiffs' request for discovery relating to the award
of attorneys' fees. The Court requests that counsel for Defendants supplement his affidavit within
fourteen (14) days of the date of this Ruling.

Dated this / ^

day of January, 2006.

BY THE COURT:

. >v 'F J ^
HT-JV

JUD'GE FRED D/HOWARD
District Court Judge

Page 4 of

5

\: \ * J
V \ «, J

C

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I certify that true copies of the foregoing Ruling were delivered on the
to the following in the manner indicated, to wit:
\}auiAA*y
by U.S. first class mail
Counsel for Plaintiffs:
Randall K. Spencer
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC
3301 North University Ave.
Provo, Utah 84604
Counsel for Defendants:
Jeffrey J. Hunt
David C. Reymann
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Deputy Court Clerk

Page 5 of

5

{3^ day of

FSLED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual;
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah
corporation; and PHILLIPS
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., a
Utah corporation,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
B. BRETT BEZZANT, an individual,
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation,
and DOES I THROUGH X,

RULING RE: SUPPLEMENTAL
AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFREY J. HUNT
REGARDING COSTS AND
ATTORNEYS' FEES; and
PROPOSED ORDER AND
JUDGMENT REGARDING AWARD
OF ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS
UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-58105(l)(a)

Case # 000403530
Judge Fred D. Howard
Division 5

Defendants.
BRETT BEZZANT, an individual; NEWTAH,
INC., dba AMERICAN FORK CITIZEN
NEW UTAH, a Utah Corporation,
Counterclaimants,
vs.
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual;
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah
Corporation; and PHILLIPS
MANUFACTURING CO.,
Counterclaim Defendants.
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' submission of a Supplemental
Affidavit of Jeffrey J. Hunt Regarding Costs and Attorneys' Fees in conjunction with their earlier

submission of a Proposed Order and Judgment Regarding Award of Attorneys Fees and Costs
Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-58-105(1)(a). The Court, having reviewed the file and being fully
advised in the premises, hereby issues the following ruling.
RULING
The Court notes that Defendants and Counterclaimants Brett Bezzant and Newtah, Inc.
d/b/a The American Fork Citizen New Utah! (collectively, the "Citizen") submitted a Proposed
Order and Judgment Regarding Award of Attorneys Fees and Costs with an accompanying
Affidavit of Jeffrey J. Hunt on October 21, 2005. On January 12, 2006, the Court issued a
Ruling requesting that Mr. Hunt supplement his affidavit to more fully delineate the work
performed during the months in question and the hours billed to each task. Defendants submitted
a Supplemental Affidavit of Jeffrey J. Hunt Regarding Costs and Attorneys5 Fees on January 19,
2006. Plaintiffs filed an Objection to Supplemental Affidavit on January 27, 2006 and
Defendants filed a Response and Renewed Request to Submit for Decision on February 2, 2006.
On February 8, 2006, Plaintiffs filed a Reply to Defendants' Response.
Defendants assert that the basis for the Court's award of costs and reasonable attorney's
fees arises under Section 105(l)(a) of Utah's Citizen Participation in Government Act, Utah
Code Ann. § 78-58-105(l)(a). Attached to the supplemental affidavit of Jeffrey Hunt are copies
of monthly invoices from his firm's accounting department detailing the work performed, hours
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billed, and fees and costs incurred by the Citizen for each month from April 30, 2001 through the
end of September 2005.
Plaintiffs object to the Supplemental Affidavit, arguing that it is inappropriate to award
Defendants attorneys' fees and costs under the anti-SLAPP statute. Plaintiffs assert that attorney
Jeffrey Hunt took this matter on a pro bono basis to garner media attention and obtain publicity
as a First Amendment attorney and therefore object that there is no indication in the exhibits that
Defendant Bezzant ever paid any fees or costs in this matter . Defendants respond that Plaintiffs'
Objection neither objects to nor challenges the necessity, reasonableness, or accuracy of the costs
and attorneys' fees set forth in Mr. Hunt's supplemental affidavit or previously filed affidavit and
the Court should therefore enter judgment for the full amount of such costs and fees.
The Court notes Plaintiffs' objection to the Supplemental Affidavit and assertion that
counsel for Defendants took this matter on a pro bono basis and that the fees were thus never
"incurred" by Defendants. The Court notes that the Supplement Affidavit filed by Mr. Hunt
includes detailed monthly invoices setting forth work performed, costs incurred, and hours billed
in this matter. Whether Mr. Hunt worked pro bono is irrelevant in determining the
reasonableness of Mr. Hunt's claimed attorneys' fees. Therefore, the Court respectfully
overrules Plaintiffs' objection.
The Utah Supreme Court has clarified that "[calculation of reasonable attorney fees is
in the sound discretion of the trial court" but "must be supported by evidence in the record."
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Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). The Utah Supreme Court has
identified four questions that must be addressed by the trial court before attorneys' fees may be
assessed:
1.

What legal work was actually performed?

2.

How much of the work performed was reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute
the matter?

3.

Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with the rates customarily charged in the locality
for similar services?

4.

Are there circumstances which require consideration of additional factors, including
those listed in the Code of Professional Responsibility?

Id at 990.
The Court notes that the legal services provided by counsel for Defendants generally
included telephone conferences; research; drafting and reviewing correspondence, documents,
and pleadings; participating in discovery and depositions; and preparation for and attendance at
hearings. For the period of time between April 30, 2001 through the end of September 2005, Mr.
Jeffrey Hunt spent a total of 374 hours performing these legal services. During the years in
question, Mr. Hunt's billing rate ranged from $200.00 per hour to $250.00 per hour. Mr. David
Reymann spent a total of 513.75 hours performing legal services, billed at a rate ranging from
$150.00 per hour to $190.00 per hour. The Court also notes that Mr. Edward Carter spent 4.5
hours on the matter, billed at $115.00 per hour. Various paralegals also performed services
totaling 5.05 hours, billed at a rate ranging from $75.00 per hour to $100.00 per hour. The Court
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finds that the billing rates charged by Defendants' counsel and law firm staff are consistent with
rates customarily charged in this area for this type of service. The Court likewise finds that the
services rendered by Defendants' counsel were reasonably necessary to defend the issues raised
in the complaint. Finally, the Court does not find any additional factors that would preclude the
Court from awarding attorneys' fees to Defendants.
The Court previously awarded the Citizen $6,386.22 for costs incurred from February
of 2001 until March of 2004. Since March of 2004, the invoices attached to Mr. Hunt's
Supplemental Affidavit include costs for long distance telephone calls, photocopies, facsimiles,
Lexis research, and a transcript fee. The Court notes that it may award to Defendants "costs"
that are properly taxable under Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In regard to costs
that may be awarded, the Utah Supreme Court has stated, "Costs were not recoverable at
common law; and are therefore generally allowable only in the amounts and in the manner
provided by statute." Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1980). Elucidating upon the
meaning of "costs," the Court stated, "The generally accepted rule is that it means those fees
which are required to be paid to the court and to witnesses, and for which the statutes authorize
to be included in the judgment." Id. at 774. The Court has also declared that "[tjhere is a
distinction to be understood between the legitimate and taxable 'costs' and other expenses of
litigation which may be ever so necessary, but are not properly taxable as costs." Id. See also
Young v. Utah, 16 P.3d 549, 553 (Utah 2000). This Court finds that the costs requested by Mr.
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Hunt cannot be considered "taxable costs" as required by the Utah Supreme Court and therefore
denies Mr. Hunt's request for costs incurred since March of 2004.
The Court finds that since April 30, 2001, through the end of September 2005, the
Citizen has incurred $169,427.50 in attorneys' fees in connection with this case. The Court notes
that it previously awarded the Citizen attorneys' fees of $13,693.94 in connection with the
Section 1988 Order. Therefore, the Court awards the Citizen additional attorneys' fees in the
amount of $155,733.56 for legal services performed. Contemporaneous with this Ruling, the
Court will sign the Order and Judgment Regarding Award of Attorneys' Fees & Costs that was
previously submitted by Defendants.
Dated this ^ f f i ^ d a y of March, 2006.

BY THE COURT:

JUZ5GE FRED D ^ H O W A | p |
District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I certify that true copies of the foregoing Ruling were delivered on the
March, 2006 to the following in the manner indicated, to wit:

^ \

by U.S. first class mail
Counsel for Plaintiffs:
Randall K. Spencer
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC
3301 North University Ave.
Provo, Utah 84604
Counsel for Defendants:
Jeffrey J. Hunt
David C. Reymann
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

*iuft 2
Deputy Court Clerk
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day of

FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

Jeffrey J. Hunt, Esq. (5855)
David C. Reymann, Esq. (8495)
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS

185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7840
Facsimile: (801) 532-7750
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaimants
Brett Bezzant and Newtah, Inc. d/b/a American
Fork Citizen New Utah!

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual;
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah
corporation; and PHILLIPS
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., a
Utah corporation,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT
REGARDING AWARD OF
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS
UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 7858-105(l)(a)

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Civil No. 000403530
BRETT BEZZANT, an individual;
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation;
AMERICAN FORK CITY, a Utah municipal
corporation; TED BARRATT, an individual;
KEVIN BENNETT, an individual; TERRY
FOX, an individual; DON HAMPTON, an
individual; TOM HUNTER, an individual;
RICKY STORRS, an individual; CARL
WANLASS, an individual; and DOES I
through X,
Defendants.

Judge Fred D. Howard
Division 5

BRETT BEZZANT, an individual;
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation,
Counterclaimants,
vs.
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual;
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah
corporation; and PHILLIPS
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., a
Utah corporation,
Counterclaim Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on the Affidavit of Jeffrey J. Hunt Regarding Costs and
Attorneys' Fees, which was submitted in connection with this Court's written Ruling Re:
Counterclaimants' Motion to Strike Inadmissible Portions of Affidavits of David Aagard, R. Brent
Stephens, Randall K. Spencer, and William T. Jacob and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (the
"Ruling") and subsequent Order Granting Counterclaimants' Motion to Strike and Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment (the "Order"). The Ruling and Order are incorporated herein by this reference.
This Order and Judgment determines the amount of costs and reasonable attorneys fees to be
awarded to the Citizen.
The Court, having considered the Affidavit of Mr. Hunt and the other pertinent materials
submitted by the parties, being fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing therefor,
hereby ORDERS as follows:
153592 1
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1.

The Court finds that the attorneys fees and costs detailed in the Affidavit of Mr. Hunt

were reasonably and necessarily incurred by the Citizen in connection with the above-captioned case
for all of the reasons specified in Mr. Hunt's Affidavit and are properly recoverable under Utah Code
Ann. § 78-58-105(l)(a).
2.

The Court hereby enters judgment against Plaintiffs, jointly and severally, in favor

of the Citizen in the amount of $155JT33«5k This amount represents $155,1-33*^ in reasonably
incurred attorneys fees and $ O

in costs incurred by the Citizen in connection with the above-

captioned matter from April 30, 2001 through the end of September 2005, less the amount of
attorneys fees and costs already awarded to the Citizen by prior Order and Judgment.
3.

With respect to the prior awards, on or about August 12, 2004, this Court entered an

Order and Judgment Regarding Award of Attorney Fees and Costs Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (the
"Section 1988 Order"), which awarded the Citizen attorneys fees in the amount of $13,310.83 and
costs in the amount of $383.11. On August 12, 2004, pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, the Court also entered an Order and Judgment Regarding Award of Costs and
Necessary Disbursements to the Citizen (the "Costs Order"), as the prevailing party under Rule
54(d). The Costs Order awarded the Citizen costs in the amount of $6,386.22. Collectively, the
Section 1988 Order and the Costs Order are referred to herein as the "Prior Judgments". The
amounts already awarded under the Prior Judgments have been deducted from the Citizen fs present
request and are not duplicative with this judgment.
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4.

All amounts awarded hereunder, as with the Prior Judgments entered by the Court,

shall bear post-judgment interest at the statutorily applicable rate as of their date of entry.
5.

The Citizen is further entitled to an award of its costs and reasonable attorneys fees

incurred after September 2005 in connection with the above-captioned matter. Such amounts shall
be awarded by supplemental judgment(s) upon submission of supplemental affidavit(s) from the
Citizen's counsel.
DATED

this j f l ^ d a y o f ^ f e a f

2006.
BY THE COURT:

^xfJL*£o

Hon/Fred D. Howard
Fourth District Court J u d g d | i k V ^
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 21st day of October 2005, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER AND JUDGMENT REGARDING AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES AND
COSTS UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-58-105(l)(a) was served, via hand-delivery, on the
following:
Randall K. Spencer
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC

3301 North University Ave.
Provo, Utah 84604
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Jeffrey J. Hunt, Esq. (5855)
David C. Reymann, Esq. (8495)
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS

185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7840
Facsimile: (801) 532-7750
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaimants
Brett Bezzant and Newtah, Inc. d/b/a American
Fork Citizen New Utah!

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual;
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah
corporation; and PHILLIPS
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., a
Utah corporation,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF
JUDGMENT

Civil No. 000403530
Judge Fred D. Howard

BRETT BEZZANT, an individual;
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation;
AMERICAN FORK CITY, a Utah municipal
corporation; TED BARRATT, an individual;
KEVIN BENNETT, an individual; TERRY
FOX, an individual; DON HAMPTON, an
individual; TOM HUNTER, an individual;
RICKY STORRS, an individual; CARL
WANLASS, an individual; and DOES I
through X,
Defendants.

BRETT BEZZANT, an individual;
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation,
Counterclaimants,
vs.
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual;
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah
corporation; and PHILLIPS
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., a
Utah corporation,
Counterclaim Defendants.

Pursuant to Rule 58A(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, notice is hereby given that
on March 29,2006 the Court herein entered its Order and Judgment Regarding Award of Attorneys
Fees and Costs Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-58-105(l)(a). A true and correct copy of this Order and
Judgment is attached hereto.
DATED this ^ [ day of March 2006.
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS

BY:

VjdZy

•

Jeffrey J. Hunt
j
David C. Reymannt
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaimants Brett Bezzant and Newtah, Inc.
d/b/a American Fork Citizen New Utah!
-2-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Z\

day of March 2006, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT was served, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on
the following:
Randall K. Spencer
FILLMOK£ SPENCER, LLC

3301 North University Ave.
Provo, Utah 84601

DavM C. Reymann
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Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah
2?l/D6

U0$[

Deputy

:3i *.«*»
Jeffrey J. Hunt, Esq. (5855)
David C. Reymann, Esq. (8495)
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS

185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7840
Facsimile: (801) 532-7750
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaimants
Brett Bezzant and Newtah, Inc. d/b/a American
Fork Citizen New Utah!

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual;
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah
corporation; and PHILLIPS
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., a
Utah corporation,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT
REGARDING AWARD OF
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS
UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 7858-105(l)(a)

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Civil No. 000403530
BRETT BEZZANT, an individual;
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation;
AMERICAN FORK CITY, a Utah municipal
corporation; TED BARRATT, an individual;
KEVIN BENNETT, an individual; TERRY
FOX, an individual; DON HAMPTON, an
individual; TOM HUNTER, an individual;
RICKY STORRS, an individual; CARL
WANLASS, an individual; and DOES I
through X,
Defendants.

Judge Fred D. Howard
Division 5

BRETT BEZZANT, an individual;
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation,
Counterclaimants,
vs.
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual;
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC, a Utah
corporation; and PHILLIPS
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC, a
Utah corporation,
Counterclaim Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on the Affidavit of Jeffrey J. Hunt Regarding Costs and
Attorneys' Fees, which was submitted in connection with this Court's written Ruling Re:
Counterclaimants' Motion to Strike Inadmissible Portions of Affidavits of David Aagard, R. Brent
Stephens, Randall K. Spencer, and William T. Jacob and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (the
"Ruling") and subsequent Order Granting Counterclaimants' Motion to Strike and Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment (the "Order"). The Ruling and Order are incorporated herein by this reference.
This Order and Judgment determines the amount of costs and reasonable attorneys fees to be
awarded to the Citizen.
The Court, having considered the Affidavit of Mr. Hunt and the other pertinent materials
submitted by the parties, being frilly advised in the premises, and good cause appearing therefor,
hereby ORDERS as follows:
1535921
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1.

The Court finds that the attorneys fees and costs detailed in the Affidavit of Mr. Hunt

were reasonably and necessarily incurred by the Citizen in connection with the above-captioned case
for all of the reasons specified in Mr. Hunt's Affidavit and are properly recoverable under Utah Code
Ann. § 78-58-105(l)(a).
2.

The Court hereby enters judgment against Plaintiffs, jointly and severally, in favor

of the Citizen in the amount of $15iS>jfr33*SL> This amount represents $ 1 5 5 , 1 ^ 3 ^ ^ 1 reasonably
incurred attorneys fees and $! O

in costs incurred by the Citizen in connection with the above-

captioned matter from April 30, 2001 through the end of September 2005, less the amount of
attorneys fees and costs already awarded to the Citizen by prior Order and Judgment.
3.

With respect to the prior awards, on or about August 12,2004, this Court entered an

Order and Judgment Regarding Award of Attorney Fees and Costs Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (the
"Section 1988 Order"), which awarded the Citizen attorneys fees in the amount of $13,310.83 and
costs in the amount of $383.11. On August 12, 2004, pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, the Court also entered an Order and Judgment Regarding Award of Costs and
Necessary Disbursements to the Citizen (the "Costs Order"), as the prevailing party under Rule
54(d). The Costs Order awarded the Citizen costs in the amount of $6,386.22. Collectively, the
Section 1988 Order and the Costs Order are referred to herein as the "Prior Judgments". The
amounts already awarded under the Prior Judgments have been deducted from the Citizen's present
request and are not duplicative with this judgment.
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4.

All amounts awarded hereunder, as with the Prior Judgments entered by the Court,

shall bear post-judgment interest at the statutorily applicable rate as of their date of entry.
5.

The Citizen is further entitled to an award of its costs and reasonable attorneys fees

incurred after September 2005 in connection with the above-captioned matter. Such amounts shall
be awarded by supplemental judgment(s) upon submission of supplemental affidavit(s) from the
Citizen's counsel.
DATED

this j f l ^ d a y o f ^ f e & f

2006.
B Y THE COURT:

Hon/Fred D. Howard
Fourth District Court Judg J |
£&&A?AJl£fi-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 21st day of October 2005, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER AND JUDGMENT REGARDING AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES AND
COSTS UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-58-105(l)(a) was served, via hand-delivery, on the
following:
Randall K. Spencer
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC

3301 North University Ave.
Provo, Utah 84604

V3TJ
Da/id C. Reymann
!
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FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah
Jeffrey J. Hunt, Esq. (5855)
David C. Reymann, Esq. (8495)
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS

185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7840
Facsimile: (801) 532-7750
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaimants
Brett Bezzant and Newtah, Inc. d/b/a American
Fork Citizen New Utah!

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual;
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah
corporation; and PHILLIPS
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., a
Utah corporation,

SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER AND
JUDGMENT REGARDING
AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES
AND COSTS UNDER UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-58-105(l)(a)

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Civil No. 000403530
BRETT BEZZANT, an individual;
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation;
AMERICAN FORK CITY, a Utah municipal
corporation; TED BARRATT, an individual;
KEVIN BENNETT, an individual; TERRY
FOX, an individual; DON HAMPTON, an
individual; TOM HUNTER, an individual;
RICKY STORRS, an individual; CARL
WANLASS, an individual; and DOES I
through X,
Defendants.

Judge Fred D. Howard
Division 5

BRETT BEZZANT, an individual;
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation,
Counterclaimants,
vs.
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual;
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah
corporation; and PHILLIPS
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., a
Utah corporation,
Counterclaim Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on the Second Supplemental Affidavit of Jeffrey J. Hunt
Regarding Costs and Attorneys' Fees, which was submitted in connection with this Court's Order
and Judgment Regarding Award of Attorneys Fees and Costs Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-58105(1 )(a), dated March 29,2006. The Court, having considered the Second Supplemental Affidavit
of Mr. Hunt and the other pertinent materials submitted by the parties, being fully advised in the
premises, and good cause appearing therefor, hereby ORDERS as follows:
1.

For all of the reasons specified in Mr. Hunt's Affidavit and the other submissions by

the parties, the Court finds that the attorneys' fees detailed in the Second Supplemental Affidavit of
Mr. Hunt were reasonably and necessarily incurred by the Citizen in connection with the abovecaptioned case from October 2005 through the end of March 2006, and are properly recoverable
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-58-105(l)(a).
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2.

The Court hereby enters judgment against Plaintiffs, jointly and severally, in favor

of the Citizen in the amount of $14,380.00.
3.

All amounts awarded hereunder, as with all prior judgments entered by the Court

against Plaintiffs, shall bear post-judgment interest at the statutorily applicable rate as of their date
of entry.
4.

The Citizen is further entitled to an award of its costs and reasonable attorneys fees

incurred after March 2006 in connection with the above-captioned matter. Such amounts shall be
awarded by supplemental judgment(s) upon submission of supplemental affidavit(s) from the
Citizen's counsel.
DATED

this ^

day of

fllOA/JL

2006.
BY THE COURT:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 26th day of April 2006, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT REGARDING AWARD OF
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-58-105(l)(a) was served,
via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on the following:
Randall K. Spencer
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC

3301 North University Ave.
Provo, Utah 84604

Davifl C. Reymann
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Jeffrey J. Hunt, Esq. (5855)
David C. Reymann, Esq. (8495)
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS

185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7840
Facsimile: (801) 532-7750
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaimants
Brett Bezzant and Newtah, Inc. d/b/a American
Fork Citizen New Utah!

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM T. JACOB., an individual;
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah
corporation; and PHILLIPS
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., a
Utah corporation,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF
JUDGMENT

Civil No. 000403530
Judge Fred D. Howard

BRETT BEZZANT, an individual;
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation;
AMERICAN FORK CITY, a Utah municipal
corporation; TED BARRATT, an individual;
KEVIN BENNETT, an individual; TERRY
FOX, an individual; DON HAMPTON, an
individual; TOM HUNTER, an individual;
RICKY STORRS, an individual; CARL
WANLASS, an individual; and DOES I
through X,
Defendants.

BRETT BEZZANT, an individual;
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation,
Counterclaimants,
vs.
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual;
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah
corporation; and PHILLIPS
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., a
Utah corporation,
Counterclaim Defendants.

Pursuant to Rule 58A(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, notice is hereby given that
on April 27,2006 the Court herein entered its Supplemental Order and Judgment Regarding Award
of Attorneys Fees and Costs Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-58-105(l)(a). A true and correct copy of
this Order and Judgment is attached hereto.
DATED

this

\_ day of May 2006.
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS

By:
Jeffrey J. Hunt
David C. Reymann V
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaimants Brett Bezzant and Newtah, Inc.
d/b/a American Fork Citizen New Utah!
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

'

day of May 2006, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT was served, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on
the following:
Randall K. Spencer
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC

3301 North University Ave.
Provo, Utah 84601

'jy^\
David C Reymann
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual;
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah
corporation; and PHILLIPS
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., a
Utah corporation,

SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER AND
JUDGMENT REGARDING
AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES
AND COSTS UNDER UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-58-105(l)(a)

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Civil No. 000403530
BRETT BEZZANT, an individual;
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation;
AMERICAN FORK CITY, a Utah municipal
corporation; TED BARRATT, an individual;
KEVIN BENNETT, an individual; TERRY
FOX, an individual; DON HAMPTON, an
individual; TOM HUNTER, an individual;
RICKY STORRS, an individual; CARL
WANLASS, an individual; and DOES I
through X,
Defendants.

Judge Fred D. Howard
Division 5

BRETT BEZZANT, an individual;
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation,
Counterclaimants,
vs.
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual;
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah
corporation; and PHILLIPS
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., a
Utah corporation,
Counterclaim Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on the Second Supplemental Affidavit of Jeffrey J. Hunt
Regarding Costs and Attorneys' Fees, which was submitted in connection with this Court's Order
and Judgment Regarding Award of Attorneys Fees and Costs Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-58105(l)(a), dated March 29,2006. The Court, having considered the Second Supplemental Affidavit
of Mr. Hunt and the other pertinent materials submitted by the parties, being fully advised in the
premises, and good cause appearing therefor, hereby ORDERS as follows:
1.

For all of the reasons specified in Mr. Hunt's Affidavit and the other submissions by

the parties, the Court finds that the attorneys' fees detailed in the Second Supplemental Affidavit of
Mr. Hunt were reasonably and necessarily incurred by the Citizen in connection with the abovecaptioned case from October 2005 through the end of March 2006, and are properly recoverable
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-58-105(l)(a).
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2.

The Court hereby enters judgment against Plaintiffs, jointly and severally, in favor

of the Citizen in the amount of $14,380.00.
3.

All amounts awarded hereunder, as with all prior judgments entered by the Court

against Plaintiffs, shall bear post-judgment interest at the statutorily applicable rate as of their date
of entry.
4.

The Citizen is further entitled to an award of its costs and reasonable attorneys fees

incurred after March 2006 in connection with the above-captioned matter. Such amounts shall be
awarded by supplemental judgment(s) upon submission of supplemental affidavit(s) from the
Citizen's counsel.
DATED

this ^

day of JhOA/JL

2006.
BY THE COURT:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 26th day of April 2006, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT REGARDING AWARD OF
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-58-105(l)(a) was served,
via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on the following:
Randall K Spencer
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC

3301 North University Ave.
Provo, Utah 84604

Davifl C. Reymann
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" NONPARTISAN Ci llZENS GROUP INFORMATION BULLETIN
A 1999 ELECTION QUESTION: CAN TWO CITY EMPLOYEES
SEEK POLITICAL OFFICE? FACTS LISTED BELOW.. . .
••CANDIDATE RICKY STORRS**
STORRS FACT #1: Candidate Stons is a City employee functioning under the "Exempt
Personnel Policies and Procedures" of the City. (See City Ordinance No. 92-05-20)
STORRS FACT #2: As a City EMT Ambulance Employee, Candidate Storrs, by City
Personnel Policy, is prohibited from holding political office while employed by the City.
(See City Ordinance #95-05-21)
STORRS FINDINGS OF FACT: Candidate Storrs has been employed by the City for
several years. The public record indicates that Candidate Storrs failed to go on leave
without pay from his City employment, while seeking election to political office. (See City
Ordinance #92-05-21)
A VOTER'S QUESTION: Will the failure of Candidate Storrs to go on leave without
pay from his City employment create a special privilege for himself while he is seeking
election to political office, and if elected, will he give up his employment with the City
during the term of his political office?

**CANDIDATE TOM HUNTER**
HUNTER FACT #1: Candidate Hunter is employed by the City as a health insurance
consultant functioning under the "Exempt Personnel Policies and Procedures" of the City.
(See City Ordinance #92-05-20)
HUNTER FACT #2: As a health insurance consultant, Candidate Hunter, by City
Personnel Policy, is prohibited from holding political office while employed by the City.
(See City Ordinance #92-05-21)
HUNTER FINDINGS OF FACT: Candidate Hunter has been employed by the City
since 1997. The public record indicates that Candidate Hunter failed to go on leave
without pay from his City employment, while seeking election to political office. (See City
Ordinance #92-05-21)
A VOTER'S QUESTION: Will the failure of Candidate Hunter to go on leave without
pay from his City employment create a. special privilege for himself while he is seeking
election to political office and if elected, will he give up his employment with the City
during the term of his political office?
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A/ew Utah! offers apology to Tom Hunter, Rick Storrs for
campaign flyer

Urgent Election Notice!
To: All American Fork Residents
From: Publisher Brett Bezzant, American Fork Citizen New Utah!

Correction and Apology to American Fork City Council
Candidate Tom Hunter
The Oct. 27th issue of \be American Fork Citizen New Utah! and New Utah!
Shopper carried a political advertisement that ran as a preprinted flyer, paid and
produced by William T. (Bill) Jacob and others involved in a "Nonpartisan
Citizens Group."
In fairness to Mr. Hunter and his candidacy, New Utah! apologizes for distributing
this flyer without giving Mr. Hunter the opportunity to respond to what we believe
is false and misleading information regarding his service to American Fork City.
Mr. Hunter is not and never has been employed by American Fork City. Neither
has he received any employee compensation nor any other employee benefit from
American Fork City. However, Mr. Hunter does own Hunter & Associates
Insurance and his firm was selected in 1997 to act as an independent insurance
broker on the employee benefits package for American Fork City. His firm
provides this same kind of service for many other employers.
Since this client/agent relationship with American Fork City is a potential conflict
of interest, Mr. Hunter intends, if elected, to file a letter with the Mayor clearly
identifying the potential conflict and stating that he will abstain from voting on
any issue that involves his pre- existing interest in the employee benefits package.
Contrary to what Mr. Jacob's flyer implied, Mr. Hunter is, to the best of our
knowledge, a qualified and eligible city council candidate and his candidacy has
not, in any way, violated the policies or procedures of American Fork City.

We also apologize to City Councilman Rick Storrs
The same flyer also questioned the candidacy of Rick Storrs, citing a city
personnel ordinance that does not even apply to Mr. Stores part-time, volunteer
employment as a city EMT. The precedent for his eligibility as a city councilman
and as an incumbent candidate have been well established in at least two other
elections. We apologize to Mr. Storrs for distributing misleading information that
would bring his candidacy in question.
nup.//www.newuiim.com/**!;>?.mm

BEZ-2609

Comments on the flyer
Mr Jacob's flyer is falsely labeled as a "nonpartisan" group. Since American Fork
no onger has pohucal parties, there is no such thing as a "nonpartisan" Z p
Unfortunately this flyer is a classic example of negative campaigning intended to
hurt one candidate in order to favor another. We believe it hunsThe !ZTorocess
^gain, we apologize to Candidates Hunter and Storrs for distributing this '
misinformation.
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FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual;
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah
corporation; and PHILLIPS
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., a
Utah corporation,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
B. BRETT BEZZANT, an individual,
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation,
and DOES I THROUGH X,

RULING RE:
COUNTERCLAIMANTS' MOTION
TO STRIKE INADMISSIBLE
PORTIONS OF AFFIDAVITS OF
DAVID AAGARD, R. BRENT
STEPHENS, RANDALL K.
SPENCER, AND WILLIAM T.
JACOB and MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Case # 000403530
Judge Fred D. Howard
Division 5

Defendants.
BRETT BEZZANT, an individual; NEWTAH,
INC., dba AMERICAN FORK CITIZEN
NEW UTAH, a Utah Corporation,
Counterclaimants,
vs.
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual;
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah
Corporation; and PHILLIPS
MANUFACTURING CO.,
Counterclaim Defendants.
This matter comes before the Court on Counterclaimants' Motion to Strike Inadmissible
Portions of Affidavits of David Aagard, R. Brent Stephens, Randall K. Spencer, and William T.

Jacob and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The Court, having reviewed the file and being
fully advised in the premises, hereby issues the following ruling.
RULING
Defendants and Counterclaimants Brett Bezzant andNewtah, Inc. d/b/a The American Fork
Citizen New Utah! (collectively, the "Citizen") filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
October 19,2004. Plaintiffs submitted their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment on February 17, 2005. Defendants replied on March 18, 2005 and
submitted a Motion to Strike Inadmissible Portions of Affidavits that same day. In addition,
Defendants filed a Request to Submit the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with the Court on
March 18,2005. On April 19,2005, after all parties had made their submissions in conjunction with
the Motion to Strike, Defendants filed a Request to Submit the Motion to Strike with the Court. A
hearing date was set for September 13, 2005 for the parties to make arguments on both pending
motions.
In their Motion to Strike Inadmissible Portions of Affidavits, Defendants assert that the
statements set forth in the affidavits or portions thereof submitted by Plaintiffs' current and former
lawyers in the case constitute inadmissible argument, opinions, legal conclusions, and/or hearsay,
and/or lack foundation or personal knowledge. Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides the following guidance as to the acceptable form of affidavits in a summary judgment
matter:
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Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that
the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Rule 56(e) U.R.C.P.
After reviewing the substance of the affidavits submitted by Plaintiffs, the Court finds
that the affidavits do not include any new facts, not already in the pleadings, that would be
admissible in evidence. Rather, the assertions made in the affidavits consist of argument,
opinions, and inadmissible legal conclusions. Therefore, for the reasons set forth in Defendants'
Memorandum in Support of the Citizen's Motion to Strike Inadmissible Portions of Affidavits of
David Aagard, R. Brent Stephens, Randall K. Spencer, and William T. Jacob, the Court hereby
strikes the affidavits submitted by Plaintiffs.
In Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Defendants assert that under
Utah Code Section 78-58-105(l)(a), they are entitled to the portion of their costs and attorneys
fees incurred in this matter that have not yet been awarded by the Court. Plaintiffs argue that
Defendants have misinterpreted the provisions of Utah's Anti-SLAPP statute, asserting that a
dismissal of a case under U.C.A. § 78-58-104 does not automatically meet the requirements of an
award of attorneys fees under U.C.A. § 78-58-105. Section 78-58-105 provides the following:
(1) A defendant in an action involving public participation in the process
of government may maintain an action, claim, cross-claim, or counterclaim to
recover:
(a) costs and reasonable attorney's fees, upon a demonstration that the
action involving public participation in the process of government was commenced
or continued without a substantial basis in fact and law and could not be supported
Page 3 of
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by a substantial argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law;
and
(b) other compensatory damages upon an additional demonstration that the
action involving public participation in the process of government was commenced
or continued for the purpose of harassing, intimidating, punishing , or otherwise
maliciously inhibiting the free exercise of rights granted under the First Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-58-105.
The Court agrees with Plaintiffs' argument that a dismissal under U.C.A. § 78-58-104
does not automatically lead to an award of attorney's fees under U.C.A. § 78-58-105. In order
for a party to prevail in a counterclaim for an award of costs and reasonable attorney's fees under
U.C.A. § 78-58-105, the party must demonstrate (1) that the Anti-SLAPP statute is applicable to
the action, (2) that the other party's claims lack factual and legal merit, and (3) that the action is
not supported by a substantial argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law. The Court can conceive of a situation where a plaintiffs claims would be dismissed under
section 104 of Utah's Anti-SLAPP statute, but would not result in an award of costs and
attorney's fees under section 105. For example, in a case of first impression where the law is
unsettled or unclear, the existing law may or may not sustain a cause of action given a certain
factual setting. Such a case would have the potential to bring about changes in the law. The
Court finds, however, that Jacob's present action is not such a case.
First, the Court finds that Utah's Anti-SLAPP statute does apply to this case. During
the motion hearing, Plaintiffs asserted a new argument, not included in Plaintiffs' pleadings, that
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the Anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to the case at bar given the statutory definition of the
"process of government." Section 78-58-102 of the Utah Code defines the "process of
government" as "the mechanisms and procedures by which the legislative and executive branches
of government make decisions, including the exercise by a citizen of the right to influence those
decisions under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution." Plaintiffs argued that election
campaign events do not amount to the process of government. The Court finds this reasoning
unpersuasive in light of the facts of this case. As Defendants asserted in response to Plaintiffs'
argument, the editorial that Defendants published dealt directly with the qualifications of Mr.
Hunter and Mr. Storrs to have their names included on the ballot for positions on the City
Council. The editorial was not just directed to the citizens of American Fork, but also to those in
the city's executive and legislative positions who had the power to disqualify the candidates.
Judge Davis, in his Ruling of April 2, 2004, also determined that the Anti-SLAPP statute is
applicable to this case. The Court is persuaded, in accordance with Judge Davis's ruling, that
this action involved public participation in the process of government.
Second, the Court finds that Defendants have demonstrated that Plaintiffs' claims
lacked factual and legal merit. The Court is persuaded that the reasoning contained in Judge
Davis' Ruling is sufficient to support Defendants' burden of proof that Plaintiffs' action was
commenced or continued without the necessary substantial basis in fact and law. In his Ruling,
Judge Davis pointed to four main defects in Plaintiffs' case that led him to determine that Jacob's
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claims lacked legal merit: (1) the Citizen's Editorial did not convey defamatory meaning as a
matter of law; (2) the Editorial was protected by Utah's public interest privilege; (3) the Editorial
constituted statements of editorial opinion, not verifiable statements of fact; and (4) Plaintiffs
failed to plead special damages, which they were required to do because they did not allege
defamation per se. As any one of the above reasons would have been sufficient to dismiss
Plaintiffs' claims, Defendants have made more than a sufficient demonstration, in accordance
with U.C.A. § 78-58-105(l)(a), that Plaintiffs' claims did not have a substantial basis in fact and
law.
In addition, the Utah Supreme Court recently clarified that a plaintiffs claim is not
necessarily supported by a substantial basis in fact and law simply because it survives a motion
of summary judgment. See Anderson Dev. Co. V. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, 528 Utah Adv. Rep. 3
(June 14, 2005). The Supreme Court reasoned, "Because dismissal of a claim based on either a
motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgement denies the nonmoving party of the right to
litigate his claim on the merits, the threshold for surviving such a motion is relatively low." Id.
at If 49. In this case, Plaintiffs' claims were so deficient that they did not even pass the
"relatively low" threshold for surviving a motion for summary judgment.
Third, the Court finds that Plaintiffs action is not supported by a substantial argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. In a review of Plaintiffs' pleadings,
especially Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary
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Judgment, the Court fails to find an argument that the law of defamation is deficient and that the
facts of Plaintiffs' case are so unique as to bring about an extension, modification, or reversal of
defamation law as it currently stands. To the contrary, all of Plaintiffs' attempts are to promote
their causes of action under existing law. They do not show how their cause of defamation is
distinct from those already available under existing law.
Notwithstanding the fact that Plaintiffs' affidavits have been stricken, the Court notes
that the affidavits contained arguments that could have been made in Plaintiffs' pleadings or at
the motion hearing. However, even after a review of the arguments made in the affidavits by
Plaintiffs' prior and current counsel, the Court is unpersuaded that Plaintiff has marshaled
substantial arguments for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. For example,
in paragraph 4 of David Aagard's affidavit, Aagard argues that the case, Mast v. Overson, 971
P.2d 928 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), was distinguishable from Jacob's facts. Aagard's reasoning is an
attempt to simply support his assertion that Jacob had a viable claim, not an attempt to show that
Mast is bad law that should be reversed.
Judge Davis was not faced with a case of first impression or claims that were grounded
in areas of law that have not matured. The law of defamation that Judge Davis applied is well
grounded, clear, well-reasoned, and has been established over the course of many years. The
application of the law in this matter was thus predictable. In light of the settled nature of
defamation law and the lack of any illustration in Plaintiffs' pleadings that defamation law is
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deficient and should be altered, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' action is not supported by a
substantial argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.
Plaintiffs contend that U.C.A. § 78-58-105 requires that a party's conduct be such that
the claims are so lacking in merit that they do not even comply with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. The Court is not persuaded that the requirements for Rule 11 sanctions must be
met for an award of costs and attorney's fees under U.C.A. § 78-58-105. Section 78-58-105 does
not include any provision that requires a notice to be served upon a SLAPP plaintiff in order for
the defendant to recover costs and attorney's fees. The plain language of the statute only requires
that the defendant demonstrate that the action involved public participation in the process of
government and that it was commenced or continued without a substantial basis in fact and law
and could not be supported by a substantial argument for the extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law. The Court finds that Defendants have met this burden.
The Utah Supreme Court also made an important clarification relating to U.C.A. § 7858-105 that, to avoid an improper retroactive application of Section 105, a plaintiff is only
entitled to recover fees, costs, and damages incurred from the date of enactment of the AntiSLAPP Statute-April 30, 2001. See Anderson, 2005 UT at ]48. The Defendants have
appropriately modified their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to request only the attorney's
fees and costs they have incurred since April 30, 2001.
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For the above reasons, this Court hereby grants Defendants' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment and the relief requested. Counsel for Defendants is instructed to prepare an
order consistent with this Ruling.
Dated this

1*5^5 day of September, 2005.
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I certify that true copies of the foregoing Ruling were delivered on the
September, 2005 to the following in the manner indicated, to wit:

by U.S. first class mail
Counsel for Plaintiffs:
Randall K. Spencer
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC
3301 North University Ave.
Provo, Utah 84604
Counsel for Defendants:
Jeffrey J. Hunt
David C. Reymann
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

4jJK
Deputy Court Clerk
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New Utah!

More LOCAL news than any other source!
www.newutah.com

59 West Main, P.O. Box 7S American Fork, Utah 84003-0007 Telephone: (801) 756-7669 FAX: (801) 756-5274

FV^-^
December 9, 1999

\0 [ K

0D

William T. Jacob
1100 North 100 East
American Fork, Utah 84003
Dear Bill:
In the spirit of trying to arrive at some kind of mutual understanding, I'll do my best to
answer your questions.
Q]. For what purpose did I disclose your identity as the individual who paid and
produced the "Non-partisan Citizens Group'1 Storrs/Hunter advertisement?
Al. There are many federal, state, and, in some cases, municipal statutes governing
campaign disclosures. Some of them specifically require the publication of the names of those
persons or officers responsible for the advertisement. As far as 1 know American Fork City does
not currently have a campaign disclosure ordinance that would apply to the Non-partisan Citizen
Group. However, Salt Lake County, for example requires that any person or association of
persons who expend more than S250 on an issue campaign, such as an initiative, referendum, or
bond issue establish a campaign committee and report all contributions and expenditures. There
is, however, a state statute that applies in this case (see answer to Q2).
The governing principle and the intent of these laws seems to be that government
business, including elections, should be as open as possible and that voters have a right to
"follow the money"-- to know who is trying to buy influence through the means of paid political
advertising.
Following this principle and in fairness to the two candidates mentioned in your
advertisement, I corrected what was lacking in your preprinted flyer— the name of at least one
responsible person. Before publishing this correction (the preparations for which had to be
completed within less than two days), I attempted to reach you at your home telephone
specifically to see if you would tell me who else should be listed as members or officers of the
"Non-partisan Citizens Group."
I also considered naming you as the responsible party for the advertisement opposing the
bond as well, but decided not to mix the issues. Furthermore, the bond advertisement was not a
personal attack as the Hunter/Storrs advertisement seemed to be. (see the answer to question Q7)
Q2. On what basis did I conclude that I could disclose your identity without your
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permission?
A2. Utah Code Section 20A-11-901 (1) (a) (iii)
Based on my understanding of the above, it never occurred to me to ask your permission.
I also recall that you told me something about how you were placing the ads because, unlike
others, you were accustomed to "taking the heat" for such things. You were the only person we
dealt with, i.e., you inquired about rates and distribution; you delivered the flyers; and you paid
for the advertisement with a check drawn on your personal account. Based on the above state
statute, Tom Hunter (and anyone else) has a legal right to know not only your name, but probably
the names of other members of the "Non-partisan Citizens Group." (I hope you realize that,
depending on how you decide to pursue your objectives, that type of full disclosure may
eventually become necessary.) I believe I had not only a legal, but also an ethical obligation to
disclose your identity.
Q3. What is New Utah's policy as to the disclosure of the identity of the purchasers of
political advertisements?
A3. We have no written policy, but our practice has been and will continue to be to tell all
that we know to anyone who asks about paid political advertising. If anything, we have required
too little public disclosure.
On a personal note and based on our "off the record" discussion, I sympathize with any
member of your group who fears some kind of retaliation. To be perfectly honest, I was surprised
that you were the least bit concerned about my disclosure of your identity. It never occurred to
me that you wanted to remain anonymous. As far as protecting our news sources, we could only
promise such protection in extreme situations on a case by case basis. And, of course, this would
apply only to a specific news story or series of stories on the same subject. It could never be
applied to political advertising.
Q4. What events led to New Utah's publication of its "Correction and Apology?"
A4. Since you brought in the preprinted flyers to our Advertising Manager, Tom
Hollingsworth, after our normal deadline on Tuesday, Oct. 26, he loaded them directly on our
truck. I didn't even see the flyer in question until about 4:00 p.m.— one hour before our press
deadline. When I saw the flyer, my initial reaction was disgust. It implied to me that Tom Hunter
was intentionally hiding his "employment" with the city in order to gain some personal
advantage as a city councilman. By so implying it seemed to attack his character and integrity. I
discussed with Marc Haddock, our managing editor, the possibility of publishing some
disclaimer in the newspaper, but he felt American Fork City Editor Barbara Christiansen's
personal column about Rick Storrs sufficiently addressed the issue and we were both reluctant
about taking time we did not have to re-make pages before our press deadline.
Wednesday morning I received an angry message from Tom Hunter. He wanted to know
who paid for the flyer and threatened to sue whomever that was as well as the newspaper. He
also threatened to cancel his business advertising with the newspaper. He was, understandably,
upset. I'm sure he believed he was acting in good faith regarding his candidacy and client/agent
relationship with American Fork City. He, too, perceived the flyer as an attack on his character. I
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called him back and told him you were the only person we dealt with That led to his phone
conversation with you
In my conversation with Tom Hunter, I told him how I felt about the flyer He lamented
the fact that our next issue would be Nov 3rd and that we apparently could not respond to the
flyer prior to the election I told him that was not necessarily true and offered to deliver my own
response prior to the election I asked him to write down what he would like me to publish He
sent me a FAX labeled "retraction" and said it had been approved by his attorney Since the flyer
was a paid advertisement, I did not consider my response a retraction nor was I intimidated by his
threat to sue the newspaper Although I used some of what Tom Hunter wanted me 10 say, the
response was my own Howe\er, I did receive his verbal approval of the wording pi lor to its
publication
In retrospect, my response was partly an emotional one I was, in effect, defending a
friend whose character had been maligned Tom Hunter is not only a valued business client of the
newspaper, he is also my insurance agent and friend
Since the "Non-partisan Citizens Group Information Bulletin" also mentioned Rick
Storrs, I decided to mention the question posed about his candidacy as well I called Mr Storrs
and he told me the city personnel ordinance cited did not apply to him Gi\en his curicni yeais of
service on the city council and his not-so recent mayoial candidacy, I took that information as an
established precedent that he could continue to serve the city as an EMT Mr Storrs did not
suggest any other wording, but I did FAX a copy of my response to him and leceived his verbal
approval as well
In addition to Hunter and Storrs, 1 also discussed my response with Managing Editoi
Marc Haddock (Barbara Christiansen was out of town at the time ) The Correction and
Apology" was then delivered just as the newspaper was distributed to American Fork residents,
some by mail and some by our newspaper carriers
Q5 Who provided information to New Utah upon which it based its conclusion that the
Non-partisan Citizens Group's political advertisement was false and misleading7
A5 Tom Hunter, Rick Storrs and William T Jacob
Q6 What were the facts upon which New Utah relied m concluding that the Non-partisan
Citizens Group's political advertisement was false and misleading
A6 Here we differ as to what is fact and what is opinion I relied on the fact that Tom
Hunter's purported designation as an "employee" is debatable and subject to legal interpretation
Such designation is not a foregone conclusion and has not been proven in court If his
"employment" were a simple fact, it would not require a one page analysis of the words used in
the city ordinance In item 2 of your analysis, for example, an "employee" is defined as one
whose employer has the power or right to control and direct the employee m the material details
of how the work is to be performed In my experience this typically means the control of where
and when the employee works, which obviously does not apply to Mr Hunter Furthermore, the
city ordinance is very explicit about other positions If the author of this ordinance had wanted it
3
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to apply to "agents" or "insurance agents," don't you think those words would have been
included? Given the same ordinance, I believe a strong case could be made that Mr. Hunter is
NOT, by definition, an "employee"- exempt or otherwise.
The statement is false because the city ordinance does not make Tom Hunter an
"employee." The ordinance does not use the words "agent" or "insurance agent," but even if
those terms could, by legal authority, be construed to mean "consultant," which is doubtful. Such
semantic maneuvering still does not make Tom Hunter a city employee in any sense of the word.
The ordinance, in this case, merely restricts the political activity of city employees AND others,
such as attorneys, consultants, volunteers, etc. However, the ordinance does not define attorneys,
consultants, volunteers, etc. as "employees." The IRS has a complicated set of rules that
distinguishes employees from independent contractors. By those rules, Tom Hunter is not, by any
stretch of the imagination, an employee. By what the term "employee" would mean to virtually
all of the audience for the Storrs/Hunter advertisement, Tom Hunter is not an employee.
Q7. What was New Utah's factual basis for concluding that the Non-partisan Citizen's
Group's political advertisement was "negative campaigning" and "hurts the entire process"?
A7. Again, we differ as to what is fact and what is opinion. However, by attempting to
mislead the residents of American Fork by stating that Tom Hunter was an employee of
American Fork City, or at least that such "employment" was beyond any doubt, the political
advertisement implied that Mr. Hunter was lacking in personal integrity and could not be trusted
to execute his public office because he would be creating his own "special privileges." Since the
advertisement was placed in the last New Utah! issue prior to the election, with no chance for
Mr. Hunter to respond in the same newspaper and prior to the election, it was apparently
intended to convince voters to vote for someone other than Mr. Hunter.
I believe that both Mr. Hunter and Mr. Storrs ran for public office with a good faith
presumption that they are in compliance with all city ordinances and personnel policies. The
political advertisement was negative because it cast Mr. Hunter and Mr. Storrs in a negative
light. It hurts our local political process because such negative attacks on a candidate's character,
whether implied or explicit, discourage other potential candidates from running for local office.
Q8. Was New Utah's "correction and apology" publication intended to represent the
responses of Mr. Hunter and Mr. Storrs to the Non-partisan Citizens Group's political
advertisement?
A8. No.
For what it's worth, I think the Non-partisan Citizens Group could have accomplished the
same thing without expecting the reader to accept your conclusions without reservation. For
example, it could have said, "According to our studied analysis of city ordinances arfd personnel
policies, we believe candidate Tom Hunter qualifies as an "employee" and, as such, should go on
leave without pay while seeking election to political office or give up his employment with the
city during his term of office."
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Such wording probably would have fostered more cooperation rather than hostility.
I still don't understand where you're going with this or what more you expect of me. We
likely will never agree on this issue, but I think we're both trying to do what is in the city's best
interest. I sincerely hope you will accept that so we can move on to more important things.
Instead of fighting each other, perhaps we should find some mutually acceptable way of
improving things at City Hall.

Brett Bezzarft
Publisher, Citizen & Taxpayer
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Randall K. Spencer (6992)
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
Counterclaim Defendants
3301 North University Ave.
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 426-8200
Fax No.: (801)426-8208

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual,
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC.,
a Utah corporation; and PHILLIPS
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID AAGARD

B. BRETT BEZZANT, an individual,
NEWT AH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation,
and DOES I THROUGH X,
Defendants

Case No. 000403530

BRETT BEZZANT, an individual;
NEWT AH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah Corporation,
Count erclaimants
vs.
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual;
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a
Utah Corporation; and PHILLIPS
MANUFACTURING CO.,
Counterclaim Defendants.

JUDGE: FRED D. HOWARD

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UTAH

I, David Aagard, having first been duly sworn, depose and state as follows:

1. At all times relevant herein I was a licensed attorney representing William T. Jacob
("Jacob").
2. On or about October 26, 2000,1 filed the initial complaint herein setting forth a claim for
libel. Such complaint had as its basis an October 28, 1999 "election notice" by defendant
Bezzant asserting Jacob to be the author of an earlier anonymous bulletin which Bezzant
declared to be false, misleading, misinformation and negative campaigning.
3. Based on my many years (more than 15) of representing Jacob, during which I met and
communicated with some of his partners, associates, employees, customers, suppliers,
competitors, and fellow citizens, I had formed an opinion of Jacob's reputation. I considered
this opinion in assessing the merit of Jacob's claim. At the time of Bezzant's notice, my
opinion was that Jacob was a longtime resident of American Fork with a reputation as a
prominent businessman, religious leader, and citizen. This reputation included a commitment
to integrity, honesty, and service. It appeared clear to me that Bezzant's notice injured and
disparaged Jacob's reputation.
4. I reviewed some of Utah libel case law, including the case of Mast v. Overson, 971 P.2d 928
(Utah Ct. App. 1998). Though the Mast case set a high threshold for libel in the political
arena, I believed it to be distinguishable from Jacob's facts. In the Mast case, the parties
-2-

traded insults and name calling in mutual political combat. The Court found the insults not
to be defamatory, at least in part, because the public generally expects such political verbal
combat to be exaggerated. In Jacob's case, there was no mutual political combat. Jacob's
anonymous bulletin questioned Storrs's and Hunter's eligibility to hold public office. Such
anonymous bulletin was neither directed to, nor had as its subject, Bezzant. Bezzant's notice
came, not from a mutual combatant, but from the editor of the local newspaper, an
unprovoked local authority. This distinguishing fact justified, in my mind, giving Bezzant's
disparaging remarks their literal defamatory meaning.
5. I also considered whether Bezzant's disparaging remarks should be protected as editorial
opinion. Because Jacob's anonymous bulletin limited itself to the technical question of
Storrs's and Hunter's eligibility for public office, the scope of an opposing editorial opinion
by a newspaper should have been limited to that subject. Bezzant's naming Jacob as the
author and his characterization of the anonymous bulletin as false, misleading,
misinformation and negative campaigning was unnecessary and beyond editorial opinion on
the subject of eligibility. I believed such excess by Bezzant evidenced an intention to injure
Jacob personally.
6. Because Jacob's damages were not easily quantifiable and were continuing to accrue, I did
not specify them in the initial complaint. As they accumulated and became more measurable
over time, I expected to specify them in discovery, in an amended complaint, or in trial.
7. At the time of filing the initial complaint, I believed Jacob's libel claim had a substantial
basis in fact and in case law.
8. I never, on behalf of Jacob or otherwise, acted to punish Bezzant for exercising his first
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amendment rights. My purpose was to repair Jacob's damaged reputation and to determine
Bezzant's motivation for disparaging Jacob. I believe consideration of my actions evidence
an attempt to accomplish this purpose with a minimum of expense to Jacob and Bezzant. I
did not file the complaint until the eve of the statute of limitations in order to allow Jacob the
maximum amount of time to meet and communicate with Bezzant in an effort to settle. After
Mr. Hunt's appearance as Bezzant's attorney, I met with Mr. Hunt and proposed a stay of
prosecution of the case in order to explore settlement. I also informed Mr. Hunt of my
deteriorating health and my intention to withdraw if settlement was not successful. Over the
following approximate three months I proposed and discussed a number of formats for
settlement with Mr. Hunt. I believe that progress was being made and settlement was possible
when Mr. Hunt unilaterally terminated the stay and demanded discovery. I then withdrew as
Jacob's counsel.
Dated this /Y^day of February, 2005.

David (Aagard
Affiant
Sworn to and subscribed before me this / y r/ * day of February, 2005

i

&

Notary Public
JANEANE JACOB
1100 North 100 East
American Fork, UT 84003
My Commission Expires
November 10,2007
State of Utah

Notary^rublic
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Randall K. Spencer (6992)
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
Counterclaim Defendants
3301 North University Ave.
Provo,Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 426-8200
Fax No.: (801) 426-8208

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
AFFIDAVIT OF R. BRENT STEPHENS
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual,
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC.,
a Utah corporation; and PHILLIPS
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
B. BRETT BEZZANT, an individual,
NEWT AH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation,
and DOES I THROUGH X,
Defendants.
BRETT BEZZANT, an individual;
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah Corporation,
Counterclaimants
vs.
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual;
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a
Utah Corporation; and PHILLIPS
MANUFACTURING CO.,
Counterclaim Defendants.

Case No. 000403530

JUDGE: FRED D. HOWARD

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UTAH

I, R. Brent Stephens, after being duly sworn, depose and state as follows:
1.

I was contacted towards the end of October of 2004 by Mr. Spencer requesting me

to provide an affidavit in this matter. In view of the fact that my law firm has withdrawn from
the case pursuant to motion and order, I informed Mr. Spencer that I would provide information
pursuant to service of a subpoena for deposition or trial.
2.

Mr. Spencer contacted me during the last week of January, 2005 and stated that

the Court denied his request to take my deposition in connection with pending motions for
summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(f) and requested that I provide this affidavit in view of
the fact that a deposition was not possible in connection with resisting the pending motions. In
light of the fact that I have a duty to my clients in connection with this matter to avoid possible
further prejudice to the client based on my firm's withdrawal, I have agreed to provide this
affidavit to fulfill duties and responsibilities under the rules of professional conduct and to
promote the fair and efficient administration of justice.
3.

I was counsel for Plaintiffs in the above entitled matter from July 9, 2001 until

November 6, 2003 when my law firm's motion to withdraw as counsel was granted by the Court
4.

I did not represent Plaintiffs in this matter at the time the original Complaint was

filed. Upon retention I reviewed the original Complaint and the Rule 26 (a) (1) supporting
documents and found it to state a claim for relief and that my review of the facts supported each
and every allegation contained therein.
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5.

I was counsel of record at the time of the filing of the Amended Complaint.

6.

In my 33 years of practice, I cannot remember a single case where I engaged in a

more exhaustive Rule 11 type investigation prior to filing the Amended Complaint. Between my
client and myself, we relied upon volumes of supporting documents and cited facts and/or legal
authority in support of every single paragraph in the Amended Complaint. After preparation of
the Amended Complaint, I actually noted next to each paragraph the support for each fact and
law asserted.
7.

I spent hours conducting research on Westlaw gathering legal support for the

Amended Complaint and the theories of liability contained therein.
8.

Upon submitting the Amended Complaint to defense counsel, they never

informed me that it watTanted sanctions equivalent to Rule 11 and stipulated to its filing on June
12, 2002. Throughout the course of my representation of Mr. Jacob and the other Plaintiffs,
Defense counsel never stated or implied that the Plaintiffs claims were so lacking in merit that
they violated Rule 11, were otherwise without merit, or were interposed for an improper
puipose.
9.

After the filing of the original Complaint, David Aagard, counsel previous to me,

was required to withdraw because Defendants ended settlement negotiations, and requested
responses to discovery. As I understand and based on a review of the correspondence, Mr.
Aagard had previously informed defendants' counsel that if the action did not settle during those
negotiations, he would be required to withdraw because of his health. Mr. Aagard had been
diagnosed as having Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (Lou Gehrig's Disease).
10.

On March 22, 2001, prior to Mr. Aagard's withdrawal and even prior to the filing
-3-

r

of an attorney's planning meeting report, Defendants initiated disco very by serving
comprehensive disco very requests on Plaintiff which included detailed interrogatories and
requests for production. Based on my experience, such conduct is not consistent with litigation
of a complaint now alleged to be so lacking in merit to justify sanctions.
11.

After I appeared as counsel, the parties exchanged Rule 26(a) material, and at

least five depositions were taken; subsequently, the Amended Complaint was filed on June 12,
2002. Furthermore, the depositions revealed facts which, if believed, supported significant and
meritorious claims regarding the conduct of American Fork city officials which violated civil
rights of plaintiffs and others under color of law.
12.

After I filed the Amended Complaint on June 12, 2002 pursuant to stipulation of

opposing counsel, Defendants asserted a counterclaim pursuant to U.C.A. §78-58-105 which is
known as the "anti-SLAPP" statute, and similar to the original Answer, asserted that Plaintiffs
claims were brought in bad faith and lacked merit among other averments.
13.

Prior to the filing of the Amended Complaint, I did submit interrogatories and

requests for production to Defendants on or about the 25th of July, 2001. Interrogatory 8 (u) &
(v) specifically stated: "Identify all facts in your Answer relating to or supporting your allegation:
...(u) in the TWENTY-SIXTH DEFENSE of your Answer that 'plaintiffs5 claims are without
merit and not brought or asserted in good faith' [and] (v) in the TWENTY-SEVENTH
DEFENSE of your Answer that 'plaintiffs lawsuit is without merit and is not brought or asserted
in good faith, but instead is a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP)V' In
submitting these interrogatories, I wanted to know if the bad faith affirmative defenses were
based on any information of which I was not aware and should further examine. Furthermore, I
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submitted requests for production numbers 41 & 42 asking for all documents supporting the
affirmative defenses 26 & 27 asserting bad faith lack of merit. See Answer to original
Complaint filed on March 2, 2001; Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories, Requests for
Admissions, and Requests for Production of Documents to Defendant submitted on July 25, 2001
and attached as Exhibit 1 hereto.
14.

On December 10, 2001, Defendants submitted their responses to my discovery

requests regarding their twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh affirmative defenses which assert bad
faith and lack of merit. The defendants did not provide any facts supporting those defenses.
The response merely referred to the conclusory allegations of the affirmative defense contained
in their Answer and quoted the statute. Finally, Defendants stated, "Discovery is continuing
and Newtah anticipates the discovery of additional facts supporting these defenses." No further
facts were brought to my attention prior to the counterclaim being filed. See Defendants'
Response to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions, and Requests for
Production of Documents submitted on December 10, 2001 and attached as Exhibit 2 hereto.
15.

Defendants' counterclaim pursuant to U.C.A. §78-58-105 as I understood

it after review, never facially asserted that the claims for defamation and false light were
"without a substantial basis in fact and law and not supported by a substantial argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." U.C.A. §78-58-105(a).
16.

On August 19, 2002,1 filed a petition to remove the matter to federal court in light

of the pending claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, and my belief that Defendants were utilizing
the state SLAPP statute in a manner completely unintended and unwarranted under existing law.
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17.

I detailed in the Amended Complaint plaintiffs' factually supported claim that

Defendant Bezzant was an unwilling instrumentality of certain defendants to intentionally chill
first and fourteenth amendment freedoms of the Plaintiffs I represent.
18.

In light of the information learned largely through the depositions in this matter,

on October 2, 2002,1 filed a Federal class action on behalf of a number of citizens of American
Fork against American Fork City alleging violations of civil rights of a class defined in the
Amended Complaint.
19.

On October 10, 2002,1 moved to consolidate this case with the Federal Lawsuit

because the cases clearly met the threshold test for consolidation under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure if both cases had remained in federal court.
20.

On January 16, 2003, Judge Ted Stewart granted Defendants' Motion to Remand

the case back to the State Court and specifically denied Defendants' request for attorney fees
finding that we were seeking a good faith extension of existing law regarding removal.
21.

There was significant delay in the transferring of files from the Federal Court to

this Court. According the Court record, it was not until August 15, 2003 that the transfer
occurred.
22.

On October 24, 2003,1 filed a Motion to Stay or, in the Alternative, to Dismiss

this Action Without Prejudice. This motion was based upon my conclusion that the proper
forum for the major part of the case was in federal court in that the federal claims were more
broad than the defamation claim and the remedial relief sought affected the entire relationship
between the governmental officials, police force and the citizens of American Fork. The relief
sought in the federal class action would also overlap the relief being sought in the Amended
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Complaint and I did not want the state court action to go to final judgment that could prejudice
the class in the federal action. While the American Fork City Defendants were willing to dismiss
this matter (and subsequently were dismissed from the case shortly after I withdrew) the Bezzant
Defendants refused after I offered to dismiss them without prejudice.
23.

On November 6, 2003, my law firm withdrew as counsel in this matter over the

clients' objections. I argued on behalf of the client in connection with the motion.
22.

I hereby attest that all allegations of the amended complaint were made in good
faith

after detailed due diligence. I have thirty three years of experience litigating cases in state and
federal court and I do not recall a single instance of a motion ever being filed asserting bad faith
on any submission I signed under Rule 11.
Dated this M day of February, 2005.

J^. Brent Stephens
Affiant
Sworn to and subscribed before me this / 7 ^ d a y of February, 2005.

Notary pUbiic ~"
JANEANE JACOB
1100 North 100 East
e
M ? a n F 0 r k ' U T 84003
My Commission Expires
November 10,2007
State of Utah

1 N ^ f a r v Public
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Randall K. Spencer (6992)
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
Counterclaim Defendants
3301 North University Ave.
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 426-8200
Fax No.: (801)426-8208

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM T. JACOB
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual,
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC.,
a Utah corporation; and PHILLIPS
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
B. BRETT BEZZANT, an individual,
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation,
and DOES I THROUGH X,
Defendants
BRETT BEZZANT, an individual;
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah Corporation,
Counterclaimants
vs.
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual;
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a
Utah Corporation; and PHILLIPS
MANUFACTURING CO.,
Counterclaim Defendants.

Case No. 000403530

JUDGE: FRED D. HOWARD

STATE OF UTAH:
COUNTY OF UTAH
WILLIAM T. JACOB, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
1. I am a citizen of American Fork City, over the age of 18, and have personal knowledge
concerning the facts set forth herein.
2. On October 26, 1999, pursuant to a long standing agreement of anonymity and a
"protected source" agreement, I delivered approximately 6,500 preprinted copies of a
"Nonpartisan Citizens Group Information Bulletin" ("Bulletin") to Tom Hollingsworth,
advertising manager for Brett Bezzant and Newtah, Inc. ("Original Defendants"), to be
distributed as an insert in the Citizen. I also delivered a check in the amount of $162.50 as
advance payment in full.
3. I am not the author the Bulletin, and my name was not listed anywhere therein.
4. On October 28, 1999, Bezzant published an "Urgent Election Notice" on the Citizen
worldwide web site, wherein Bezzant falsely identified me as the author of the Bulletin and
further claimed that it contained false and misleading information and misinformation, thereby
calling me a liar and exposing me to public hatred, contempt and ridicule. The so-called "Urgent
Election Notice" was not on the opinion page of the web site; rather, it was accessible only via an
icon entitled, "Election 99". Bezzant also published a door knob style flyer headlined,
"Correction and Apology to City Council Candidate Tom Hunter" which contained the same
substantive content as the "Urgent Election Notice" (collectively, "Election Notices") and on
October 29, 1999, it was distributed by hand-delivery and United States mail to citizens of
American Fork.
5. I never gave Bezzant my permission to reveal my identity in association with the

Bulletin. Nor did Bezzant contact me prior to publication of the Election Notices to ascertain the
truth of his allegations against me. Rather, he recklessly relied upon information from Tom
Hunter and Ricky Storrs, and assumed facts that were not true.
6. During the election campaign of 1999, there was very little media coverage or
publicity regarding Tom Hunter's and Ricky Storrs's conflicts of interest caused by their exempt
employee status with American Fork City ("City") to seek and hold political office.
7. I have studied American Fork City ordinances that are applicable to the underlying
dispute in this case. I am familiar with the provisions therein which expressly state that exempt
employees are prohibited from seeking and holding political office for the American Fork City
Council.
8. I was present during a deposition when Ricky Storrs testified that he is classified as an
exempt employee. I was also present when Tom Hunter, Mayor Ted Barratt, and Kevin Bennett
testified that Tom Hunter is an employee benefit consultant to the City. Consultants to the City
are expressly classified as exempt employees under City Ordinance #92-05-20. Tom Hunter also
testified that he holds a pecuniary interest in the contract between the City and the insurance
provider because he receives commissions from the insurance provider. Hunter testified that he
was aware that no member, officer, or employee of the City shall have any interest, direct or
indirect, in any contract or the proceeds thereof between the City and any provider.
9. I was present during deposition testimony when Tom Hunter testified that in response
to the Bulletin, he contacted Bezzant and demanded that Bezzant publish a preprinted
"retraction" approved by Hunter's attorney. Otherwise, Hunter threatened Bezzant that he would
discontinue his newspaper advertising business with the Citizen and sue both Bezzant and me.
Furthermore, I did receive a letter from Hunter's attorney threatening to immediately take action

and file a lawsuit against me, attached hereto as EXHIBIT "A".
10. Prior to the Original Defendants' recent Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings,
Bezzants' publications that attacked me personally have been referred to only as a "retraction",
an "Urgent Election Notice", or a "Correction and Apology", both in the original publications
and in the subsequent answers and responses to disco very requests. They were never identified
as "editorials", nor was the claim ever made that they were merely opinion. As such, the public
perceived them as formal, authoritative, factual "Election Notices", "Apologies", and
"Corrections" in response to my alleged "misinfoiination", which is precisely how they were
designed to be perceived. They were not identified or perceived as mere opinion and
commentary.
11. Even if the Election Notices had been identified and published as mere editorial
opinion, which they were not, Bezzant's malicious personal attack and unauthorized use of my
name as a "protected source" still exposed me to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule and is still
defamatory.
12. Although Bezzant now claims that he felt a "civic obligation" to print the Election
Notices, I know from my conversations with Bezzant that what he really felt was fear that at least
Tom Hunter would sue him and discontinue advertising in the Citizen. Bezzant told me that he
had to make a choice of being sued by Hunter or being sued by me. Bezzant also said that
Hunter was a valued business client of the Citizen, as well as his insurance agent and friend.
13. Moreover, contrary to Bezzant's recent claim made in hindsight that the content of
the Election Notices reflected only his opinion, Bezzant admits that he in fact published the
Election Notices only upon the review and express approval of Tom Hunter and Ricky Storrs.
14. My family and I were very upset and embarrassed when Bezzant publicly and falsely

accused me of printing false and misleading misinformation and of being a liar. Both my
personal and professional reputation have been damaged as a result of the publication of the
Election Notices, which were designed as an artifice to single me out and expose me to public
hatred, contempt, and ridicule.
15. I highly value my constitutional rights of freedom of speech and the press, and my
right to privacy. I also cherish the rights of all concerned citizens to be actively involved in and
contribute to their communities. I have no desire to preclude anyone else from exercising these
same rights or from participating in their communities within appropriate constitutional
parameters.
16. However, I do not believe that citizens who speak out on community issues should be
personally attacked and falsely labeled a liar for doing so, particularly at the behest of public
officials/candidates and via malicious, false and defamatory publications that are mis-perceived
as authoritative and objective fact, and thus are well beyond the constitutional parameters of fair
comment.
17. I filed this action with no desire or motivation to chill or inhibit others' constitutional
rights, which rights I value. Rather, I filed this action because I was personally, publicly and
unjustifiably attacked in an egregious and malicious manner designed to single me out and
expose me to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule. The harm that I have suffered as a result is
real and not frivolous. Furthermore, there obviously has been no chilling effect caused by the
filing of my Complaint as Original Defendants continue to publish critical and libelous
statements about me and my associates. See, ''American Fork May Want to Consider . . ." by
Dave Robinson, American Fork Citizen, October 23, 2003, attached as EXHIBIT CCB".
18.1 have made numerous good-faith, albeit unsuccessful, attempts to resolve my dispute

with Bezzant in a fair and reasonable manner and without court intervention. However, based
upon my personal knowledge of the facts in this case, I know that Bezzant has colluded with and
permitted himself to be manipulated by public officials in their collective efforts to punish me for
my community involvement as a citizen of American Fork. Further and contrary to his claims,
Bezzant has never requested that I dismiss this action. Indeed, I have read Bezzant's Affidavit
and most of his allegations are not true.
19. Based upon my personal knowledge of the facts underlying this action, my role as a
concerned citizen of American Fork, my participation in the distribution of the anonymous
Bulletin, and my communications with Bezzant subsequent to publication of the Election
Notices, I believe that the primary purpose of the Election Notices, the Counterclaim and the
consequent Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings/ Summary Judgment is to prevent, interfere
with, and/or to chill my participation and the participation of other concerned citizens in the
process of government, including the right to engage in the legitimate public debate regarding
various community issues in American Fork City.
20. As a result of Bezzant's malicious and defamatory publication and subsequent and
related conduct, including but not limited to his frivolous and groundless anti-SLAPP
Counterclaim and Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Commercial Properties, Inc., Phillips
Manufacturing Company, Inc., and I have incurred substantial attorneys' fees, costs, and
expenses.
//
//
//
//

Dated this

(2fciay of February, 2005.
^Ulia^T. Jacob / ^
Affiant

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 1 / day of Febraary, 2005

"Notary
Notary Public
My Commission Expires: Q^yjO

I / 0 ~"7

^/

:•*£ f.^-^f.v-roO/'

^

Randall K. Spencer (6992)
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
Counterclaim Defendants
3301 North University Ave.
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 426-8200
Fax No.: (801)426-8208

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual,
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC.,
a Utah corporation; and PHILLIPS
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
B. BRETT BEZZANT, an individual,
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah coiporation,
and DOES I THROUGH X,
Defendants.

AFFIDAVIT OF RANDALL K.
SPENCER

Case No. 000403530

JUDGE: FRED D. HOWARD
BRETT BEZZANT, an individual;
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah Corporation,
Counterclaimants
vs.

WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual;
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a
Utah Corporation; and PHILLIPS
MANUFACTURING CO.,
Counterclaim Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UTAH
I, Randall K. Spencer, depose and state as follows:
1.

I am currently counsel for William T. Jacob and the other Plaintiffs and Counterclaim
defendants in the above entitled matter.

2.

I was contacted in November of 2003 by Mr. Jacob and was requested to represent him
and the other Plaintiffs.

3.

Prior to entering an appearance, I reviewed the amended Complaint and hundreds of
pages of documents provided to be by Mr. Jacob.

4.

I also reviewed the elements of the causes of action, and I was very satisfied that the
claims were meritorious pursuant to a Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
standard.

5.

I subsequently signed and submitted Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Judgment
on the Pleadings and/or Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum in Support
of Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim among other pleadings.

6.

I am confident that every pleading that has been submitted in this case complies with the
standards of Rule 11 and the essentially equivalent language of U.C.A. §78-58-105
(2001).

7.

I have spent many hours working with my clients in this matter, and am confident that no
improper motives have existed in the pursuit of this litigation.

8.

In preparing the Memorandum in Opposition to Judgment on the Pleadings and/or
Summary Judgment, Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim
among other pleadings, I believed then, and still believe now that the arguments were not

only compliant with Rule 11, but were in fact meritorious such that we should have
prevailed at least for puiposes of the gatekeeping functions of summary dispositions.
9.

It is my further belief that Defendants' motion for sanctions of attorney fees and costs
against me and my client for advancing this claim without substantial basis in fact and
law and without a substantial argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law is simply wrong.

Dated this t

day of February, 2005.

idall K. Spencer
Affiant

Sworn to and subscribed before me this \ 1

day of February, 2005.

Notary Public I
My Commission Expires: ' ^ / ( 3 i / Q "7

0

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the _J [_ day of fl^rof the foregoing to the following:
Jeffrey J. Hunt, Esq.
Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Fax: 801-532-7840
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual;
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah
corporation; and PHILLIPS
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC, a
Utah corporation,
Plaintiffs,

RULING RE: PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION TO RECONSIDER

Case # 000403530
Judge Fred D. Howard
Division 5

vs.
B. BRETT BEZZANT, an individual,
NEWT AH, INC, dba AMERICAN FORK
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation,
and DOES I THROUGH X,
Defendants.
BRETT BEZZANT, an individual; NEWTAH,
INC, dba AMERICAN FORK CITIZEN
NEW UTAH, a Utah Corporation,
Counterclaimants,
vs.
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual;
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC, a Utah
Corporation; and PHILLIPS
MANUFACTURING C O ,
Counterclaim Defendants.
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs' submission of & Motion to Reconsider
Court }s Rulings on Summary Judgment and/or Judgment on the Pleadings and Summary Judgment

on Defendants' Counterclaim. The Court, having reviewed the file and being fully advised in the
premises, hereby issues the following ruling.
RULING
The Court notes that Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Reconsider with an accompanying
memorandum on October 7, 2005. On October 27, 2005, Defendants filed a Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion. Plaintiffs filed a Response on November 8,2005 and Defendants
filed a Request to Submit for Decision on November 17,2005. The Court notes that Plaintiffs have
requested a hearing on the issue of reconsideration. The Court declines to grant this request due to
the fact that the Court is well familiar with the issues and the facts of this case. The Court has
reviewed its notes and previous Ruling on this issue and the parties' memoranda and does not
consider a hearing to be necessary in order to decide the issues before the Court.
Plaintiffs assert that the Court should reconsider its Ruling of September 16,2005 because
the Court ruled on Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment prior to considering Plaintiffs'
supplemental authority and that the law cited by Plaintiffs is dispositive and demonstrates that the
anti-SLAPP Act does not apply to the facts of the present case. Defendants argue that a Motion to
Reconsider is inappropriate and not contemplated by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants
argue that Plaintiffs have not offered any new facts, new law, or new argument that has not already
been exhaustively considered.
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The Court first notes that Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider Court's Rulings is inappropriate
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the simple reason that no such motion exists. The Utah
Supreme Court has long held a motion for reconsideration to be improper. Utah State Employees
Credit Union v. Riding, 469 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1970) ("We are unaware of any such motion under our
rules"). The Utah Supreme Court has also declared that u a motion to reconsider the final judgment
of the district court [is] a motion which is not provided for under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
and which has never been recognized as a proper motion in this state. Wisden v. Bangerter et al, 893
P.2d 1057, 1058 (Utah 1995). In order to prevent litigants from endlessly requesting a court to
reverse itself, the Utah Supreme Court does not allow such a motion. In the interest of judicial
economy and finality, the Utah Supreme Court has held that a motion to reconsider is not a valid
motion. Drury v. Lunceford, 415 P.2d 662 (Utah 1966).
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a motion for reconsideration after a summary
judgment ruling can be considered a motion for a new trial under Rule 59. Watkins & Campbell v.
Foa & Sons, 808 P.2d 1061,1064 (Utah 1991). In order for the motion to be granted, however, the
movant must demonstrate that one of the requirements for a new trial are met, which are as follows:
(1) irregularity in the proceedings of the court, (2) misconduct of the jury, (3) accident or surprise,
(4) newly discovered evidence, (5) excessive or inadequate damages, (6) insufficiency of the
evidence, or (7) error in law.
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Plaintiffs have failed to produce evidence that would satisfy any of the above requirements
to justify the Court granting a new trial. The Court respectfully disagrees with the arguments of
Plaintiffs in their Motion to Reconsider, which issues and arguments are the same as previously
considered. As Defendants note in their Opposition Memorandum, the entire basis of Plaintiffs'
reconsideration motion was discussed at oral argument and directly rejected by this Court in its
Ruling of September 16, 2005. In a motion for a new trial, the movant cannot simply reiterate the
same arguments that failed previously and expect the Court to rule in its favor. The Court is
unpersuaded to change its analysis or ruling. Having reached such conclusion, the Court respectfully
denies Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider.
Dated this

day of January, 2006.

BY THE COURT:
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I certify that true copies of the foregoing Ruling were delivered on the
to the following in the manner indicated, to wit:
Ok^uavy 'ZooC

t^

day of

by U.S. first class mail
Counsel for Plaintiffs:
Randall K. Spencer
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC
3301 North University Ave.
Provo, Utah 84604
Counsel for Defendants:
Jeffrey J. Hunt
David C. Reymann
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Deputy Court Clerk
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